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gest various analysis and mining techniques to solve problems related to diffusive and infection
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Chapter 1: Introduction
With the proliferation of rich data-sets from various scientific fields such as economics, social
science, finance, ecology, biology and computer science, there is now much ongoing research to
analyze such data sets. Moreover, because it is possible to get fine and abundant historical and
(or) interaction data from various online social network services, the analysis of diffusive and in-
fection phenomenon has been extensively studied and social (information) network analysis and
mining techniques have become closely intertwined with the analysis of diffusive and infection
phenomena. Moreover, as graph data models can naturally express the relationships and interac-
tions among data elements, graph models have been widely used for solving various problems in
diverse areas.
In this thesis, we suggest various analysis and mining techniques to solve problems related
to diffusive and infection phenomena over social (information) networks built from various data-
sets in diverse areas. In short, we focus on developing data mining techniques for social influence
analysis to quantify the relative importance of vertices in networks, network simplification to
scale up social analysis techniques for very large networks, social network database for networks
whose edges have space, time and uncertainty information, malware infection prediction to predict
the volume of malware infections in each country and systematic banking crises prediction over
countries. The short descriptions of the contributions are below.
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Social Influence Analysis. Influence analysis in social networks has received considerable at-
tention in recent years due to its wide range of applications, e.g viral marketing, personalized
recommendation, link prediction and ranking of feeds. Centrality of a vertex as a measure of its
relative importance within a graph is a fundamental concept in network analysis. It has been ex-
tensively studied and widely used for social network influence analysis. In Chapter 2, we develop
two new centrality measures, Diffusion Centrality and Covertness Centrality for different analysis
purposes.
In different areas including economics, epidemiology, physics, sociology and computer
science, there has been much research on analyzing how various diffusive properties of vertices
spread through the networks and various diffusion models have been developed. However, existing
centrality measures mainly depend on the structural properties of networks and do not explicitly
consider diffusion processes, how properties diffuse through social networks. They also do no
consider the semantical properties of nodes, and the nature of the links between them. Therefore,
in Chapter 2.1, we suggest Diffusion Centrality to quantify the influence of vertices in social net-
works with respect to a given diffusion model. We then develop a general framework which con-
sists of syntax/semantics to express diffusion models and suggest a hypergraph-based algorithm,
HyperDC, to compute diffusion centrality efficiently with optimizations in the social information
networks for a given diffusion model.
It has been known for some time that in terror networks, money laundering networks, and
criminal networks, important players want to stay off the radar and to blend into the crowd. But
they hold sufficient ability to communicate with or to diffuse information to the rest of their net-
work. In order to capture these, Chapter 2.2 proposes Covertness Centrality. Covertness Centrality
measures how common a vertex is w.r.t. a set of centrality measures (common-ness) and how well
the vertex can communicate with a user-specified set of vertices. We first propose probabilistic
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models to measure common-ness of a vertex and then, define Covertness Centrality of a vertex as
a linear combination of common-ness and the communication ability of the vertex.
Network Simplification. In very large networks, it would be not feasible to apply network analy-
sis techniques directly and exactly.Because of this, several network simplification techniques have
been developed in order to analyze huge social networks. But there are no network simplification
techniques to capture smaller equivalent representation of the network that preserves its diffu-
sion and infection characteristics with considering not only structural aspects but also semantic
aspects of social networks. So In Chapter 3 we suggest two network simplification techniques,
COARSENET and Coarsened Back and Forth (CBAF).
In Chapter 3.1, we first formulate a novel Graph Coarsening Problem to find a succinct
representation of any graph while preserving key characteristics for diffusion processes on that
graph. We then provide a fast and effective near-linear-time (in nodes and edges) algorithm,
COARSENET and show how our method can help in diverse applications like influence maxi-
mization and detecting patterns of propagation at the level of automatically created groups on
real cascade data. In Chapter 3.2, we develop another network simplification technique which is
extended from COARSENET to support various diffusion models explicitly and semantic aspects
of social networks. Then, we suggest CBAF algorithm to find top-k vertices having the highest
diffusion centrality in very large social information networks approximately and efficiently.
Spatio-Temporal Uncertain Network. In prior social network analysis research, an edge ex-
presses the relationship or the interaction between two vertices with labels. However, due to the
widespread adoption of location-sensing mobile devices, people can share information about their
geographic position with others easily via online social network services. As a consequence, ser-
vice providers have access to the data on online relations and interactions with spatial and temporal
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information among users. Many companies already provide services taking into account spatial
and temporal information with social networks. There are also numerous ongoing efforts to infer
spatial, temporal and other properties of social networks. The spatial, temporal and uncertainty
information allow us to build reliable social network models and the models can help us enrich
network analysis techniques. Moreover, it is obvious that diffusive and infection phenomena could
be (very) different according to different spatio-temporal situations. But the framework to express
social networks whose edges have space, time and uncertainty information has not been studied
yet. So, in Chapter 4, we propose a new network model, STUN (Spatio-Temporal Uncertain Net-
works), to formally define social networks whose edges can be characterized with uncertainty,
space, and time information. We then develop an index structure to store the networks and to
retrieve graph patterns efficiently with space, time, and uncertainty constraints over the networks.
We also introduce STUN ranking queries which attempt to identify important nodes in a STUN
network, extending the well-known PageRank algorithm.
In the previous techniques suggested in this thesis, we assume that diffusion models are
given. In this thesis, we also suggest how diffusion models can be built for capturing the diffusion
and infection process of specific diffusive and infection phenomenon from infection history data.
Our research does not suggest a general framework to build diffusion models for various datasets,
because the infection properties (features) of diffusive and infection phenomenon would be (very)
different for different application domains. For example, the diffusion and infection features of
epidemic diseases would be very different from the diffusion process of information and rumors.
In our research, we show how social network analysis techniques can be used for the analysis
of diffusive and infection phenomenon and how the analyzed features can be used for building
diffusion and infection models to predict the infections of diffusive objects. We specifically study
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the diffusion process and infection (diffusion) phenomenon of two different data sets.
Malware Infection and Diffusion prediction model. Given a history of detected malware attacks,
can we predict the number of malware infections in a country? Can we do this for different mal-
ware and countries? This is an important question which has numerous implications for cyber se-
curity, right from designing better anti-virus software, to designing and deloying targeted patches
to more accurately measuring the economic impact of breaches. This problem is compounded by
the fact that, as externals, we can only detect a fraction of actual malware infections. In Chapter 5,
we address this problem using data from Symantec covering more than 1.4 million hosts and 50
malware spread across 2 years and multiple countries. We first carefully design domain-based
features from both malware and machine-hosts perspectives. Secondly, inspired by epidemiolog-
ical and information diffusion models, we design a novel temporal non-linear model for malware
spread and detection. Finally we present ESM, an ensemble-based approach which combines both
these methods to construct a more accurate algorithm. Using extensive experiments spanning mul-
tiple malware and countries, we show that ESM can effectively predict malware infection ratios
over time (both the actual number and trend) and the performance is stable and robust even when
the number of detected infections is low.
Systematic Banking Crises (infection) prediction model. The global financial crisis has reignited
interest in crisis prediction models. It has also raised the question whether financial interconnect-
edness can serve as an early warning indicator of crises. In Chapter 6, first we suggest network
indicators that measure the connectedness among countries in the global network of financial
linkages. The indicators can be obtained by applying social network analysis techniques and can
capture the infection (diffusion) properties of crises over countries implicitly and relatively. Sec-
ond, we suggest a infection prediction model to predict which countries will experience systemic
5
banking crises with the indicators. We then examine the ability of connectedness in the global
network of financial linkages to predict systemic banking crises during 1978-2010 year period.
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Chapter 2: Social Influence Analysis
Influence analysis in social networks has received considerable attention in recent years due to
its wide range of applications, e.g viral marketing, personalized recommendation, link prediction
and ranking of feeds. Various centrality measures have been used for social influence analysis.
However, there is no centrality measure to consider the infection (propagation) flow of diffusive
properties directly and explicitly in various diffusive and infection phenomenon over networks.
No centrality measure also exists to capture the features of important players who want to hide
in a crowd and to have sufficient communication ability with others in crime social networks. In
Chapter 2, we suggest two new centrality measures, Diffusion Centrality and Covertness Cen-
trality for them. Diffusion Centrality is to measure the relative influence of a vertex in a social
information network with considering explicitly the diffusion process of a given diffusion model
and proposed in Section 2.1. Covertness Centrality quantifies the abilities of a vertex, how well
the vertex can be hidden in crowds and communicate with others. We develop it in Section 2.2.
2.1 Diffusion Centrality
2.1.1 Introduction
An increasingly important problem in social networks (SNs) is that of assigning a ‘centrality”
value to vertices reflecting their importance within the SN. Well-known measures such as degree
centrality [83, 163], betweenness centrality [37, 82], PageRank [?], closeness centrality [177, 21],
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and eigenvector centrality [36] only take the structure of the network into account—they do not
differentiate between vertices that are central w.r.t. spreading one topic or meme or sentiment vs.
spreading another. A vertex that is important in spreading awareness of a mobile phone program
may be very unimportant in spreading information about a restaurant. Likewise, most past work
assumes that there is no information about properties of the vertices/edges or edge weights—but in
modern social networks, at least some self-declared properties exist and, in many cases, analysis
of tweets and posts can provide further information. These omissions can cause serious problems
as shown in the following toy example.
Example 2.1.1 (HIV). Figure 2.1 shows four people a, b, c, d, where b has HIV. Solid edges denote
sexual relationships, while dashed edges denote friend relationships (these edges are undirected
in this example, i.e. sexual partners and friends are considered symmetric relationships). Edge










]A small HIV social network. Shaded vertices denote people with HIV. Solid edges denote sexual
relationships, dashed edges denote friend relationships.
The table below shows the centrality of a, b, c, d w.r.t. various centrality measures1.
Intuitively, the only person in this network capable of spreading HIV is b. However, b has
the lowest centrality according to all five centrality measures mentioned above.
Past centrality measures ignore how properties (e.g., HIV in the above example) diffuse
1 The classical definitions of the centrality measures are used as opposed to their weighted versions.
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Centrality Measure a b c d
Degree 1 0.33 0.66 0.66
Betweenness 2 0 0 0
PageRank 0.367 0.141 0.246 0.246
Closeness 0.33 0.2 0.25 0.25
Eigenvector 0.375 0.125 0.25 0.25
through the SN, solely focusing on the structure of the network. We can readily think of networks
(e.g., Twitter) where person A has the highest centrality in terms of spread of support for Repub-
licans, while person B is the central player in terms of spread of support for conserving gorillas.
The network in both cases is the same (Twitter), but the centrality of vertices should be measured
both by structural graph properties and by a vertex’s ability to diffuse a given property. In Sec-
tion 2.1, we propose the novel notion of diffusion centrality that takes an SN, a diffusive property
p, and a previously learned diffusion model Π for p, and defines centrality of vertices based on
these inputs. We do not provide algorithms to automatically learn diffusion models—interested
readers may find one such algorithm in [41].
In Section 2.1, we also show how diffusion centrality can be used to achieve significantly
higher spread of a diffusive property p by using diffusion models for p rather than classical cen-
trality measures. We further show that this can be done for most diffusion models we have seen
in the literature. Moreover, this can often be done in time comparable to that of Pagerank. Last
but not least, our methods are shown to scale to social networks with over 2M vertices and 20M
edges.
Section 2.1 is organized as follows.
• We define Diffusion Centrality (DC) in Section 2.1.3 to quantify the influence of vertices in
a social network with respect to (i) a given diffusion model which explains how a diffusive
9
property is spreading, (ii) the structural properties and (iii) the semantic properties of the
network. Diffusion models are expressed via Generalized Annotated (logic) Programs or
GAPs [131] that were previously shown [184] to express most diffusion models studied in
the literature, including a variety of cascade models, tipping models, disease spread models,
and homophilic models.
• Section 2.1.4 proposes a general ‘hypergraph fixed point algorithm” (HyperLFP) to effi-
ciently compute the likelihood that an arbitrary vertex has certain properties according to
the GAP diffusion model. We also define novel classes of GAPs (such as p-monotone and
p-dwindling), together with a novel suite of network filtering methods to develop the Hy-
perDC algorithm. These optimization significantly reduce the time required to compute the
expected spread of p through the network w.r.t. a diffusion model Π.
• Section 2.1.5 describes extensive experiments comparing DC with classical centrality mea-
sures in terms of both runtime and the “spread” generated by central vertices. Experimental
results on multiple real-world social networks and widely used diffusion models in the liter-
ature show that when the top-k vertices selected by diffusion centrality are given property p
(e.g., an incentive to spread good news about a mobile phone plan or a political candidate),
they usually achieve much bigger spreads (i.e., expected number of vertices in the network
having property p) than when these top-k vertices are selected by classical centrality mea-
sures. This maximization of spread w.r.t. a wide variety of diffusion models is the main
goal of this paper. Moreover, the experiments show that HyperDC is much faster than be-
tweenness and closeness centrality—its runtime is often similar to PageRank, eigenvector,
and degree centrality.
In Section Ap.1.4, we summarize all the notations used in Section 2.1.
10
2.1.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we formally define social networks (SNs), recall generalized annotated programs
(GAPs) from [131], and show how diffusion models can be expressed with GAPs.
2.1.2.1 Social Networks
We assume the existence of a set VP of unary predicate symbols (to capture properties of vertices
in a social network), called vertex predicate symbols (or properties), and a set EP of binary predi-
cate symbols (intended to capture relationships between vertices in a social network), called edge
predicate symbols.
Definition 1 (Social Network). A social network (SN) is a tuple (V,E,VL, ω) where:
1. V is a finite set of vertices;
2. E ⊆ V × V × EP is a finite set of (labeled) edges;
3. VL : V → 2VP assigns a set of properties to each vertex;
4. ω : E → (0, 1] assigns a weight to each edge.
Intuitively, an SN is a directed graph where VL assigns a set of properties to each vertex and
there can be multiple labeled edges between a given pair of vertices, each of which is associated
with a weight and a unique edge predicate symbol.
Example 2.1.2. Consider the SN of Example 2.1.1 (cf. Figure 2.1). Here, VP = {hiv} and
EP = {sp, fr}, where sp and fr stand for sexual and friend relationships, respectively. The SN is
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defined as:
1. V = {a, b, c, d}.
2. E = {〈a, b, sp〉, 〈b, a, sp〉, 〈a, c, sp〉, 〈c, a, sp〉, 〈a, d, fr〉, 〈d, a, fr〉, 〈c, d, fr〉, 〈d, c, fr〉}.
3. VL(b) = {hiv}; VL(a) = VL(c) = VL(d) = ∅.
4. ω(〈a, b, sp〉) = ω(〈b, a, sp〉) = ω(〈a, c, sp〉) = ω(〈c, a, sp〉) = 0.1;
ω(〈a, d, fr〉) = ω(〈d, a, fr〉) = 0.8; ω(〈c, d, fr〉) = ω(〈d, c, fr〉) = 0.7.
Our definition of social networks is much broader than that used by several researchers [?,
63, 115, 127] who often do not consider either vertex properties or edge labels or edge weights—it
is well known in marketing that intrinsic properties of vertices (customers, patients) and the nature
and strength of the relationships (edges) are critical for decision-making.
2.1.2.2 Generalized Annotated Programs (GAPs)
Syntax. We assume the existence of a set T of variable symbols ranging over the unit real interval
[0, 1] and a set F of function symbols (corresponding to continuous functions), each of which has
an associated arity.
Definition 2 (Annotation Term). Annotation terms are defined as follows:
1. Any member of [0, 1] ∪ T is an annotation term.
2. If f ∈ F is an n-ary function symbol and t1, . . . , tn are annotation terms, then f(t1, . . . , tn) is
an annotation term.
For instance, 0.5 and X are annotation terms (X is assumed to be a variable in T ). If + is
a binary function symbol in F , then X + 1 is an annotation term.
We now define a logical language whose predicate symbols are VP ∪ EP. We assume the
existence of a finite set V of constants (the universe of vertices) and a set V of variable symbols
ranging over the constants (vertices). No function symbols are present. Any member of V ∪ V is
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a term. If p ∈ VP and t is a term, then p(t) is a vertex atom. If p ∈ EP and t1, t2 are terms, then
p(t1, t2) is an edge atom.
Definition 3 (Annotated Atom/GAP-Rule/GAP). If A is an atom and µ is an annotation term,
then A : µ is an annotated atom; if A is a vertex (resp. edge) atom, then A : µ is also called a
vertex (resp. edge) annotated atom. A GAP-rule (or simply rule) is of the form A0 : µ0 ← A1 :
µ1 ∧ . . . ∧ An : µn where n ≥ 0 and every Ai : µi is an annotated atom. A0 : µ0 is the head of
the rule, while A1 : µ1 ∧ . . . ∧ An : µn is the body of the rule. A generalized annotated program
(GAP) is a finite set of rules.
For notational simplicity, we will write a ground rule A0 : µ0 ← simply as A0 : µ0, that
is, we drop ←. Such a rule is called a fact. An annotated atom (resp. rule, GAP) is ground iff
there are no occurrences of variables from either T or V in it. We use A to denote the set of all
ground atoms. Throughout this paper we consider a restricted class of GAPs: every rule with a
non-empty body has a vertex annotated atom in the head ([131] allows any annotated atom in the
head of a rule). Thus, edge atoms can appear only in rule bodies or rules with an empty body. This
restriction results from the set of diffusion models we consider in this paper: neither edge weights
nor edge labels change as the result of the diffusion.
We use grd(r) to denote the ground instances of a rule r, i.e. the set of all rules obtained
from r by replacing every occurrence of a variable in T (i.e., appearing in annotation terms) with
a real number in [0, 1], and every occurrence of a variable in V (i.e., appearing in vertex or edge
atoms) with a vertex in V—multiple occurrences of the same variable are replaced in the same




We assume that VP contains a distinguished vertex predicate symbol vertex that represents
the presence of a vertex in an SN. Every SN S = (V,E,VL, ω) can be represented by a GAP,
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denoted ΠS , as follows:
ΠS = {vertex(v) : 1 | v ∈ V } ∪ {p(v) : 1 | v ∈ V ∧ p ∈ VL(v)} ∪
{ep(v1, v2) : ω(〈v1, v2, ep〉) | 〈v1, v2, ep〉 ∈ E}
Example 2.1.3. The GAP associated with the SN of Example 2.1.1 is the following:
vertex(a) : 1 sp(a, b) : 0.1 fr(a, d) : 0.8 hiv(b) : 1
vertex(b) : 1 sp(b, a) : 0.1 fr(d, a) : 0.8
vertex(c) : 1 sp(a, c) : 0.1 fr(c, d) : 0.7
vertex(d) : 1 sp(c, a) : 0.1 fr(d, c) : 0.7
When we augment ΠS with other rules, such as rules describing how certain properties
diffuse through the social network, we get a GAP Π ⊇ ΠS that captures both the structure of the
SN and the diffusion principles. Below is a small example.
A GAP Πhiv for the SN of Example 2.1.1 might be:
r1 : hiv(V ) : 0.9×X × Y ← sp(V, V ′) : Y ∧ hiv(V ′) : X
r2 : hiv(V ) : 0.4×X × Y × Y ′ ← fr(V, V ′) : Y ∧ sp(V ′, V ′′) : Y ′ ∧ hiv(V ′′) : X
r3 : hiv(V ) : 0.6×X × Y × Y ′ ← sp(V, V ′) : Y ∧ sp(V ′, V ′′) : Y ′ ∧ hiv(V ′′) : X
The first rule says that the confidence that a vertex V has HIV, given that a partner V ′ has HIV
with confidence X , is 0.9×X×Y , where Y is the weight of the sexual relationship between
the two vertices. The other rules can be similarly read.
Semantics. An interpretation I is a mapping from the set of all ground atoms A to [0, 1]. The set
of all interpretations can be partially ordered as follows: given two interpretations I1 and I2, then
I1  I2 iff for all ground atoms A ∈ A, I1(A) ≤ I2(A). An interpretation I satisfies a ground
annotated atom A : µ, denoted I |= A : µ, iff I(A) ≥ µ. I satisfies a ground rule r of the form
AA0 ← AA1∧ . . . ∧ AAn, denoted I |= r, iff (i) I satisfies AA0 or (ii) there exists an 1 ≤ i ≤ n
such that I does not satisfy AAi. I satisfies a (possibly non-ground) rule iff I satisfies all ground
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instances of it. I satisfies a GAP Π iff I satisfies every rule in Π. A GAP Π entails a ground
annotated atom AA, denoted Π |= AA, iff every interpretation I that satisfies Π also satisfies AA.
[131] associates an operator TΠ that maps interpretations to interpretations with any GAP
Π. Suppose I is an interpretation. Then,
TΠ(I)(A) = max({I(A)} ∪ {µ | A : µ← AA1 ∧ . . . ∧ AAn is in grd(Π) and
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, I |= AAi})
The iteration of TΠ is defined as follows:
TΠ ↑ 0 is the interpretation that assigns 0 to all ground atoms.
TΠ ↑ (i+ 1) = TΠ(TΠ ↑ i).
[131] shows that TΠ is monotonic (w.r.t. ) and has a least fixed point lfp(TΠ). Moreover,
they show that a GAP Π entails a ground annotated atom A : µ iff µ ≤ lfp(TΠ)(A) and therefore
lfp(TΠ) precisely captures the ground atomic logical consequences of Π. We will denote the least
fixed point lfp(TΠ) also as lfp(Π).
Example 2.1.4. Consider again the HIV SN S of Example 2.1.1 and the GAP Πhiv of Exam-
ple 2.1.2.2. Let Π = ΠS ∪ Πhiv. TΠ has a least fixed point that coincides with TΠ ↑ 3 as shown
in Table 2.1 (edge atoms are not reported as the values assigned to them at iteration 1 are those
reported in Example 2.1.3 and do not change after iteration 1). Thus, the least fixed point assigns
0.09 to hiv(a), 1 to hiv(b), 0.0081 to hiv(c), and 0.032 to hiv(d).
2.1.2.3 Expressing Diffusion Models with GAPs
Diffusion models specify how vertex properties “propagate” and fall into three categories: tipping
models, in which a vertex adopts a behavior when a sufficiently large percentage of its neighbors
adopt the behavior [179, ?, 115]; cascade models, in which diffusion cascades across the network
(cascade models have been developed for the SIR model of disease spread [10], marking photos
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TΠ ↑ i hiv(a) hiv(b) hiv(c) hiv(d)
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
2 0.09 1 0.006 0.032
3 0.09 1 0.0081 0.032
4 0.09 1 0.0081 0.032
Tab. 2.1: Iterations of TΠ.
as favorites in Flickr [?]); and homophilic models, in which vertices adopt behaviors on the basis
of their intrinsic properties but not on the basis of the network structure [12]. Many existing
diffusion models for a variety of phenomena can be expressed as GAPs. [183] shows that GAPs
can represent many different diffusion models, including: the Susceptible-Infectious-Removed
(SIR) model of disease spread [10], which is a classic disease model; the Susceptible-Infectious-
Susceptible (SIS) model [110], which is a variant of the SIR model; the Big Seed marketing
approach [200], which is a strategy of advertising to a large group of individuals who are likely
to spread the advertisement further through network effects; models of diffusion of “favorited”
pictures in Flickr [49]; tipping models like the Jackson-Yariv product diffusion model [115].
Example 2.1.5. Suppose the SN in Figure 2.1 represents cell phone users and vertices have prop-
erties like male, female, young, old, and adopter telling us if the user adopted a cell phone plan.
The phone company wants to identify important users. Suppose d is male and everyone else is
female; initially nobody is an adopter. A cell phone provider may have a diffusion rule learned
from past promotions:
adopter(V ′) : 0.6×X × Y ← adopter(V ) : X ∧male(V ) : Y ∧ fr(V, V ′) : W
The vertex which has the greatest influence, if given a free mobile phone plan and if the
above diffusion model is used, is clearly d (because this is the only vertex that can “influence”
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others to adopt the plan). However, we see from the table in Example 2.1.1 that d is not the most
relevant vertex w.r.t. to all centrality measures. It is also interesting to note that c and d have the
same centrality w.r.t. all standard centrality measures (because their properties and the diffusion
model are ignored).
Other examples of diffusion models expressed with GAPs, such as a conditional probability
model, the Jackson-Yariv and the SIR model, are reported in Section Ap.1.1, as they have been
used in our experiments.
2.1.3 Diffusion Centrality
Diffusion centrality tries to measure how well a vertex v can diffuse a property p (e.g., the hiv
property). Given an SN S = (V,E,VL, ω), a vertex predicate symbol p, and a vertex v ∈ V ,
the insertion of p(v) into S, denoted S ⊕ p(v), is the SN (V,E,VL′, ω) where VL′ is exactly
like VL except that VL′(v) = VL(v) ∪ {p}. In other words, inserting p(v) into a social network
merely says that vertex v has property p and that everything else about the network stays the same.
Likewise, the removal of p(v) from S, denoted S 	 p(v), is the social network (V,E,VL′′, ω)
which is just like S except that VL′′(v) = VL(v)− {p}.
Definition 4 (Diffusion Centrality). Let S = (V,E,VL, ω) be an SN, Π a GAP, and p a property.








Whenever Π, p, and S are clear from the context, we denote the diffusion centrality of a
vertex v simply as dc(v).
This definition says that computing the diffusion centrality of vertex v involves two steps.
First, we find the least fixed point of the diffusion model and the SN S ⊕ p(v), i.e. we assume that
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vertex v has property p and see how much diffusion occurs. Then, we find the least fixed point
of the diffusion model and the SN S 	 p(v), i.e. we assume that vertex v does not have property
p and see how much diffusion occurs. The difference between these two numbers captures the
“impact” that would occur in terms of diffusion of property p if vertex v had property p.2
Example 2.1.6. Consider again the HIV SN of Example 2.1.1 and the GAP of Example 2.1.2.2.
Recall that the only vertex with property hiv is b. It can be easily verified that the values for the
positive and negative summands of Definition 4 for all vertices are as reported in the following
table.
a b c d
Positive Summand 1.122 0.13 1.122 1.0981
Negative Summand 1.0401 0 1.122 1.0981
Diffusion Centrality 0.0819 0.13 0 0
Thus, b has the highest centrality w.r.t. hiv and Πhiv— classical centrality measures (Ex-
ample 2.1.1) do not capture this because b is not a “central” vertex from a purely topological
perspective. However, b should have the highest centrality because it is the only one with HIV.
Vertices c and d do not increase the confidence of any vertex to have HIV. So their diffusion cen-
trality is zero.
Example 2.1.7. If we return to the cell phone case (Example 2.1.5), we see that the DC of d
2 Considering just the first summation of Definition 4 is wrong. Suppose we have an SN and a vertex v s.t. the first
summation of dc(v) is a high numberN (i.e., the expected number of vertices that would have property p assuming that
v has property p is N ). Suppose that when we assume that v does not have property p, the same value N is determined
(i.e., this is the value of the second summation). Then, intuitively, v should not have a high diffusion centrality since
the expected number of vertices with property p is the same regardless of whether v has property p or not (hence v does
not seem to play a central role in the diffusion of p). In contrast, considering just the first summation would give v a
high centrality.
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is 1.2, while all other vertices have 0 as their DC. Thus, d has the highest diffusion centrality.
Furthermore, as opposed to classical centrality metrics, c and d do not have the same centrality,
because their properties and the diffusion of interest make them important to a different extent.
Diffusion Centrality Problem (DCP). Given an SN S = (V,E,VL, ω), a GAP Π, and a property
p, the diffusion centrality problem consists of finding the DC (w.r.t. Π, p, and S) of every vertex
of S.
2.1.4 The HyperDC Algorithm for Exact Diffusion Centrality Computation
In this section, we present the HyperDC algorithm (Section 2.1.4.3), which solves DCP exactly
using the HyperLFP algorithm (Section 2.1.4.2) to compute the least fixed point of a GAP. We
start with a set of optimization that can speed up HyperDC (Section 2.1.4.1).
2.1.4.1 Preprocessing Optimization Steps
When computing dc(v), we note that S, S⊕p(v), and S	p(v) differ only in whether or not vertex
v has property p. One way to leverage this is to first compute and cache lfp(Π ∪ΠS) independent
of v. We then only need to calculate one summation in order to compute dc(v).
Proposition 1. Consider a social network S = (V,E,VL, ω), a GAP Π, and a property p. Let














φ(p(v′′)) if p /∈ VL(v)
Proof. Consider a vertex v ∈ V . If v has property p, then, by definition of S ⊕ p(v), we have that
φ = lfp(Π ∪ ΠS⊕p(v)) and the first equation holds. Likewise, if v does not have the property p,
then, by definition of S 	 p(v), we have that φ = lfp(Π ∪ΠS	p(v)) and then the second equation
also follows. 
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p-monotonic GAPs, defined below, are a class of GAPs to which we can apply optimization
techniques. The dependency graph of a GAP Π is a directed graph dep(Π) whose vertices are the
predicate symbols in Π. There is an edge from a predicate symbol q to a predicate symbol p iff
there is a rule in Π where p occurs in the head and q occurs in the body. We say that q can reach p
if there exists a path from q to p in dep(Π). If q can reach p and vice versa, then we say that p and
q are mutually recursive. We use MΠ,p to denote the set of predicate symbols that are mutually
recursive with p. We define RΠ,p as the set of predicate symbols that can reach p and appear in
the head of some rule of Π. Note that MΠ,p ⊆ RΠ,p.
Definition 5 (p-monotonic GAP). We say that a rule A0 : µ0 ← A1 : µ1 ∧ . . . ∧ An : µn is
monotonic iff µ0 is a monotonic function3. Given a GAP Π and a property p, we say that Π
is p-monotonic iff, for every rule r in Π, when the head predicate symbol is in RΠ,p then r is
monotonic.
We now introduce the p-interfered predicate set—intuitively, it is the set of predicate sym-
bols that may impact the values assigned to ground atoms of the form p(v) in the least fixed point.
Definition 6 (p-interfered predicate set). Given a GAP Π and a property p, the p-interfered pred-
icate set is defined as follows:
IΠ,p =

MΠ,p if Π is p-monotonic
RΠ,p if Π is not p-monotonic
The GAP Π of Example 2.1.2.2 is hiv-monotonic with IΠ,hiv = {hiv}. The following GAP
3 If µ0 is a constant, it is considered to be monotonic. Moreover, if µ0 = f(. . .), then µ0 is monotonic if f is
monotonic, i.e., if xi ≤ yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ arity(f), then f(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ f(y1, . . . , yn).
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Π is not p-monotonic because of the second rule and IΠ,p = {p, q}.
p(V ) : 0.5×X ×W ← fr(V, V ′) : W ∧ p(V ′) : X
q(V ) : (1−X)×W ← fr(V, V ′) : W ∧ p(V ′) : X
p(V ) : 0.9×X ×W ← fr(V, V ′) : W ∧ q(V ′) : X
Given a GAP Π and a property p, we define
Πp = {r ∈ Π | the head predicate symbol of r belongs to RΠ,p},
Π∗p = {r ∈ Πp | every predicate symbol q in the body of r is s.t. q /∈ IΠ,p}.
Proposition 2. Consider an SN S, a GAP Π, and a property p. Let ψ = lfp(ΠS ∪ Π∗p). Then,
lfp(Π ∪ΠS)(p(v)) = lfp((Πp −Π∗p) ∪ {A : ψ(A) | A ∈ A})(p(v)) for every vertex v of S.
Proof. All the rules in Π−Πp have a predicate in the head atom that cannot reach predicate p, and
then these rules do not affect the value of lfp(Π ∪ ΠS)(p(v)). As we are interested in computing
the diffusion centrality for property p, we can ignore these rules in the computation. Moreover,
rules in Πp can be partitioned into two sets of rules, namely Π∗p and (Πp −Π∗p), and by definition
of Π∗p, we have that rules in (Πp−Π∗p) “depend on” rules in Π∗p because an atom having predicate
symbol q ∈ IΠ,p may appear in the head of a rule in Π∗p and in the body of a rule in (Πp − Π∗p),
but not vice versa. Thus, the rules in (Πp − Π∗p) do not contribute to the computation of the least
fixed point of the program Π∗p and then the value of ψ can be pre-computed. .
To compute lfp(Π∪ΠS)(p(v)), Proposition 2 says that (i) we do not need to consider rules
in Π − Πp (they do not affect the value assigned to atoms of the form p(v) in the least fixed
point); and (ii) we can compute ψ as a preprocessing step, use it to define facts, and do not need to
consider again the rules in Π∗p (however, we can benefit from this only when Π is p-monotonic).
The last optimization step we propose is called network filtering, which consists of reducing
the given SN by removing vertices (and the relative incoming and outgoing edges) that do not play
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any role in the diffusion process, i.e., those vertices that can never receive or transmit diffusive
property p from/to other vertices in the SN via any rule in the considered diffusion model.
Example 2.1.8. Consider the diffusion model Πhiv from Example 2.1.2.2:
hiv(V ) : 0.9×X ×W ← sp(V, V ′) : W ∧ hiv(V ′) : X
hiv(V ) : 0.4×X ×W ×W ′ ← fr(V, V ′) : W ∧ sp(V ′, V ′′) : W ′ ∧ hiv(V ′′) : X
hiv(V ) : 0.6×X ×W ×W ′ ← sp(V, V ′) : W ∧ sp(V ′, V ′′) : W ′ ∧ hiv(V ′′) : X
Suppose v is a vertex in an SN having no sp relations. Moreover, suppose none of v’s friends have
sp relations. Then, v is an “unnecessary” vertex (for the purpose of computing DC) because there
is no rule r ∈ Πhiv by which the vertex v can receive the property hiv or transmit hiv to other
vertices.
Given a GAP Π, a property p, and a rule r ∈ Π, we define relbody(r) = {AA | AA is an
annotated atom in the body of r and its predicate symbol is not in RΠ,p}. Vertex v of an SN S ac-
tivates a rule r ∈ Π iff there exists a ground rule r′ ∈ grd(r) such that:
1. for every AA ∈ relbody(r′), ΠS |= AA;
2. if A : µ is the head of r′, then µ > 0; and
3. v appears in an annotated atom of the body of r′.
Definition 7 (Necessary and unnecessary vertices). Let S be an SN, Π be a GAP, and p a property.
A vertex of S is necessary if it activates a rule of Πp, otherwise it is unnecessary.
The filtering of a social network eliminates all unnecessary vertices (along with their in-
coming/outgoing edges).
Definition 8 (Network Filtering). Let S = (V,E,VL, ω) be an SN, Π a GAP, p a property, and U
the set of unnecessary vertices. The filtering of S (w.r.t. Π and p) is the SN S ′ = (V ′, E′,VL′, ω′)
where:
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1. V ′ = V \ U ;
2. E′ = E \ {〈u, v, q〉 ∈ E | u ∈ U ∨ v ∈ U};
3. VL′(v) = VL(v) for all v ∈ V ′;
4. ω′(e) = ω(e) for all e ∈ E′.
The filtering of an SN is useful because unnecessary vertices have a DC of zero. The DC
of necessary vertices can be computed on the (smaller) filtered SN.
Proposition 3. Let S be an SN, Π be a GAP, p a property, and S ′ the filtering of S. For every
vertex v of S,
1. if v is unncessary, then dcΠ,p,S(v) = 0;
2. if v is necessary, then dcΠ,p,S(v) = dcΠ,p,S′(v).
Proof. 1. If a vertex v is unnecessary, it cannot activate any rule in Π, thus, independently
from the fact whether it has the diffusion property p or not, it does not give any contribution










and then dcΠ,p,S(v) = 0.














It follows that dcΠ,p,S(v) = dcΠ,p,S′(v). 
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Below we present another class of GAPs, called p-dwindling, for which our HyperLFP
algorithm has a faster convergence to the least fixed point.
Definition 9 (p-dwindling GAP). Suppose p is a property. A GAP Π is p-dwindling iff for every
ground rule A0 : µ0 ← A1 : µ1 ∧ . . . ∧ An : µn in grd(Π) s.t. q is the predicate symbol of A0
and q ∈ IΠ,p, it is the case that µ0 ≤ µi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n s.t. the predicate symbol of Ai is in
IΠ,p.
For the Flickr, Jackson-Yariv, and SIR models (see Ap.1.1) we consider in our experimental
evaluation, we can state the following properties.
Proposition 4. The Flickr model is p-monotonic and p-dwindling. The Jackson-Yariv model is
p-monotonic but not p-dwindling. The SIR model is neither p-monotonic nor p-dwindling.
Proof.
1. Clearly, the function µv′,v × µp × µq × dpF in the head atom annotation of the unique rule
of the Flickr model is monotonic, thus the GAP describing the Flickr model is p-monotonic.
Moreover, the GAP is also p-dwindling because the value of the function µv′,v ×µp×µq ×
dpF is less than or equal to any value that µp can assume as the annotations µv′,v and µq
and the constant dpF can assume only values between 0 and 1.

















×dpJY is constant. However, the GAP describing the Jackson-Yariv
model is not p-dwindling because of the term
∑
j ωj in the head atom function.
3. The GAP describing the SIR model is not p-monotonic because of the terms (1 − R) and
(1− R′) in the head atom annotation function of the first rule (which is (1− R)× µev′,v ×
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µpv′ × (1 − R
′) × µqv × dpSIR). Moreover, the GAP is not p-dwindling. To see this, it is
sufficient to note that, because of the presence of the terms (1 − R) and (1 − R′) in the
head atom annotation function of the first rule, we cannot say that the value assumed by this
function is always less than or equal to R or R′ (remember that IΠSIR,p = {p, r1, r2}). 
2.1.4.2 The HyperLFP Algorithm
In this section, we propose an efficient hypergraph-based algorithm, HyperLFP, to compute the
least fixed point used for diffusion centrality computation. As HyperLFP uses hypergraphs, we
first define hypergraphs.
Definition 10. A directed hypergraph is a pair 〈V,H〉 where:
1. V is a finite set of vertices.
2. H is a finite set of directed hyperedges. A hyperedge is a pair 〈S, t〉 where S is a (possibly
empty) set of vertices, called source set, and t is a vertex, called target vertex. Given a
hyperedge h ∈ H we use S(h) to denote its source set and t(h) to denote its target vertex.
We now define a hypergraph that captures how a property p diffuses through an SN S
according to a GAP Π. The hypergraph does not depend on which vertices have property p in the
original SN, but depends only on Π and the structure of S in terms of edges and vertex properties
other than p. Therefore, given a GAP Π and an SN S, the diffusion hypergraph has to be computed
only once and can be used with different assignments of a property p to the vertices and edges of
S. In addition, the hypergraph allows us to eliminate (ground) diffusion rules that are useless for
the purpose of computing the least fixed point.
Definition 11 (Enabled Rule). Consider an SN S , a GAP Π, and a property p. Let ϕ = lfp(ΠS ∪
Π∗p). A rule r ∈ grd(Π−Π∗p) is enabled iff ϕ(A) ≥ µ for every annotated atom A : µ in the body
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of r whose predicate symbol is not in IΠ,p.
Intuitively, enabled rules are the ground rules that can affect the diffusion of p (directly or
indirectly) in the least fixed point computation. Proposition 2 is applied in Definition 11 via the
computation of ϕ = lfp(ΠS ∪Π∗p).
Example 2.1.9. Consider the GAP Πhiv of Example 2.1.2.2 and the SN of Example 2.1.1 (cf.
Figure 2.1). The following ground instance of the second rule is enabled: hiv(d) : 0.4 × 0.08 ←
fr(d, a) : 0.8 ∧ sp(a, c) : 0.1 ∧ hiv(c) : 1. Notice that the atom hiv(c) does not play any role in
determining whether or not the rule is enabled.
Definition 12 (Diffusion HypergraphH(S,Π, p)). Consider an SN S = (V,E,VL, ω), a GAP Π,
and a property p. The hyperedge associated with a ground rule r ∈ grd(Π) whose head anno-
tated atom is of the form p′(v) : µ is defined as 〈{p′′(vi) | p′′(vi) : µi is in the body of r and p′′ ∈
IΠ,p}, p′(v)〉 and is denoted by hedge(r). The diffusion hypergraphH(S,Π, p) is a triple 〈N,H,W 〉
such that:
1. 〈N,H〉 is a directed hypergraph with N = {q(v) | q ∈ IΠ,p and v ∈ V }, and H =
{hedge(r) | r is an enabled ground rule of Π whose head predicate
symbol is in IΠ,p},
2. W is a function such that for each h ∈ H and matrix M [1...|IΠ,p|][1..|V |] of real values
in [0, 1], W (h,M) is the head annotation of the ground rule r satisfying the following two
properties: (i) hedge(r) = h, and (ii) for every atom q(v) appearing in S(h), M [q][v] is
equal to the annotation of q(v) in r.
Example 2.1.10. Figure 2.2 shows the diffusion hypergraph for the GAP Πhiv of Example 2.1.2.2















Fig. 2.2: A diffusion hypergraph.
The rough idea of the HyperLFP algorithm (Algorithm 1) is that hyperedges that propagate
a value greater than zero are kept in a max-heap and those propagating higher values are visited
first; the max-heap is updated as propagation unfolds.
For all q ∈ IΠ,p and v ∈ V , M [q][v] is the initial value of the ground atom q(v) and is given
as input, U [q][v] keeps track of the hyperedges having q(v) in their source set and is also given
in input, and M ′[q][v] is the current assignment to q(v). Specifically, M ′[q][v] is initially set to
M and then iteratively updated by the algorithm. C keeps track of the highest values propagated
by hyperedges that were added to MaxHeap. At each iteration of the while loop on lines 5–18,
a pair 〈h,w〉 with maximum w is retrieved from MaxHeap. If M ′[q][v] is less than w, it is set to
w, otherwise another hyperedge is retrieved from MaxHeap. If w is assigned to M ′[q][v], then
hyperedges that can be affected by this are inspected (for each loop on lines 10–18). Only the
hyperedges having t(h) in the source set are inspected. For each of them, if no hyperedge added
to MaxHeap propagated a higher value (line 13), then if Π is p-monotonic the hyperedge is added
to MaxHeap (along with the value it propagates), otherwise it is added to MaxHeap′. The reason
for this is that when Π is p-monotonic we can retrieve hyperedges in descending order of their
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weights even if their values were derived from different iterations of TΠ. However, if Π is not
p-monotonic, the iterations of TΠ must be executed one after the other without mixing the values
derived at each of them. So, when Π is not p-monotonic, hyperedges are retrieved in descending
order of their weight for each iteration of TΠ. When MaxHeap is empty, MaxHeap′ is assigned
to MaxHeap. M ′ is returned if both heaps are empty.
If a GAP Π is p-dwindling and p-monotonic, then HyperLFP ensures that when a value w
is assigned to a ground atom q(v), then w is the final value for q(v) in the least fixed point; hence
the hyperedge that propagated w as well as any other hyperedge having q(v) as a target atom no
longer needs to be considered in order to see if a new higher value can be assigned to q(v).
Proposition 5. The worst-case time complexity of Algorithm HyperLFP is O(|N | + 1α · |H| ·
(log |H| + Umax · (Smax + log |H|))), where Umax = maxv∈V,q∈IΠ,p{|{h | h ∈ H ∧ q(v) ∈
S(h)}|}, Smax = maxh∈H{|S(h)|}, and α is the minimum value obtained at line 9 for (w −
M ′[q][v]).
Proof. The cost of making two copies of the matrix M at Lines 1-2 is O(|N |). The the loop at
Line 5 is executed |H| times as at each iteration we remove an hyper-edge from MaxHeap (Line
6). Within this loop, the predominant costs are the cost of deleting the maximum fromMaxHeap
(Line 6), which is O(log |H|), and the cost of the loop at Line 10. This loop is executed for each
hyper-edge h′ ∈ U [q][v] whose number is Umax in the worst-case and at each iteration the cost
of computing the function W at Line 11 is O(Smax) in the worst-case, while the cost of adding
〈h′, w′〉 either to MaxHeap (Line 16) or MaxHeap′ (Line 18) is O(log |H|). Thus, the cost
of executing Lines 5-19 is O(|N | + |H| · (log|H| + Umax · Smax)). Finally, the loop at Line
3 is executed 1α times in the worst-case as 1 is the maximum growth the annotation of an atom
can have and α is the minimum increment step. Thus, the complexity of HyperLFP algorithm is
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O(|N |+ 1α · |H| · (log |H|+ Umax · (Smax + log |H|))). 
Algorithm 1 HyperLFP
Input: For a social network S = (V,E,VL, ω), a GAP Π, and a property p,
two matrices U [1...|IΠ,p|][1..|V |] and M [1...|IΠ,p|][1..|V |],
a max-heap MaxHeap, the diffusion hypergraphH(S,Π, p) = 〈N,H,W 〉
Output: lfp(Π ∪ΠS)(q(v)) for all v ∈ V and q ∈ IΠ,p
1: C ← copy of M;
2: M ′ ← copy of M;
3: while MaxHeap 6= ∅ do
4: MaxHeap′ ← ∅;
5: while MaxHeap 6= ∅ do
6: 〈h,w〉 ← deleteMax(MaxHeap);
7: Let q(v) = t(h);
8: if M ′[q][v] < w then
9: M ′[q][v]← w;
10: for each h′ ∈ U [q][v] do
11: w′ ←W (h′,M ′);
12: Let q′(v′) = t(h′);
13: if w′ > C[q′][v′] then
14: C[q′][v′]← w′;
15: if Π is p-monotonic then
16: Add 〈h′, w′〉 to MaxHeap;
17: else
18: Add 〈h′, w′〉 to MaxHeap′;
19: MaxHeap ← MaxHeap′;
20: return M ′;
29
2.1.4.3 The HyperDC Algorithm
The HyperDC algorithm (Algorithm 2) initializes Minit, U , and MaxHeapinit by calling Algo-
rithm 3 (line 1), and then uses them to compute lfp(Π ∪ ΠS) (lines 2–4). After that, the diffusion
centrality of each vertex is computed (lines 6–25). Specifically, the value of atom p(v) is incorpo-
rated into Minit, and MaxHeap is updated accordingly (lines 7–16). Then, the least fixed point is
computed using the updated Minit and MaxHeap (lines 17–18). Finally, the diffusion centrality
of vertex v is computed and the value of p(v) in Minit is restored (lines 19–25). In this last step,
Proposition 1 is leveraged. In fact, if p ∈ VL(v′), the positive summand of the definition of DC
has already been computed in lines 2–4 and what is being computed is the negative summand. In
this case, the positive summand is equal to sump − F [p][v] and the negative summand is equal
to sum′p, so the diffusion centrality of vertex v is (sump − F [p][v]) − sum′p. If p 6∈ VL(v′), the
negative summand has been computed already in lines 2–4. In this case, the diffusion centrality of
vertex v is sum′p − (sump − F [p][v]).
Proposition 6. The worst-case time complexity of Algorithm HyperDC is O(|V | · (|N |+ 1α · |H| ·
(log |H| + Umax · (Smax + log |H|)))), where Umax = maxv∈V {|{h | h ∈ H ∧ v ∈ S(h)}|},
Smax = maxh∈H{|S(h)|}, and α is defined as in Proposition 5.
Proof. By leveraging Proposition 1, the HyperDC algorithm computes one least fix point for each
node, so its worst-case time complexity is given by the number of vertices (|V |) times the worst-
case time complexity of the HyperLFP algorithm (which is O(|N | + 1α · |H| · (log |H| + Umax ·
(Smax + log |H|)))) called at line 17. 
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Algorithm 2 HyperDC
Input: An SN S = (V,E,VL, ω), a GAP Π, a property p,
the diffusion hypergraphH(S,Π, p) = 〈N,H,W 〉
Output: {〈v, dc(v)〉 | v ∈ V }
1: 〈Minit, U,MaxHeapinit〉 ← InitializeHyperDC(S, IΠ,p,H);
2: MaxHeap ← copy of MaxHeapinit;





6: for each v ∈ V do
7: MaxHeap ← copy of MaxHeapinit;




12: for each h ∈ U [p][v] do
13: remove 〈h,w〉 from MaxHeap;
14: Let p′(v′) = t(h);
15: if W (h,Minit) > Minit[p′][v′] then
16: Add 〈h,W (h,Minit)〉 to MaxHeap;





19: if p ∈ VL(v) then
20: dc(v)← (sump − F [p][v])− sum′p;
21: Minit[p][v]← 1;
22: else
23: dc(v)← sum′p − (sump − F [p][v]);
24: Minit[p][v]← 0;




Input: A social network S = (V,E,VL, ω),
a p-interfered predicate set IΠ,p,
a diffusion hypergraphH = 〈N,H,W 〉.
Output: M [1..|IΠ,p|][1..|V |], U [1..|IΠ,p|][1..|V |], MaxHeap
1: n = |IΠ,p|; m = |V |;
2: M [1..n][1..m]; U [1..n][1..m]; MaxHeap ← ∅;
3: M [q][v]← 0, U [q][v]← ∅ for all q ∈ IΠ,p and v ∈ V ;
4: for each v ∈ V do
5: for each q ∈ VL(v) ∩ IΠ,p do
6: M [q][v]← 1;
7: for each h ∈ H do
8: Add 〈h,W (h,M)〉 to MaxHeap;
9: for each q(v) ∈ S(h) do
10: U [q][v]← U [q][v] ∪ {h};
11: return 〈M,U,MaxHeap〉;
A brief note is in order about how the techniques in this section yield better scalability.
Compared to our past work [123], HyperDC is approximately 100 times faster than that in [123].
In particular, the U and MaxHeapinit structures used in HyperDC are built just once. This yields
a speedup of approximately 5x. In addition, the filtering based on Proposition 3 yields a further
speedup of 20x, leading to a total speedup of 100x.
2.1.5 Experimental Evaluation
This section contains a detailed report on our experiments. We compared the runtime and spread
generated by diffusion centrality against classical centrality measures (Section 2.1.5.2), using net-
works with up to around 265K vertices and 440K edges. The networks used here were not as large
as possible because some classical algorithms were unable to handle these sizes.
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We implemented the HyperLFP (Algorithm 1) and HyperDC (Algorithm 2) in Java. To
compute degree, eigenvector, PageRank, closeness, and betweenness centrality we used the Java
Universal Network/Graph Framework (JUNG)4. All experiments were run on an Intel Xeon @
2.40 GHz, 24 GB RAM.
2.1.5.1 Experimental Setup
Social Networks. Our experiments used several real-word social networks summarized in Ta-
ble 2.2.
Network Description Type # Vertices # Edges Avg. Degree Density
BlogCatalog friendship undirected 10,312 333,983 64.78 6.28E-03
e-mail Enron e-mail communications undirected 36,692 183,831 10.02 2.73E-04
Douban friendship undirected 154,907 654,188 8.45 5.45E-05
wiki-Vote Wikipedia vote relationships directed 7,115 103,689 14.57 2.05E-03
soc-Epinions Trust relationships directed 75,879 508,837 6.71 8.84E-05
email-EuAll e-mail communications directed 265,214 420,045 1.58 5.97E-06
Tab. 2.2: Non-Game Social Networks used in the experiments.
We also considered an additional online game dataset called STEAM [22] which contains
friendship relations (represented as directed edges) between players (vertices). Each player has
several vertex properties and we selected country, group(s), games played and total time played
per game. We extracted 10 subnetworks from the whole STEAM dataset by choosing different
games and selecting, for each game, all players who played and all edges among the players. The
features of the extracted networks are reported in Table 2.3.
Diffusion Models. We ran experiments with a conditional probability model (hereafter referred to
as the “Flickr model” [?]), the Jackson-Yariv tipping model [115], and the SIR (susceptible, infec-
4 jung.sourceforge.net
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Social Network # Vertices # Edges Avg. Degree Density
GAME8690 4,083 21,447 5.25 1.29E-03
GAME50510 28,872 115,254 3.99 1.38E-04
GAME6850 52,879 164,702 3.11 5.89E-05
GAME1500 66,571 303,240 4.56 6.84E-05
GAME24420 82,377 437,554 5.31 6.45E-05
GAME11450 89,942 327,258 3.64 4.05E-05
GAME17300 122,467 441,657 3.61 2.94E-05
GAME420 1,307,335 12,431,564 9.51 7.27E-06
GAME220 2,030,579 20,596,331 10.14 5.00E-06
Tab. 2.3: STEAM networks used in the experiments.
tious, removed) model of disease spread [10]. [184] has shown that these three diffusion models
can be expressed as GAPs (along with many others). We generalized these diffusion models by
adding an additional condition q(u) : µ in rule bodies. When all vertices have the property q, then
we have the original diffusion models. The q-condition determines when the diffusion process can
happen. In our experiments, we compared DC with other classical centrality measures by varying
the percentage of vertices in the network with property q. The diffusion models are reported in
Section Ap.1.1, while Table 2.4 summarizes their main features (see Proposition 4).
Model IΠ,p p-monotonic p-dwindling
Flickr model {p} yes yes
Jackson-Yariv model {p} yes no
SIR model {p, r1, r2} no no
Tab. 2.4: Features of the Flickr, Jackson-Yariv, and SIR models.
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2.1.5.2 Diffusion Centrality vs. Classical Centrality Measures
As described earlier, the Flickr, Jackson-Yariv, and SIR diffusion models assume that some set
of vertices in the network have property p and that only vertices satisfying some property q can
spread p. For our STEAM data, we were able to use known properties of the vertices for q but we
were not able to do this for the other data sets. We therefore report our results comparing DC with
classical measures in two subsections.
Before getting into the details of the very extensive experiments we conducted comparing
diffusion centrality with classical centrality measures, we summarize the high level conclusion of
these comparative experiments.
1. The runtime of HyperDC is significantly better than betweenness and closeness centrality
and comparable with the others.
2. The spread achieved by diffusion centrality is almost always significantly better than those
achieved by classical centrality measures.
2.1.5.3 STEAM Data
We used all but the last two (very large) STEAM data sets (Table 2.3) for the comparative analysis
as some classical centrality measures could not complete even on the first seven STEAM data sets.
Consistently with the data, we set the percentage δp of vertices that initially have property p to 0%
and varied the percentage δq of vertices having property q by using real properties of vertices in
the STEAM data. In the STEAM data, q was taken to be the playing time of users in the game
and was assigned as follows: we sorted the players in descending order according to playing
time and assigned q to the first δq users. We varied δq ∈ {1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%,
25%, 30%}. The last two STEAM subnetworks, which are substantially larger, were used for the
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evaluation of the CBAF algorithm (cf. Section 3.2.4).
Runtime. We compared the time to compute DC w.r.t. the three diffusion models against the
time to compute classical centrality measures. Figure 2.3a shows how the runtimes vary w.r.t. δq
for two representative STEAM games (Ap.1.2 shows all the games). Of the 7 STEAM games
we tested in this experiment, closeness centrality computation finished only in the smallest case
(GAME8690)—this is shown in Figure 2.3. HyperDC’s runtime is much faster than betweenness
and closeness centrality for all the STEAM subnetworks and for all values of δq. Even when
δq = 30%, the runtime of diffusion centrality is still low.
Figure 2.3b zooms in on the cases where δq varies from 1% to 5% and shows the runtimes
for HyperDC, degree centrality, and PageRank. HyperDC is faster than PageRank over networks
GAME8690 and GAME50510, and also faster than degree over network GAME8690.5 However,
when the number of vertices increases, HyperDC becomes slower than PageRank and degree for
all three diffusion models. For instance, we see in GAME1500 (Figure 2.3b) that a crossover
occurs when δq = 3% for the SIR model but not for the Jackson-Yariv model. In fact, across
the 7 STEAM games, there are some cases when HyperDC is faster than degree centrality and
PageRank and some cases where the opposite is true with no clear discernible pattern.
We also checked p-values of T-test with the runtimes of HyperDC and other centrality. The
values are shown in Appendix Ap.2. The results show that HyperDC runtime is significantly
different from the runtime of Betweenness centrality for various δq. In most cases, the p-values
are less than 0.05 except three cases for Jacson-Yariv model when δq is 20, 25 and 30% (The p-
values for the cases are 0.058, 0.065 and 0.069.). The results for PageRank and degree centrality
5 Though it may seem surprising that HyperDC sometimes beats degree centrality, the reason for this is that when δq
is low (below 3%), HyperDC only needs to compute diffusion centrality for a smal number of vertices. However, when
δq is larger, this is not the case. Likewise, PageRank computation can also be slower than HyperDC when the network
density is high.
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(a) STEAM Data: Runtime of HyperDC algorithm for Exact Diffusion Centrality computation with Flickr,
Jackson-Yariv, and SIR diffusion models compared with Classical Centrality Measures Averaged Per
Vertex when δq ∈ {1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%}.
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(b) STEAM Data: Runtime of HyperDC algorithm for Exact Diffusion Centrality computation with Flickr,
Jackson-Yariv, and SIR diffusion models compared with Classical Centrality Measures Averaged Per
Vertex when δq ∈ {1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%}. Detailed view of part (a).
●
Centrality
DC−FK DC−JY DC−SIR PageRank Degree
















































Fig. 2.3: STEAM Data Runtime
are interesting. For Flickr and SIR models, the general trend is similar. When δq is small, 1% (and
2%), and relatively high (≥ 10%), the difference between HyperDC runtime and the runtime of
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the two centrality measures is significant. But when δq is 3− 5% for Flickr model and 2− 3% for
SIR model, the p-values show that the difference is not significant. For Jackson-Yariv model, the
p-values show that the difference is not significant in all vairous δq.
Runtime of HyperDC Tends to be Linear. We note from Proposition 6 that in the worst
case, the complexity of HyperDC is nonlinear. In order to assess actual runtime characteristics
of HyperDC, we ran an experiment on the STEAM data when the number of vertices increases
and as δq varies. We used the networks from GAME 50510, 6850, 11450, and 17300 which all
have a similar average degree (in the 3-4 range). Figure 2.4 shows the number of vertices in the
network on the x-axis and the average runtime per vertex on the y-axis. Different curves show
varying values of δq. Each upper-lower pair of graphs uses a different diffusion model (Flickr,
Jackson-Yariv, and SIR). The upper figure shows δq ranging from 1-5% while the lower figure
shows δq ranging from 5-30%. We see that irrespective of the diffusion model used and the value
of δq, HyperDC runs in linear time in practice.
Spread. In this section, we compare the diffusion of property p when we choose the top-k central
vertices according to HyperDC vs. using classical centrality measures on the STEAM data. In
each case, the top-k vertices are called seeds. We vary k from 10 to 100 in steps of 10. The spread
w.r.t. a given set of seeds is the expected number of vertices with property p (after diffusion)
assuming the seeds have property p minus the expected number of vertices with property p (after
diffusion) in the original social network. This difference is normalized.
Our spread experiments are presented in two ways. In the first, we show how spread varies
by averaging over the number of seeds for fixed δq values. In the second, we do the opposite.
Spread Experiments Averaged over Varying k values for specific δq values. We varied δq over the
set {1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%}. For each selection of δq, we considered
every value of k from the set {10, 20, . . . , 100}. Then for a fixed δq, k,Diffusion-Model triple,
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STEAM Data: Average Runtime (per vertex) of HyperDC]STEAM Data: Average Runtime (per
vertex) of HyperDC as the number of vertices is increased as as δq is varied using Flickr,
Jackson-Yariv, and SIR models. The figure shows that in practice, HyperDC runs in linear time,
irrespective of the value of δq and the diffusion model used.
we computed the ratio of the spread using HyperDC and the best spread achieved by any of the
classical centrality measures. Table 2.5 reports the average of these ratios. Thus, any ratio greater
than 1 in Table 2.5 shows that HyperDC achieves a higher spread than all of the classical centrality
measures.
For the Flickr and Jackson-Yariv diffusion models, HyperDC always achieved a better
spread than all classical centrality measures. In the case of the SIR model, on average, Hy-
perDC achieves better spreads than classical centrality measures as long as δq ≤ 15% — at 20%,
they are even, and at 25-30%, classical centrality measures achieve a better spread.
Not surprisingly, this spread ratio decreases as δq increases because when δq is large, diffu-
sion occurs due to network structure rather than due to diffusion rules.
Interestingly, spread ratios for the Flickr model are very large compared to those for the
Jackson-Yariv and SIR models. This is because the expected number of vertices which have
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Tab. 2.5: Spread over STEAM networks for different δq values.
STEAM Data: Average ratio of the spread generated by diffusion centrality
to the best spread generated by any of the classical centrality measures for different δq .
Model Network 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
FKModel GAME8690 19.4 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
GAME50510 18.1 22.5 23.8 26.5 19.5 5.0 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.4
GAME6850 436.6 654.2 11.6 10.4 10.7 8.1 6.4 5.6 4.1 3.2
GAME1500 677.6 89.9 48.3 49.9 46.6 48.8 50.0 56.2 55.5 3.1
GAME24420 125.6 6.5 6.1 6.3 5.7 4.9 3.1 2.3 1.9 1.7
GAME11450 512.0 585.5 804.3 8.9 9.7 6.9 5.5 5.1 4.9 3.7
GAME17300 288.7 363.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 5.4 5.1 4.4 3.7 2.8
Average 296.9 246.4 129.0 15.8 14.4 11.6 10.8 11.2 10.6 2.6
JYModel GAME8690 2.8 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2
GAME50510 11.0 5.0 5.1 4.3 4.0 2.7 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.0
GAME6850 8.1 5.8 4.9 4.5 3.6 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6
GAME1500 8.8 6.7 4.6 3.7 3.6 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 0.9
GAME24420 5.4 3.3 2.8 2.6 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
GAME11450 10.9 7.7 6.2 5.1 4.2 2.9 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
GAME17300 9.0 4.5 2.4 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Average 8.0 5.0 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3
SIRModel GAME8690 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
GAME50510 10.1 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.2 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9
GAME6850 4.9 3.6 2.8 2.6 2.5 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2
GAME1500 5.7 3.3 2.2 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8
GAME24420 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
GAME11450 6.7 4.4 2.7 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9
GAME17300 4.3 2.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Average 5.0 2.6 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9
property p after diffusion is much higher in the case of the Flickr model than in the other two
cases.
Spread Experiments Averaged over Varying δq values for specific k values. Here we selected val-
ues of k as before and averaged over different possible values of δq drawn from the set {1%, 2%, 3%,
4%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%}. Table 2.6 summarizes the results. As in the previous case,
a ratio exceeding 1 implies that HyperDC outperforms all classical centrality measures.
On average, for all possible values of k and for all three diffusion models, HyperDC
achieves a better spread than all the classical centrality measures. In fact, with a few exceptions
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Tab. 2.6: [
STEAM Data: Average ratio of spread]STEAM Data: Average ratio of the spread generated by
diffusion centrality to the best spread generated by any of the classical centrality measures for
different k.
Average ratio of the DC spread to the best spread of other centrality measures for different k.
Model Network 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
FlickrModel GAME8690 16.5 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1
GAME50510 48.1 6.8 9.0 10.5 7.7 8.6 9.2 9.8 10.3 7.2
GAME6850 41.4 67.3 86.1 101.2 114.9 127.9 138.5 149.6 157.8 166.2
GAME1500 364.0 94.3 58.4 67.8 74.2 81.0 88.3 93.5 99.9 104.7
GAME24420 48.2 72.2 4.4 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.7 6.0 5.7
GAME11450 70.9 116.4 155.1 187.7 216.8 241.5 265.2 287.8 310.0 95.3
GAME17300 63.3 101.0 134.8 164.0 187.8 8.0 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.4
Average 93.2 65.7 64.3 76.9 87.0 67.8 73.8 79.6 85.0 55.8
JYModel GAME8690 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
GAME50510 3.3 3.6 3.9 3.7 4.1 3.7 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.8
GAME6850 2.6 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.0
GAME1500 3.1 3.3 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5
GAME24420 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3
GAME11450 3.0 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.6
GAME17300 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.0
Average 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2
SIRModel GAME8690 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
GAME50510 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.7
GAME6850 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.4
GAME1500 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8
GAME24420 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0
GAME11450 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
GAME17300 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4
Average 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
in the SIR model, HyperDC achieves a better spread than all centrality measures.
Interestingly, the spread ratio for GAME8690 is consistently the lowest according to each
of three diffusion models and in each setting of both Tables 2.5 and 2.6. This game has just
4083 vertices (so it is very small and dense). Our choice of q is based on the amount of playing
time of a player and there is strong correlation between that and the number of friends. As a
consequence, having multiple seeds does not greatly increase diffusion of property p because of
overlaps between the vertices that may be influenced by the seeds.
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2.1.5.4 Non-Game Social Network Data
In this section, we perform experiments similar to those reported above on the networks in Ta-
ble 2.2. For these networks, the data did not have associated vertex properties. We looked at two
cases.
Case 1. We randomly selected δp = 0.1% of the vertices in the network to have a synthetic
property p (in 5 different runs). In each run, we varied δq ∈ {1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%
, 25%, 30%} and selected δq% of the vertices to have a synthetic property q.
Case 2. We randomly selected δq = 3% of the vertices and varied δp ∈ {0.1%, 0.2%, 0.3%,
0.4%, 0.5%} and associated synthetic properties p and q with vertices as above.
Runtime. Figure 2.5a shows how runtime varies w.r.t. δq for Case 1 above. The networks are
sorted from left to right according to the number of vertices, with directed networks in the first row
and undirected networks in the second row. As in the case of our experiments with the STEAM
data, closeness and betweenness centrality are time consuming compared to the other algorithms
(including HyperDC). Figure 2.5b zooms in on the cases where δq varies from 1% to 5% (with
closeness and betweenness centrality removed as they are too slow).
HyperDC with the Flickr model is faster than PageRank in the majority of cases considered,
and sometimes faster than eigenvector centrality. HyperDC with the SIR model is faster than
PageRank for directed networks when δq ≤ 4%. As in the case of the STEAM data described
earlier, this is because the network filtering step can eliminate many vertices. For the Flickr and
SIR models, the runtimes increase slightly as δq increases because of the higher diffusion that
takes place. However, as in the case of the STEAM data, HyperDC with the Jackson-Yariv model
often takes the most time.
Figure 2.6 shows how runtime varies as δp varies (Case 2). We note that the runtime for
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closeness and betweenness centrality are very high (worse by 1 to 3 orders of magnitude) and
hence we do not report runtimes for them. HyperDC’s runtime for the Flickr and SIR models do
not vary much with δp. HyperDC with the Flickr is faster than Pagerank in almost all networks
and settings. Compared to degree centrality, HyperDC with Flickr exhibits competitive runtimes,
being faster in about half the settings considered and comparable or slightly worse in the others.
HyperDC with the SIR is faster than Pagerank in all data sets except the Douban data set. As
in the case of the STEAM data, HyperDC with the Jackson-Yariv is the worst performer w.r.t.
runtime (excluding betweenness and closeness centrality which we eliminated earlier due to their
very poor performance).
Spread. In both Cases 1 and 2, on average, the ratio of spread generated by HyperDC to the spread
generated by the best classical measure exceeds 1. As in the case of the STEAM data, the best
ratios are for the Flickr model. Due to space constraints we show 4 tables in Ap.1.3.
2.1.5.5 Summary of Experiments
In this section, we conducted two experiments. The first compares HyperDC (which exactly com-
putes diffusion centrality) with classical centrality measures. The experiment conclusively shows
that: The runtime of HyperDC is significantly better than betweenness and closeness centralities
and comparable with PageRank, eigenvector centrality, and degree centrality. The spread achieved
by diffusion centrality is almost always significantly better than those achieved by classical cen-
trality measures.
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(a) Non-Game Social Network Data: Runtime (ms) per vertex when varying δq from 1% to
30% and δp = 0.1%.
●
Centrality
DC−FK DC−JY DC−SIR PageRank Eigenvector Closeness Betweenness Degree
















































































































































































% of vertices having 'q' (For 'p', 0.1% vertices)
(b) Non-Game Social Network Data: Runtime (ms) per vertex when varying δq from 1% to
5% and δp = 0.1%. Zoomed in view of Figure 2.5a.
●
Centrality
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% of vertices having 'q' (For 'p', 0.1% vertices)































































































































































% of vertices having 'p' (For 'q', 3% vertices)
Fig. 2.6: [
Non-Game Social Network Data: Runtime (ms) per vertex when varying δp]Non-Game Social
Network Data: Runtime (ms) per vertex when varying δp from 0.1% to 0.5% with δq = 3%.
2.2 Covertness Centrality
2.2.1 Introduction
There are certainly several important applications where users want to have low centrality accord-
ing to classical centrality measures, but still retain the ability to communicate with a given set of
vertices. For example: (i) Terrorists or criminals communicating through online social networks
may need to communicate with a certain set of vertices, i.e. their terror or criminal network, while
appear “common”, i.e. looking similar to many other vertices in the network so that they cannot
be easily distinguished from other vertices. (ii) A booming industry is in online marketing on plat-
forms like Twitter where companies offer to “insert” certain types of messaging into the network
for a client. In such cases, the marketers want to get the message out without “standing” out as
spreaders of a marketing message. We call actors who wish to satisfy (i) and (ii) covert actors, i.e.
actors who want to communicate well with certain other actors, but who wish to stay “below the
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]Histograms of the degree and closeness centrality scores (normalized to the interval [0,1]) for
the URV dataset (see Table 2.7).
radar.”
Measuring which network positions are “not common” and which ones are “common” is
not straightforward. In most social networks there are a lot more vertices with a low degree than
vertices with a high degree, as most social networks are known to be scale-free. But low values
are not always dominating. Closeness centrality scores are usually normally distributed (or follow
at least another bell shaped distribution) as shown in Fig. 2.7 6. So it takes more to measure how
well a vertex hides in the crowd than looked at how low its centrality scores are.
In this section, we define a new centrality measure, denoted as Covertness Centrality (CC
for short), that captures the intuitions. Unlike classical centrality measures which start solely with
a graph as input, CC assumes that we are given as input, both a graph and a set C of classical
centrality measures. Intuitively, think of C as being a set of centrality measures that a covert actor
thinks an adversary might use to identify key players in a network. We split the definition of CC
6 These distributions for the respective centrality measures hold true for all of our evaluation networks listed in
Tab. 2.7
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into two parts - how “common” a vertex is in a network w.r.t. given C and how well the vertex can
communicate with a given set of nodes in the network according to a centrality measure.
Section 2.2 is organized as follows: In Section 2.2.2, we discuss requirements that a defini-
tion of “common-ness” should be satisfied as well as possible ways to define covertness centrality.
Next, in Section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, we propose sampling methods to compute covertness centrality
and evaluate the proposed covertness centrality measures and algorithms.
2.2.2 Covertness Centrality Definition
Our notion of covertness centrality is a combination of commonness and communication potential.
Commonness means hiding in a crowd of equal or similar actors and communication potential is
the ability to efficiently communicate in order to achieve the objective of the group. In this section,
we will discuss how to construct a covertness centrality measure from this two components.
2.2.2.1 Commonness
As introduced, commonness should measure how well an actor hides in a crowd of similar ac-
tors. Let CM(a) denote the (as yet undefined) commonness of an actor a. Intuitively, we want
CM(a) > CM(b) if and only if knowledge of properties of the structural position of actor a
reveals less information about a than knowledge of properties of the structural position of actor b
reveals on b. This means, that if the size of the crowd actor a is hiding in is larger than the crowd
actor b is hiding in, a’s covertness centrality has to be higher.
In terms of conditional probability we can describe what we want to measure as follows.
If we want to search for an actor a and we know that this actor has the property I , what is the
probability that a randomly picked actor with property I is actor a? In this work, we are focusing
solely on network data. That means, no other information on actors are available than the edges
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connecting them. Therefore, the possible information on a person are properties of his or her
position in the network. Moreover, we assume that this information is encoded via a user-specified
set C of centrality measures.
Before we can give a formal definition of covertness centrality, we need to introduce some
definitions. Let G = (V,E) be a graph where V denotes a set of vertices and E ⊂ V × V and set
of edges connecting pairs of vertices. Furthermore, let C = (C1, C2, . . . , Ck) be an ordered set of
centrality measures on graph G where Ci is a function from V to R.
We can regard an actor w as similar to an actor v with respect to a centrality measure Ci,
when Ci(w) and Ci(v) are “similar”. We define what values of Ci can be regarded as similar
based on the variance of the values of the centrality measure. Let σi be the standard deviation of
centrality scores Ci(v) where v ∈ V . Then, the k-dimensional interval of centrality values similar
to the one of vertex v (v’s similarity neighborhood) is
Iv = [C1(v)− ασ1, C1(v) + ασ1]×
[C2(v)− ασ2, C2(v) + ασ2]×
. . .×
[Ck(v)− ασk, Ck(v) + ασk] .
where α ≥ 0 is a parameter that defines the range of similar values. A user can define what α
should be.
Furthermore, let X(v) = (C1(v), C2(v), . . . , Ck(v)) be the vector of centrality measures
for vertex v and let σ(v) = (σ1(v), σ2(v), . . . , σk(v)) be the vector of the standard deviations for
all centrality measures in C.
As we have a finite set of actors, the distinct centrality vectors that are similar to a vertex v
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w.r.t. C are
DC(v) = {X|Ci(w) = Xi, i ∈ {1..k}, w ∈ V ∧X ∈ Iv}.
The probability that a randomly chosen vertex has the centrality vector X is
fC(X) =P (C1(v) = X1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ck(v) = Xk)
=
|{v|C1(v) = X1 . . . ∧ Ck(v) = Xk}|
|V |
.
However, in our context, we are not interested in the probability that a randomly chosen vertex
has a specific centrality vector but in the probability that some other randomly chosen vertex has
the same centrality vector X as a given vertex. So we define
gC(X) = max
{
|{v|C1(v) = X1 . . . ∧ Ck(v) = Xk}| − 1




Given these definitions, we can define the commonness CM(v) of a vertex v ∈ V with
respect to a non-empty set C of base centrality measures in various ways. However, it is desirable
(though not strictly necessary) that all specific definitions of CM satisfy certain properties.
Property 1. Optimal Hiding: If all vertices are equal w.r.t. all centrality measures, the vertices
are indistinguishable and so the hiding is optimal. In this case the commonness has to be 1 for all
vertices.
∀v, w ∈ V,C ∈ C C(v) = C(w)⇒ ∀u ∈ V : CM(u) = 1.
Optimal hiding gives the upper limit for commonness as there can be no better hiding than
in the crowd that consists of all other actors.
Property 2. No hiding: Given a definition of similarity, if a vertex is not similar to any other
vertex w.r.t. any centrality measure, the commonness of this vertex should be 0.
∀w 6= v ∈ V,C ∈ C C(v)  C(w)⇒ CM(v) = 0
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This property defines the lower bound for commonness and simply means that if an actor
cannot hide at all, s/he is maximally exposed and should get the lowest possible commonness
score.
Property 3. If one measure in the set of base centrality measures assigns the same score to all
vertices, removing this measure from the set should have no effect on the commonness scores.
∃x∀v ∈ V C(v) = x⇒ CMC(v) = CMC\C(v)
This axiom basically says that if a centrality measure C ∈ C is not able to distinguish
between the vertices (i.e. it assigns the exact same centrality score to all vertices), than it should
have no influence on the commonness score.
Given this desired properties, we can define specific commonness measures and see how
well they align with these properties.
Definition 13 (Common-ness Measure CM1). We can define commonness as the sum of the
squared distances separately for each dimension:










Definition 14 (Common-ness Measure CM2). Another way to define commonness is the fraction





If we think of the deviation from no informational value (that is when all actors have the
same centrality value) as an error, we can define commonness as the sum of the squared error over
all dimensions as in Definition 13. However, if the centrality measures are uncorrelated, measuring
the averageness of an actor independently for each measure can lead to undesired results. For
example, an actor might appear to be totally average w.r.t. all measures considered independently,
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but if the sets of actors he is similar to are large, but do not overlap for the different centrality
measure, there is no crowd he can hide in. To account for this, in Definition 14 the joint probability
distribution of all centrality measures is used.
We now investigate whether the two definitions have the desired properties. We start with
CM1.
Proposition 7. CM1 satisfies properties (1) and (2) but not (3).
Proof. It follows immediately for the definition that CM1 satisfies Property 1. If for a centrality
measure all vertices have the same value x, then for all centrality measures C there is a X so that
for all vertices v D{C}(v) = X and f(X) = 1. It follows immediately CM1(v) = 1−(1/1) = 0.
Property 2 is satisfied as well. If for a measure C and a vertex v for all other vertices w ∈ V
C(w) /∈ Iv (this is the definition of similarity ∼ of CM1), then D{C}(v) is empty. So, the sum
over all X in D{C} is 0, the whole fraction becomes k/k = 1 and CM(v) = 0. Finally, lets
have a look at Property 3 for CM1. Let us assume we have two centrality measures C1 and
C2, whereof C2 is non-distinguishing. For C1 the term
∑
X∈D{C}(v) g{C}(X) will have some
value a < 1 for every v while the term get 0 for C2 (compare discussion of Property 2). So
CM1({C1}, v) = 1 − a/1 while CM1({C1, C2}, v) = 1 − (a + 1)/2. Since a < 1 follows
CM1({C1}, v) 6= CM1({C1, C2}, v) and CM1 does not satisfy Property 3.
Proposition 8. CM2 satisfies all 3 properties (1)–(3).
Proof. The proof that CM2 satisfies Property 1 is similar to that for CM1. If for some set of
centrality measures C all vertices have the identical centrality vector X , for every v ∈ V the only
similar vector DC(v) is X . As all vectors are identical g(x) = 1 and so CM2(C, v) = 1 for every
v. Likewise, ifD{C}(v) is the empty set when there are not other vertices similar to a vertex v, i.e.
there is no w 6= v ∈ V with C(w) ∈ Iv. From D{C}(v) = ∅ follows CM2(· , v) = 0 and so CM2
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satisfies Property 2. To proof that Property 3 is satisfied goes as follows. Let Cn be a measure that
assign the same score s to every vertex. If we addCn to C we only extend the centrality vectors and
intervals by one dimension. As every vertex has the same centrality score of Cn, for every vector
Y = (y1, . . . , yk) in DC(v) there is a corresponding vector Yn = (y1, . . . , yk, s) in DC∪Cn(v). As
X = (x1, . . . , xk) we be extended to Xn = (x1, . . . , xk, s) it follows that gC(X) = gC∪Cn(Xn)
holds because of the correspondence between X and Xn.
Thus, CM2 satisfies all three properties we want a commonness measure to have, while
CM1 satisfies only the first two desired properties. As a consequence, CM2 seems to be the
epistemologically better choice.
2.2.2.2 Communication Potential
The communication potential should reflect the ability to communicate and cooperate to achieve
a common objective. This vague statement makes no point about which communication and co-
operation options are important to achieve the common goal. If only in-group connections are
important for achieving the group’s objective, we define the the communication potential based
on a centrality measure D and the group V̂ ⊂ V . Let Ĝ = (V̂ , Ê) be the induced subgraph of G
given by the group V̂ . Then the communication potential is CP1(v) = DĜ(v), i.e. the centrality
score of v on the graph Ĝ that is “of interest”. In a criminal or terrorist network application, V̂
might consist of vertices that an investigative agency has already uncovered - people they know are
suspicious for one reason or another — and the agency wants to “uncover” the rest of the covert
network. However, if the ability to communicate with people outside the group is important as
well, the entire graph G can be used to measure the communication potential: CP2(v) = DG(v).
Calculating CP1 requires knowledge of the group that a vertex is trying to communicate
with — a factor that can be problematic in the real world. Therefore, we can only calculate and
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compare CP1 and so the covertness centrality of the members of a group to each other. CP1
is undefined for actors that are not group members. So a covertness centrality measure based
on CP1 is suitable for explaining organizational structures of terror/criminal groups when V̂ is
known through other processes. In contrast, a covertness centrality score based on CP2 is defined
for every actor in a network. It can be used to answer generic questions such as “Where would
criminals try to hide?”
2.2.2.3 Covertness Centrality
In Section 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2 we discussed definitions of the two components of covertness cen-
trality: commonness and communication potential. There is no unique “best way” to combine
these two measure into one — any combination method would reflect a different judgment on the
importance of common-ness and communication. Let us assume that the communication potential
CP is normalized in a reasonable way to the interval [0, 1] like CM is. A possible family of
functions is
CC(v, τ, λ) =

0 , CM(v) < τ
λCM(v) + (1− λ)CP (v) , CM(v) ≥ τ
(2.3)
For τ = 0, CC is a classic trade-off between the two requirements. Additionally requiring a
minimum level τ of commonness would reflect an understanding that the communication potential
is irrelevant as long as the threat of being identified is too high. For the case of criminal networks,
the actual assessment of the trade-off is influenced by the type of illegal activity a groups pursues.
Morselli et al. [161] discuss that criminal for-profit organizations put more emphasis on efficiency,
while ideological groups like terrorists are primarily concerned with security.
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2.2.3 CC Computation using Sampling Methods
Calculating the exact commonness of a vertex requires calculating all base centralities for all
vertices. While the computational effort to calculate some centrality measures is low, e.g. degree
centrality, other centrality measures have a high runtime complexity, e.g. closeness and between-
ness centrality. Calculating the exact commonness for large graphs is a very time-consuming or
practical impossible task. However, if we are not interested in the covertness centrality of all
vertices but only for some, we can speed up the calculation.
We could estimate the probability gC(X) that a random vertex has a given centrality score








If we expect that the centrality scores follow a power-law distribution (as they e.g. usually
do for degree and betweenness centrality [90]), this sampling strategy might be problematic. We
can expect random sampling – and hence g̃C(X) – to tend to underestimate the size of the neigh-
borhood for vertices in the long tails of power-law distributions when the sample size is low. In
a similar but less significant way, centrality measures involving other distributions (e.g. closeness
centrality distributions which are usually bell-shaped) can be affected when large parts of the score
range have very low probabilities.
Let f̂C be the estimated joint probability distribution for the set of centrality measure C. The
continuous equivalent of CM1 (Definition 13) is


















f̂C(X)dXk . . . dX1 (2.6)
The equations are identical to their discrete counterparts except for the calculation of the estimated
number of vertices in the interval around v. The equivalence goes directly back to the derivation
of the integral as the approximation of a stepwise function with infinite steps.
As we can assume that many centrality measures have a power-law distribution and are at
least to some degree correlated to the degree centrality, an improved sampling technique might
also improve the accuracy of heuristic algorithms. Instead of simple random sampling, systematic
sampling [150] based on the degree of the vertices seems to be a good idea. Simple random
sampling means we randomly select vertices of V . For systematic sampling, we order all vertices
by degree. From a population of n vertices, we then select k vertices by taking every n/k-th vertex
starting from a randomly select start vertex among the first n/k-th vertices.
To summarize, the computation of commonness is based on the size of the similarity neigh-
borhood of a vertex, which can be computed in several ways:
1. Exact computation: Empirical distribution of all vertices in V
2. Heuristic computation based on simple sampling:
(a) Empirical distribution7
(b) Estimated distribution8
3. Heuristic computation based on systematic sampling:
(a) Empirical distribution
7 i.e. we compute the exact number of similar vertices based on the empirical distribution of the centrality scores
8 i.e. we compute the expected number of similar vertices based on the probability density of the estimated distribu-
tion of the centrality scores
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(b) Estimated distribution
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudo-code to compute covertness centrality for a set of vertices S
based on the empirical distributions of a set C of base centrality measures. The function sample
could be either a simple random or systematic sampling or could return all vertices V if we want to
compute exact scores. The communication potential measure D can be any centrality measure, Ĝ
is an arbitrary subgraph ofG (including Ĝ = G) to computeD on, CM is a commonness function
like those given in Eq. 2.1, 2.2, 2.5 and 2.6. The covertness function CC combines commonness
and communication potential as in Eq. 2.3.
Though the Covertness Centrality Algorithm (Algorithm 4) can take any distribution as
input, we note that the computation of commonness based on estimated distributions requires a
method to detect the type of distribution of centrality measure as well as the parameters of the
distribution — due to space constraints, we do not discuss 2(b) and 3(b) above.
Algorithm 4 Covertness Centrality
Input: Graph G = (V,E), set of vertices S, set of centrality measures C, communication potential measure D,
sampling function sampling, commonness function CM , covertness function CC, subgraph Ĝ
Output: covertness centrality scores list<Float> covertness
1: GetBaseCentralityScores
2: for v ∈ sample(V ) ∪ S do
3: for C ∈ C do
4: scores[v][C]← C(G, v)
5: GetCovertnessCentralityScores
6: for v ∈ S do
7: cm← CM(v, scores)
8: cp← D(v, Ĝ)




The covertness of actors is especially of interest for the analysis of large networks as only then is
there potentially a large crowd to hide in. Therefore, the computational complexity of algorithms
to compute covertness centrality is important. To compute the exact commonness of a vertex,
the base centrality score of all vertices for all centrality measures in C must be computed and the
most expensive one will determine the compound complexity. Eigenvector and shortest-path based
centrality measures have at least a quadratic run-time. However, for most measures, approximation
algorithms have been developed. For a discussion of centrality measure computation see [116].
Let n denote the number of vertices in a graph. Calculating the exact commonness has
a complexity equal to the sum of the base centrality measures plus the time to determine the
neighborhood of a vertex. If all the centrality vectors are stored in a range tree whose creation
takes O(n(log n)k−1), retrieving the similarity neighborhood of a vertex takes O((log n)k + t)
where t is the number of retrieved neighbors [25]. To calculate the covertness centrality of all
vertices only for all distinct centrality vectors, a neighborhood search is required. In most cases,
the dominating factor in the complexity of common-ness will originate from the calculation of
the base centrality measures, e.g. when the set of base centralities includes a shortest-path based
measure.
For some base centrality measures, sampling can speed up the calculation of common-
ness. Instead of calculating the empirical distribution of the centrality of all vertices, the empirical
distribution of a random sample can be used as shown (see Equation 2.4). This is beneficial for
all centrality measures where the individual centrality scores can be calculated independently for
each vertex. In the case of betweenness centrality, all source shortest paths have to be computed
for getting the score of one vertex and so individual score computation provides almost no benefit.
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For eigenvector centrality, computing the score of only one vertex is impossible as the scores of the
vertices are interdependent. If all scores have to be calculated, sampling would only decrease the
complexity of the similarity neighborhood search. For closeness centrality however, calculating
the scores of only a sample of vertices can dramatically decrease the runtime because in this case
the single source shortest path problem has to be solved for each and every vertex.
As discussed in Section 2.2.3 the simple strategy of using the empirical distribution of a
random sample will probably tend to underestimate the size of the neighborhood for vertices in
the long tails of power-law distributions. Estimating the parameter of a distribution based on the
sample is likely to provide higher accuracy for the same sample size. A second advantage would
be that instead of having to determine the similarity neighborhood of each vertex, we just need
to calculate the integral in Equation 2.5 or 2.6. For a graph with n vertices, a sample size of e.g.
log n would decrease the effort for getting the required closeness centrality scores from O(n3) to
O(n2 log n). We will evaluate required sample sizes in Section 2.2.4. The required sample size
depends on the sampling technique and the desired accuracy.
Systematic sampling instead of simple random sampling would require an additionalO(n log n)
to sort the vertices. For example, determining the closeness centrality score of one vertex takes
O(n2) time — so the advanced sampling technique would pay off if the same accuracy is achieved
with a minimal smaller sample size.
2.2.4 Evaluation
In this evaluation, we analyze the properties of the covertness centrality measures as well as the
algorithms to calculate them. For this evaluation, we use the testbed of real-world networks listed
in Table 2.7.
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Tab. 2.7: Real-world evaluation datasets. The Youtube networks are snowball samples from the original
dataset. URV is the abbreviation for Universitat Rovira i Virgili.
Network #Vertices #Edges Type Reference
URV 1133 10902 e-mail [103]
Youtube 40k 39998 85793 friendship [158]
Youtube 60k 59998 151481 friendship [158]
2.2.4.1 Measures
First, we study the results of the two different commonness definitions. We have already discussed
the fact that CM1 might have a problem when the different centralities in C are not correlated
because vertices that are very exposed w.r.t. one measure might still end up with high commonness
scores. This is what we see in Fig. 2.8. Vertices with low closeness centrality scores have lowCM2
scores because of the low probability density of closeness in that area. However, these vertices
have high CM1 scores as they have many vertices in their similarity neighborhood for other base
measures. That compensates for their rare closeness values.
Commonness is strongly negatively correlated to the base centrality measure degree, close-
ness, eigenvector and betweenness centrality. In Fig. 2.9 we see for λ = 1 (i.e. covertness is
measured by common-ness only) that the distribution density increases for higher common-ness
scores. For lower values of λ, i.e. for an increasing contribution of communication potential to
covertness centrality, the distribution of covertness gets closer to that one of the communication
potential measure. For λ = 0.25 the covertness centrality distribution is already very similar to






















Fig. 2.8: Scatter plot of the commonness scores according to CM1 and CM2 (based on the four base cen-
trality measures degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality and the URV dataset)
in relation to closeness centrality.
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Fig. 2.9: Distribution ofCC scores depending on different λ values whenCM2 (based on degree, between-
ness, closeness and eigenvector centrality) is used as the measure of commonness and closeness
centrality is used to measure CP and computed base on the whole graph.
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Fig. 2.10: Comparison of the rank correlation between the exact algorithm and the two sampling algorithm
with different sampling methods for the URV dataset.
2.2.4.2 Compute Time
We implemented CM1 and CM2 in Python and evaluated the performance on a standard desktop
machine. The scores of the base centralities were read from a file to evaluate the performance
of the covertness computation only. The runtime scales linearly with the number of vertices with
compute times of 0.1, 2, and 3 seconds respectively for our three test networks.
Beside the exact commonness algorithm we also studied the heuristic computation of the
sizes of the similarity neighborhoods based on sampling. Fig. 2.10 shows for both sampling
methods the Kendall τ rank correlation [129] of the commonness scores to the exact scores (with
no sampling) is very high — well over 0.95. To achieve the same accuracy than simple random
sample, systematic sampling requires a significantly lower sample size. More detailed results are
shown in Table 2.8 and Tab. 2.9.
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Tab. 2.8: Accuracy of sampling for different sampling methods and networks for CM1 measured with
Kendal’s τ .
Network Simple Systematic
20% 40% 60% 20% 40% 60%
URV 0.965 0.981 0.981 0.966 0.985 1.000
YouTube 40k 0.975 0.992 0.997 0.979 0.996 1.000
YouTube 60k 0.981 0.995 0.997 0.990 0.996 1.000
Tab. 2.9: Accuracy of sampling for different sampling methods and networks for CM2 measured with
Kendal’s τ .
Network Simple Systematic
20% 40% 60% 20% 40% 60%
URV 0.880 0.929 0.940 0.876 0.965 0.976
YouTube 40k 0.983 0.985 0.998 0.993 0.992 0.996
YouTube 60k 0.992 0.989 0.996 0.995 1.000 0.998
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2.3 Related Work
Several centrality measures have been proposed in graph theory and social network analysis:
degree centrality [83, 163], betweenness centrality [37, 82],PageRank [?], closeness central-
ity [177, 21], and eigenvector centrality [36]. Different variants of such centrality measures have
been proposed as well [42, 71, 4, 3, 172, 100]. Game-theoretic centrality measures have been
proposed in [114, 191].
Diffusion Centrality. One of the main differences between all of these centrality measures and
diffusion centrality is that the former only take the structure of the network into account, ignoring
properties of vertices as well as properties and weights of edges. As a consequence, any “seman-
tics” embedded in the network is completely neglected—for instance, two completely different
social networks (in terms of properties assigned to vertices and edges) that have the same topol-
ogy are treated in the same way.
Another drawback of the aforementioned centrality measures is that they do not take into
account the diffusive property with respect to which a vertex is considered “influential” or “cen-
tral”, as well as the model describing how such a property propagates. However, person A can
have the highest centrality in terms of spread of support for Republicans, while person B can be
the central player in terms of spread of support for conserving gorillas, so it becomes crucial to
take into account the property with respect to which vertices are considered influential.
As discussed in Section 2.1 and shown in our experimental evaluation, neglecting this in-
formation can cause serious problems that diffusion centrality overcomes, being able to take into
account both the semantics aspects of social networks and the diffusion model of interest. To the
best of our knowledge, classical centrality measures either do not capture these aspects or simply
ignore them.
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There has been extensive work in reasoning about diffusion in social networks. One well-
known and extensively studied problem is influence maximization, that is, the problem of identi-
fying a subset of vertices in a social network that maximizes the spread of influence. The problem
was first posed in [72] where diffusion processes were modeled as Markov random fields. The
problem was formulated as an optimization problem in the seminal paper [127], which mainly fo-
cuses on two propagation models: the independent cascade and the linear threshold models. [127]
shows that the influence maximization problem is NP-hard and provides an approximation greedy
algorithm (with approximation guarantees).
The algorithm proposed in [127] is extremely expensive and does not scale to large social
networks. To overcome this limitation, there have been numerous proposals aimed at achieving
better performance under the independent cascade and linear threshold models [128, 133, 143, 53,
54, 117, 93, 95, 56, 55, 96, 198, 43, 135]. Algorithms for the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible
(SIS) model have proposed as well [134, 178, 112].
All of the approaches reported above for the influence maximization problem consider re-
stricted diffusion models which suffer from various limitations when it comes to real-world propa-
gation as no properties and vertex/edge conditions are considered. In contrast, our approach deals
with very general diffusion models and takes social network semantic properties into account. The
language we consider can express several well-known diffusion models such as the independent
cascade, the linear threshold, the SIS and SIR models, the Jackson-Yariv model, and many oth-
ers. Being able to accurately model the diffusion process and incorporate the semantic aspects of
networks is fundamental for correct analysis of real-world diffusion phenomena.
Another well-studied related problem in computer science is the target set selection prob-
lem [119, 146, 58]. This problem assumes a deterministic tipping model and seeks to find a set of
vertices of a certain size that optimizes the final number of adopters. Although approximation al-
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gorithms for this problem have been discovered, there is no evidence that they scale well for large
datasets. Moreover, these approaches focus on specific diffusion models and neglect networks’
semantics.
Recently, after our paper on diffusion centrality [123], a few pieces of work have observed
that no individual can be a universal influencer, and influential members of the network tend to
be influential only in one or some specific domains of knowledge, highlighting that the research
on social influence has surprisingly largely overlooked this aspect [19, 47, 193]. Several theories
in sociology [136, 99] show that the effect of the social influence from various angles may be
different. This has led to the extension of the classic independent cascade and linear threshold
models to be “topic-aware” [19, 47] thus considering propagation with respect to a particular
topic. Approaches along this line but tailored for the microblogging setting have been proposed
in [202, 166]. Still, the diffusion models considered by these works are limited, as well as the
characteristics of the vertices and the edges of social networks.
A recent survey on different issues related to information diffusion in social networks
is [102]. A general framework to solve social network diffusion optimization problems that can
take a broad class of diffusion models as input has been proposed in [184], where diffusion models
are expressed via generalized annotated logic programs [131].
Covertness Centrality. The literature on different types of dark, hidden or covert networks of
criminal or terrorist groups is extensive. However, most existing literature deals with the network
among the members of a covert group only. In contrast, the situation we deal with in Section 2.2
is a large network (e.g. phone, e-mail) in which a small fraction of actors constitute a covert
sub-network in a larger (mostly innocent) population.
Our work is inspired by previous work on the conflict between the efficiency of commu-
nication in a terrorist group and the attempt to maintain secrecy. Lindelauf et al. [147] analyzed
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the trade-off between secrecy and information. Secrecy is defined by the exposure probability and
the link detection probability. The exposure probability is the probability that a group member
gets identified. Link detection probability is the probability that a covert actor is identified by
following a link of an already identified covert actor. The link detection probability refers to what
Gutfraind [104] denote as cascade resilience. In their case, a link is established if the resulting
communication efficiency outweighs the costs of potentially being identified by following that
link. In contrast, we see the costs of establishing a link with respect to the exposure an actor re-
ceives through it. So our approach is different, as for us covertness does not mean having the least
possible number of connections but having connections that appear unsuspicious.
There has been a small amount of work on detecting covert cells within networks. In such a
case, a group of individuals tries to stay hidden within a large network. However, most past works
on covert cell detection do not study the relationship between centrality measures and covert cell
structure. For instance, [20] discusses groups that try to camouflage communications - but the
idea that an adversary trying to uncover such covert groups may look at centrality measures is not
considered. In addition, there is work on detecting anomalous positions in a network - however, an
anomaly may occur not because someone is trying to hide while maintaining communications with
cell members but because an individual is in a location in the network that has skewed statistical
properties. Conversely, covertness is not anomalous - an individual trying to stay ”off the radar” is
making an explicit attempt to look ”normal” within the network and our notion of common-ness




Centrality is a fundamental concept in social network analysis. Each centrality measure quantifies
the relative importance of vertices in social networks w.r.t. a different analysis purpose. Many
centrality measures have been extensively studied and widely used in social influence analysis.
But there is no centrality measure to measure the influence of vertices with considering explicitly
diffusion process of diffusive properties over social networks. So, in Section 2.1, we propose the
novel concept of Diffusion Centrality and show how it can be computed with respect to diffusion
models expressed via generalized annotated programs (GAPs). We then present the HyperDC
algorithm that exactly computes diffusion centrality vertices w.r.t. any GAP-expressible diffusion
models. We conduct a very detailed experimental study on several real-world social networks.
The experiments compare the runtime and spread generated via the HyperDC algorithm with
classical centrality measures. Our results show that HyperDC runs very fast, comparable in time
to PageRank (and sometimes even degree centrality) for the Flickr and SIR models – but slightly
slower for the Jackson-Yariv model, while producing much better spread for all three diffusion
models.
In Section 2.2, we discuss the problem of constructing a measure that reflects covertness of
a vertex that combines elements of “common-ness” as well as communication efficiency in a social
network. Being covert in a network means hiding in a crowd of similar actors. It is motivated by
attempt to analyze how malicious actors in a network behave if they are aware that the network
is being monitored via a set C of centrality measures. Previous work on covertness focused on
how actors as parts of small covert networks optimize their position within the network only. We
extend those work by the broader view on large networks where covert network are embedded in.
We present several ways to construct a covertness centrality measure as well as ways to compute
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the scores of such measures. Given that the base centrality scores are known covertness centrality
can be computed efficiently. If the base scores are unknown, we show that with suitable sampling
techniques it is not necessary to determine the exact similarity neighborhoods. We develop an
algorithm to compute covertness centrality of nodes using different types of sampling methods,
showing that these sampling methods are highly correlated to methods without sampling and that
they can be computed relatively efficiently with small sample sizes.
Note. The material in Section 2.2 has been published in [165]. The authors agree that I made a
significant contribution and may use this work in my thesis.
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Chapter 3: Network Simplification
For very huge networks, it is not feasible to apply social network analysis techniques directly
and exactly. Due to the reason, several network sparsification and simplifications techniques have
been developed in order to help social influence analysis in such large social networks. But the
techniques do not consider diffusion process explicitly and semantic aspects (vertex and edge
properties) of social networks. Therefore, we develop new network coarsening techniques that
approximately preserves both structural and semantic properties of social networks with respect
to diffusion process (of a given diffusion model). In Section 3.1, first, we formulate a novel Graph
Coarsening Problem to find a succinct representation of any graph while preserving key charac-
teristics for diffusion processes on that graph. We then provide a fast and effective near-linear-
time (in nodes and edges) algorithm COARSENET. Then, in Section 3.2, we develop methods
to coarsen a network and propose a heuristic algorithm called “Coarsened Back and Forth” or
CBAF to compute the top-k vertices (having the highest diffusion centrality w.r.t. p) which is ex-
tended from COARSENET to support various diffusion process and semantica aspects of networks
in coarsening step mainly.
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3.1 Fast Influence-based Coarsening for Large Networks
3.1.1 Introduction
The unprecedented popularity of online social networking websites, such as Facebook, Google+,
Flickr, and YouTube, has made it possible to analyze real social networks. Word of mouth mar-
keting and viral marketing strategies have evolved to take advantage of this network structure by
utilizing network effects. Similarly, understanding large-scale epidemiological datasets is impor-
tant for designing effective propagation models and containment policies for public health. The
sheer size of today’s large social networks makes it challenging to perform sophisticated network
analysis.
Given a propagation graph, possibly learnt from cascade analysis, is it possible to get a
smaller nearly diffusion-equivalent representation for it? Getting a smaller equivalent graph will
help multiple algorithmic and data mining tasks like influence maximization, immunization, un-
derstanding cascade data and data compression. In this paper, we study a novel graph coarsening
problem with the aim of approximating a large social network by a much smaller graph that ap-
proximately preserves the network structure. Our primary goal is to find a compact representation
of a large graph such that diffusion and propagation processes on the large graph can be studied by
analyzing the smaller representation. Intuitively, most of the edges in a real network are relatively
unimportant; hence we propose characterizing and “contracting” precisely such edges in a graph
to obtain a coarse representation.
The main contributions of this paper are:
(a) Problem Formulation: We carefully formulate a novel Graph Coarsening Problem (GCP) to
find a succinct representation of a given social network so that the diffusion characteristics
of the network are mostly preserved.
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(b) Efficient Algorithms: We develop COARSENET, an efficient (near-linear time) and effective
algorithm for GCP, using careful approximations. We show that due to our novel scoring
technique, the coarsened graph retains most of the diffusive properties of the original net-
work.
(c) Extensive Experiments: We show that COARSENET is able to coarsen graphs up to 90% with-
out much loss of key information. We also demonstrate the usefulness of our approach via
a number of interesting applications. A major application we consider in this work is that
of influence maximization in the Independent Cascade model. We propose a framework
CSPIN that involves coarsening the graph and then solving influence maximization on the
smaller graph to obtain high quality solutions. As the coarsened graph is much smaller than
the original graph, the influence maximization algorithm runs orders of magnitude faster on
the coarsened graph. Further using real cascade data from Flixster, we show how GCP can
potentially help in understanding propagation data and constructing non-network surrogates
for finding nodes with similar influence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 5.7 gives related work and Sec-
tion 3.1.2 briefly gives the notation and explains some technical preliminaries. Section 3.1.3 pro-
vides a formal definition of the Graph Coarsening Problem that we introduce, while Section 3.1.4
presents our approach and solution. In Section 3.1.5, we show how our coarsening framework can
be applied to solve influence maximization on large networks. Finally, Section 4.7 gives experi-
mental results while we conclude in Section 4.9.
3.1.2 Preliminaries
Table 3.1 gives some of the notation.
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Tab. 3.1: Symbols
Symbol Definition and Description
A,B, . . . matrices (bold upper case)
~a,~b, . . . column vectors
aj or a(j) jth element of vector a
n number of vertices in the graphs
m number of edges in the graphs
α the reduction factor
λG first eigenvalue (in absolute value) of
adjacency matrix of graph G
~uG, ~vG Right and left first eigenvectors (for
λG) of adjacency matrix G
IC Model The Independent Cascade Model
GCP Graph Coarsening Problem (see Def-
inition 17)
COARSENET Our algorithm for GCP
IC Model. A social network is a directed, weighted graph G = (V,E,w). Usually each vertex
v ∈ V represents an individual of the network and edges represent influence relationships between
these individuals. The Independent Cascade (IC) model is a popular diffusion model used to model
the way influence propagates along the edges of a social network. In this setting, a vertex v ∈ V
is called active if it has been influenced and inactive otherwise. Once an inactive vertex becomes
active, it always stays active, i.e. we focus only on progressive models. Given a seed set S ⊂ V of
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initially active vertices, the Independent Cascade model proceeds in discrete time steps as follows.
At time step t, let St denote the set of vertices activated at time t. Every vertex u ∈ St is given
a single chance to activate each currently inactive neighbor v with probability of success w(u, v)
independently of all other interactions. If u succeeds, then v becomes active at time t + 1. This
diffusion process continues until no more activations are possible. The influence spread of seed
set S, denoted by σ(S), is the expected number of activated vertices at the end of the process.
3.1.3 Problem Formulation
Motivated by the fact that in any real network, most edges and vertices are not important (due to
the heavily skewed degree distributions), we propose a graph coarsening problem which involves
pruning away precisely such edges (and vertices). We aim to coarsen the graph to obtain a much
smaller representation which retains the diffusive properties. We coarsen a graph by successively
merging adjacent node pairs. We attempt to quickly find “good” edges which have little effect on
the network’s diffusive properties. At first glance, this seems impossible as the diffusive properties
of a graph are highly dependent on the connectivity of the vertices and edge weights. Further,
determining which node pairs to merge and analyzing the effect of merging two nodes on diffusion
are non-trivial. Informally, we study the following problem in this paper:
Definition 15 (Informal Problem).
INPUT: Weighted graph G = (V,E,w) and a target fraction 0 < α < 1
GOAL: Coarsen G by repeatedly merging adjacent node pairs to obtain a weighted graph H =
(V ′, E′, w′) such that
• |V ′| = (1− α)|V |
• Graph H approximates graph G with respect to its diffusive properties
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Role of Eigenvalues. In order to address the informal problem described above, we need a
tractable way to characterize the diffusive properties of a network. Recent work [169] shows
that for almost any propagation model (including the IC model), important diffusion character-
istics (in particular the so-called epidemic threshold) of a graph (after removing self loops) are
captured by the spectrum of the graph, specifically, by the first eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix.
Thus it is natural to believe that if the first eigenvalue of the coarsened graph H (its adjacency
matrix) is close to that of the original graph G, then H indeed approximates G well. Although the
work of [169] deals with undirected graphs, their findings are also applicable to strongly connected
directed graphs.
Merging node pairs. To explicitly formulate the problem in Definition 15, we also need to define
what happens when a node pair is merged (i.e. an edge is contracted) in a weighted graph. More
precisely, after merging neighboring vertices a and b to form a new node c, we need to determine
the new edge weights of all incoming and outgoing edges of c. In order to maintain the diffusive
properties of the network, we need to reweight the new edges appropriately.
x e d b a
cdex
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.50.5 0.5?
Fig. 3.1: Why reweight?
To see why this is crucial, consider Figure 3.1. Assume that the IC model is being run.
Suppose we need to pick the two best seeds (i.e. two nodes with the maximum influence spread
as defined in the previous Section) from the top 5-vertex chain. Further assume that the graph is
undirected and each edge has the same weight β = 0.5. Clearly, vertices b and e are the best. If we
merge vertices {a, b}, we get the bottom 4-vertex chain. To still match the original solution, we
correspondingly want {c, e} to be the best seed-set in the new chain—but if edge {d, c} remains
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the same weight, any of the pair of vertices {e, c} or {x, d} are the best seed sets in the 4-vertex
chain. This motivates the need to reweight suitably so that new coarsened graph still retains the
original characteristics.
The main insight is that if we select c as a seed, we are in-effect intending to choose only
one of vertices a and b to be seeded (influenced); which suggests that the likelihood of d being
influenced from c is either 0.5 or 0.25 (corresponding to when a or b is chosen respectively).
Hence the weight of edge (c, d) should be modified to reflect this fact.
We propose the following solution: Suppose e = (a, b) is contracted and a and b are merged
together to form “supervertex” c (say). We reweight the edges adjacent to a and bwhile coarsening
so that the edges now represent the average of the transmission probabilities via a or b. So in our
example of Figure 3.1, edge {c, d} would have weight 0.375 (average of 0.5 and 0.25). Further,








































Fig. 3.2: Reweighting of edges after merging node pairs
Extending the same principle, Figure 3.2 shows the general situation for any candidate node
pair (a, b) and how a merge and re-weight (= contract) operation will look like. More formally,
our contract operation is as follows:
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Definition 16 (Merging node pairs). LetNbi(v) (respectivelyNbo(v)) denote the set of in-neighbors
(resp. out-neighbors) of a vertex v. Let viu = w(u, v) and v
o
u = w(v, u) denote the weight of the
corresponding edges. If the node pair(a, b) is now contracted to a new vertex c, and w(a, b) = β1






































∀t ∈ Nbo(a) ∩Nbo(b)
Graph Coarsening Problem. We are now ready to state our problem formally. Motivated by
the connections between the diffusive and spectral properties of a graph, we define the following
Graph Coarsening Problem to find the set of node pairs which when merged (according to Defi-
nition 16) lead to the least change in the first eigenvalue. Further, since a vertex cannot influence
itself, we assume without loss of generality that the graph G has no self loops.
Definition 17 (Graph Coarsening Problem).
INPUT: Directed, strongly connected, weighted graph G = (V,E,w) without self loops and a
target fraction 0 < α < 1
OUTPUT: E∗ = arg minE′⊂E,|E′|=α|V | |λG − λG′ |, where G′ is obtained from G by merging all
node pairs in E′.
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A related problem is Edge Immunization [195] that asks for a set of edges whose removal
leads to the greatest drop in the first eigenvalue. In contrast, GCP seeks to find a set of edges
whose contraction (Definition 16) leads to the least change in the first eigenvalue. The Edge
Immunization problem is known to be NP-hard [195].
3.1.4 Our Solution
As obvious algorithms to GCP are clearly exponential, we propose a greedy heuristic that repeat-
edly merges a node pair which minimizes the change in the first eigenvalue. Let G−(a,b) denote
the graph G after merging nodes a and b (and incorporating the re-weighting strategy), and λG
denote the first eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of G. We define the score of a node pair(a, b)
as follows -
Definition 18 (Score). Given a weighted graph G = (V,E,w) and an adjacent node pair(a, b),
score(a, b) is defined by:
score(a, b) = |λG−(a,b) − λG| = ∆λ(a,b)
Intuitively, if score(a, b) ≈ 0, it implies that edges (a, b) and (b, a) do not play a significant
role in the diffusion through the graph and can thus be contracted. Figure 3.3 shows an example
of our approach.
Naı̈ve Algorithm: The above intuition suggests the following naı̈ve algorithm for selecting node
pairs for merging. At each stage, calculate the change in the eigenvalue due to merging each
adjacent node pair, choose the node pair leading to the least change, merge the chosen nodes,
and repeat until the graph is small enough. An implementation for this, even using the Lanczos
algorithm for eigenvalue computation for sparse graphs, will be too expensive, takingO(m2) time.
































































Fig. 3.3: Our approach on an example network. All edges have weight 0.5 in the original graph. We do not
show the new edge weights in the coarsened graph for clarity.
Main Idea: We use a matrix perturbation argument to derive an expression for the change in
eigenvalue due to merging two adjacent nodes. Using further information about the specific per-
turbations occurring due to merging two adjacent nodes, we show that the change in the eigenvalue
can be approximated well in constant time. Thus, we obtain a linear (O(m)) time scheme to esti-
mate the score of every pair of adjacent nodes.
3.1.4.1 Score Estimation
Let a and b denote the two neighboring vertices that we are trying to score. We assume that
the first eigenvalue of the graph λG and the corresponding right and left eigenvectors ~u,~v are
precomputed. Further since the graph G is strongly connected, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem,
the first eigenvalue λG and the eigenvectors ~u and ~v are all real and have positive components.
When it is clear from the context, we drop subscripts G and (a, b). In the proofs that follow
λ = λG and ∆λ = ∆λ(a,b) as there is no ambiguity. Let A denote the adjacency matrix of
the graph. Further as ~u denotes the eigenvector of A, let ua = u(a) denote the component of
~u corresponding to vertex a. Merging nodes changes the dimensions of the adjacency matrix A
which we handle by viewing merging nodes a, b as adding b′s neighbors to a and isolating node b.
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Approximation 9 provides an equation for the change in the eigenvalue by a matrix pertur-
bation argument. Proposition 10 and Proposition 11 show how our reweighting strategy helps us
to approximate the score(a, b) in constant time.
Approximation 9. The change in eigenvalue ∆λ can be approximated by ∆λ =
~vT∆A~u+ ~vT∆A∆~u
(~vT~u+ ~vT∆~u)
where ∆A denotes an infinitesimally small change in the adjacency matrix A and ∆~u denotes the
corresponding change in the eigenvector ~u.
JUSTIFICATION. By the definition of an eigenvalue and eigenvector of a matrix, we have
A~u = λ~u (3.1)
~vTA = ~vTλ (3.2)
Perturbing all values of (3.1) infinitesimally, we get
(A + ∆A)(~u+ ∆~u) ≈ (λ+ ∆λ)(~u+ ∆~u)
A∆~u+ ∆A~u+ ∆A∆~u ≈ λ∆~u+ ∆λ~u+ ∆λ∆~u
Premultiplying by ~vT and using (3.1) and (3.2),





Using expression (3.3) along with prior knowledge about the perturbations to the adjacency
matrix A and the eigenvector ~u, we obtain an expression for computing the score of the node pair.
Proposition 10 (Score Estimate). Under Approximation 9, the score of a node pair score(a, b)
can be approximated as
∆λ(a,b) =
−λ (uava + ubvb) + va~uT ~co + β2uavb + β1ubva
~vT~u− (uava + ubvb)
(ignoring second order terms).
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Proof. Approximation 9 provided an expression for ∆λ in terms of the change in the adjacency
matrix and the eigenvector. Now ∆A, i.e., change in the adjacency matrix can be considered as
occurring in three stages namely (i) Deletion of a, (ii) Deletion of b, (iii) Insertion of c. Assume




















where ~ev denotes a vector with a 1 in the vth row and 0 elsewhere. Further, as we modify only
two rows and columns of the matrix, this change ∆A is very small.
Also, deletion of vertices a and b cause ath and bth components of ~u and ~v to be zero. ∆~u,
i.e, change in the eigenvector ~u can thus be considered as setting ua and ub to zero, followed by
small changes to other components and to ua due to addition of c. Thus we obtain,
∆~u = −ua ~ea − ub~eb + ~δ (3.5)
Although ∆~u cannot be considered as small, we assume that the changes ~δ after setting ua
and ub components to zero are very small.
Substituting for ∆A, we get
~vT∆A~u = ~vT (−(~ai ~eaT + ~ea ~ao
T






Since ~vT ~ea = va and similarly,
~vT∆A~u = −ua~vT ~ai − va ~ao
T




T ~ci + va~co
T
~u
But ~vT ~ai = λva and ~ao
T
~u = λua and similarly,




Now using (3.4) and (3.5) consider,
~vT∆A∆~u = ~vT∆A(−ua ~ea − ub~eb + ~δ)
Since ∆A and ~δ are both very small, we ignore the second order term ~vT∆A~δ.
⇒ ~vT∆A∆~u = ~vT∆A(−ua ~ea − ub~eb)
= ~vT (−(~ai ~eaT + ~ea ~ao
T





))(−ua ~ea − ub~eb)
Since self loops do not affect diffusion in any way, we can assume without loss of generality that
G has no self loops. Further, simplifying using definitions of eigenvalue we get,
~vT∆A∆~u = λ(uava + ubvb) + β2uavb
+ β1ubva − ua~vT ~ci (3.7)
Ignoring small terms, we also have,
~vT∆~u = ~vT (−ua ~ea − ub~eb + ~δ) = −(uava + ubvb) (3.8)
Substituting (3.6),(3.7) and (3.8) in Approximation 9, we get
∆λ =
−λ (uava + ubvb) + va~uT ~co + β2uavb + β1ubva
~vT~u− (uava + ubvb)
Note that every term in this expression is a simple product of scalars, except for the ~uT ~co
term. We now show that even ~uT ~co can in fact be expressed in terms of scalars and can thus be
computed in constant time.
Proposition 11. Using the re-weighting scheme as defined in Definition 16, if c denotes the new




(λua − β1ub) +
(1 + β1)
2
(λub − β2ua) where β1 is the weight of edge (a, b) and β2 is
the weight of the edge (b, a).
Proof. Let X = Nbo(a) \ Nbo(b), Y = Nbo(b) \ Nbo(a), Z = Nbo(a) ∩ Nbo(b). Since, c is

















where W is the weight of a self loop added at c. Note that a self loop does not affect diffusion
in any way (as a node can not influence itself). We use a self loop only in the analysis so as to
compute the scores efficiently.

























bot )ut + ucW (3.9)






































t = λub − bo(Z)− β2ua (3.11)
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We now choose W = (−(1 + β2)
4
ao(Z)− (1 + β1)
4








Corollary 1. Given the first eigenvalue λ and corresponding eigenvectors ~u,~v, the score of a node
pair score(a, b) can be approximated in constant time.
Proof. Substituting for ~ut~co in Proposition 10 using Proposition 11, we obtain an expression for
score(a, b) that is composed entirely of scalar terms. Thus we can estimate the edge score in
constant time.
3.1.4.2 Complete Algorithm
Using the approximation described in the previous section, we assign a score to every pair of
adjacent nodes of the graph. We then sort these node pairs in ascending order of the absolute
value of their scores. Intuitively, we would like to merge a node pair if it has minimal score. Given
an upper bound of α, the graph is then coarsened by contracting αn node pairs one by one in this
order ignoring any pairs that have already been merged. We give the pseudo-code of our algorithm
COARSENET in Algorithm 5.
Lemma 1 (Running Time). The worst case time complexity of our algorithm is O(m ln(m) +
αnnθ) where nθ denotes the maximum degree of any vertex at any time in the coarsening process.
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Algorithm 5 Coarsening Algorithm - COARSENET(G,α)
Input: A directed, weighted graph G=(V ,E,w),
a reduction factor α
Output: Coarsened graph Gαcoarse=(V ′,E′,w′)
1: i = 0
2: n = |V |
3: G′ = G
4: for each adjacent pair of nodes a, b ∈ V do
5: Compute score(a, b) using Section 3.1.4.1
6: π ← ordering of node pairs in increasing order of score
7: while i ≤ αn do
8: (a, b) = π(i)
9: G′ ← ContractG′(a, b)
10: i++
11: return Gαcoarse = G′
Proof. Computing the first eigenvalue and eigenvector of the adjacency matrix of the graph takes
O(m) time (for example, using Lanczos iteration assuming that the spectral gap is large). As
shown in Section 3.1.4.1, each node pair can be assigned a score in constant time. In order to score
all m adjacent pairs of nodes of the graph, we require linear i.e. (O(m)) time. The scored node
pairs are sorted in O(m ln(m)) time. Merging two nodes (a, b) requires O(deg(a) + deg(b)) =
O(nθ) time. Since we each merge at most αn pairs of nodes, the merging itself has time complex-
ity O(αnnθ).




The eigenvalue based coarsening method described above aims to obtain a small network that ap-
proximates the diffusive properties of the original large network. As an example application, we
now show how to apply our graph coarsening framework to the well studied influence maximiza-
tion problem. Recall that given a diffusion model (IC model in our case) and a social network,
the influence maximization problem is to find a small seed set of k nodes such that the expected
number of influenced nodes is maximized.
Since we have designed our coarsening strategy such that nodes and edges important for
diffusion remain untouched, we expect that solving influence maximization on the coarsened graph
is a good proxy for solving it on the much larger original network. The major challenge in this
process is to determine how to map the solutions obtained from the coarsened graph back onto
the vertices of the original network. But due to the carefully designed coarsening strategy which
tries to keep important, candidate vertices unmerged, we observe that a simple random pull back
scheme works well in practice.
More formally, we propose the following multi-stage approach to solve influence maxi-
mization:
1. Coarsen the social network graph G by using Algorithm 5 to obtain a much smaller graph
Gcoarse. Let µ : V → Vcoarse denote a mapping from vertices of the original graph to those
of the coarsened graph.
2. Solve the influence maximization problem on Gcoarse to get k vertices s1, . . . , sk in the
coarsened graph that optimize the desired objective function. We can use any off-the-shelf
algorithm for influence maximization in this step. Since Gcoarse is much smaller than G,
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traditional algorithms for influence maximization can provide high quality solutions in little
time.
3. Pull back the solutions on to the vertices of the original graph. Given a seed si in Gcoarse,
we need to select a vertex v ∈ µ−1(si) from G as a seed. Multiple strategies can be
considered here such as v = argmaxu∈µ−1(si)(σ(u)) where σ(u) is the expected influence
by seeding u. However, thanks to our careful coarsening framework, we show that a simple
strategy of selecting a seed uniformly at random from µ−1(si) for every seed si performs
very well in practice.
Algorithm 6 describes our strategy to solve influence maximization problems. Note that a
similar strategy can be applied to study other problems based on diffusion in networks.
Algorithm 6 CSPIN: Influence Maximization Framework
Input: A weighted graph G=(V ,E,w), the number of seeds k, a reduction factor α
Output: A seed set S of k seeds
1: Gαcoarse, µ← COARSENET(G,α) (See Algorithm 5)
2: s′1, s′2, . . . , s′k ← InfluenceMaximization(Gαcoarse, k)
3: for i = 1, . . . , k do
4: si ← random sample from µ−1(s′i)
5: return S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk}
3.1.6 Experimental Evaluation
We performed several experiments to show the effectiveness of COARSENET algorithm and also
the GCP framework for cascade analysis.
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Tab. 3.2: Datasets: Basic Statistics
Dataset #Vertices #Edges Mean Degree
Flickr small 500,038 5,002,845 20.01
Flickr medium 1,000,001 14,506,356 29.01
Flickr large 2,022,530 21,050,542 20.82
DBLP 511,163 1,871,070 7.32
Amazon 334,863 1,851,744 11.06
Brightkite 58,228 214,078 7.35
Portland 1,588,212 31,204,286 39.29
Flixster 55,918 559,863 20.02
Datasets All experiments were conducted on an Intel Xeon machine (2.40 GHz) with 24GB
of main memory1. We used a diverse selection of datasets from different domains to test our
algorithm and framework (see Table 3.2). These datasets were chosen for their size as well as
the applicability to the diffusion problem. COARSENET was tested on data from Flickr, DBLP,
Amazon, Brightkite and Portland epidemiology data. In the Flickr data, vertices are users, and
links represent friendships [49]. In the DBLP data, vertices represent authors and edges represent
co-authorship links. Brightkite is a friendship network from a former location-based social net-
working service provider Brightkite. In the Amazon dataset, vertices are products and an edge
represents that the two products are often purchased together. The Portland dataset is a social
contact graph of vertices representing people and edges representing interactions—it represents
a synthetic population of the city of Portland, Oregon, and has been used in nation-wide small-
1 Code at: http://www.cs.vt.edu/˜badityap/CODE/coarsenet.tgz
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pox studies [77]. Finally, we also used a real cascade dataset Flixster2, where cascades of movie
ratings happen over a social network.
3.1.6.1 Performance for the GCP problem
We want to measure the performance of COARSENET algorithm on the GCP problem. In short,
we can coarsen up to 70% of node-pairs using COARSENET, and still retain almost the same
eigenvalue.
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3.1.6.1.1 Effectiveness As a baseline we used RANDOM, a random node-pair coarsening algo-
rithm (randomly choose a node-pair and contract), used in some community detection techniques.
Figure 3.4 shows the values of λ as the reduction factor α increases when we ran COARSENET and
RANDOM on three datasets (we set a weight of 0.02 for this experiment). We observed that in all
datasets, as the reduction factor α increases, the values of λ barely change for COARSENET, show-
ing that the diffusive properties are maintained even with almost 70% contraction; while RANDOM
destroyed the eigenvalue very quickly with increasing α. This shows that (a) large graphs can in
fact be coarsened to large percentages while maintaining diffusion; and (b) COARSENET effec-
tively solves the GCP problem. As we show later, we apply the GCP problem and COARSENET
on a detailed sample application of influence maximization.
3.1.6.1.2 Scalability Figure 3.5 shows the running times of COARSENET w.r.t. α and n. To
analyze the runtime of COARSENET with respect to graph size (n), we extracted 6 connected
components (with 500K to 1M vertices in steps of 100K) of the Flickr large dataset. As expected
from Lemma 1, we observe that in all datasets, as the reduction factor α increases, the running
time increases linearly (figures also show the linear-fit, with R2 values), and scale near-linearly as
the size of the graph increases. This demonstrates that COARSENET is scalable for large datasets.
3.1.6.2 Application 1: Influence Maximization
Here we demonstrate in detail a concrete application of our GCP problem and COARSENET al-
gorithm to diffusion-related problems. We use the well-known Influence Maximization problem.
The idea as discussed before is to use the Coarsen-Solve-Project CSPIN framework (see Sec-
tion 3.1.5). In short we find that we obtain 300× speed-up on large networks, while maintaining
the quality of solutions.
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(c) Brightkite (d) Flickr (Varying sizes)
Fig. 3.5: Scalability of COARSENET for GCP. (a,b,c) Linear w.r.t. α. (d) Near-linear w.r.t. size of graph.
Propagation probabilities: Since accurate propagation probabilities for these networks are not
available, we generate propagation probabilities according to two models following the literature.
• Uniform: Each edge is assigned a low propagation probability of 0.02. In most real social
networks, the propagation probabilities are known to be low. For example, [49] find that the
propagation probability in the Flickr network is about 1-2%.
• Trivalency: We also test on the trivalency model studied in [54]. For every edge we choose
a probability uniformly at random from the set {0.1, 0.01, 0.001} which correspond to the
edge having high, medium and low influence respectively.
Algorithms and setup: We can use any off-the-shelf algorithm to solve Inf. Max. problem on
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the smaller coarsened network. Here, we choose to use the fast and popular PMIA [54] algorithm.
We then compared the influence spreads and running-times of the CSPIN framework with the plain
PMIA algorithm to demonstrate gains from using GCP.
3.1.6.2.1 Effectiveness Quality of solution (Influence spread). In all experiments, the influ-
ence spread generated by our CSPIN approach is within 10% of the influence spread generated
by PMIA. In some cases, we even perform slightly better than PMIA. Figure 3.6(a) shows the
expected spread obtained by selecting k = 1000 seeds on five datasets. For these experiments, the
percentage of edges to merged is set at 90% and we use the uniform propagation model.
Quality w.r.t α. We find that we can merge up to 95% of the edges while still retaining influ-
ence spread. As more edges are merged, the coarsened graph is smaller; so the superseeds in
Gαcoarse can be found faster and thus we expect our running time to decrease. We ran tests on the
Flickr medium dataset for 1000 seeds and varied α from 80% to 95%. Figure 3.6(b) shows the
ratio of the expected influence spread obtained by CSPIN to that obtained by PMIA is almost 1 with
varying α.
Quality of solution: Effect of unbiased random pullback.








100 58996.6 58984.8 5.061× 10−5
COARSENET groups nodes which have similar diffusion effects, hence choosing any one of



































































(c) Running times vs α on Flickr medium
Fig. 3.6: Effectiveness of CSPIN. Ratio of influence spread between CSPIN and PMIA for (a) different
datasets; (b) varying α. (c) Running time vs α.
CSPIN). Note we do not claim that these groups belong to link-based communities—only that their
diffusive effects are similar. To demonstrate this, we performed 100 trials of the random pullback
phase for the Flickr small graph. For these trials, 1000 superseeds were found by coarsening 90%
of the edges. In each trial, we use these same superseeds to find the 1000 seeds independently and
uniformly at random. Table 3.3 shows that the coefficient of variation of the expected spread is
only 5.061× 10−5.
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3.1.6.2.2 Scalability Scalability w.r.t number of seeds (k). As the budget k increases, we
see dramatic performance benefits of CSPIN over PMIA. We run experiments on Flickr small, and
Portland by setting α = 90%, and k varied from 0.01% to 1% of |V |. Figure 3.7(a,b) shows the
total running times (including the coarsening). Due to lack of space we show only the results for
the trivalency model (the uniform case was similar). In all datasets, as k increases, the running
time of CSPIN increases very slowly. Note that we get orders of magnitude speed-ups: e.g. on

















































































































(c) Flickr (Varying sizes)
Fig. 3.7: Scalability of CSPIN. (a,b) vs k; (c) vs size of graph. CSPIN gets increasing orders-of-magnitude
speed-up over PMIA.
Scalability w.r.t α. We can see that the running time also drops with increased coarsening as seen
in Figure 3.6(c).
Scalability w.r.t n. We ran CSPIN on the components of increasing size of Flickr large with
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k = 1000 and α = 90%. Figure 3.7(c) plots the running times: CSPIN obtains a speed up of
around 250× over PMIA consistently.
3.1.6.3 Application 2: Diffusion Characterization
We now briefly describe how the GCP problem can help in understanding cascade datasets in an
exploratory setting.
Methodology: We used a Flixster dataset, where users can share ratings of movies with friends.
There is a log-file which stores ratings actions by each user: and a cascade is supposed to happen
when a person rates the same movie soon after one of her friends. We use the methodology of [94]
to learn influence probabilities of a IC-model over the edges of the friendship network from the
traces. We then coarsen the resulting directed graph using COARSENET to α = 50%, and study
the formed groups (supernodes). Note that this is in contrast to the approaches where the group
information is supplied by a graph-partitioning algorithm (like METIS), and then a group-based IC
model is learnt. The base network had 55, 918 nodes and 559, 863 edges. The trace-log contained
about 7 million actions over 48, 000 movies. We get 1891 groups after removing groups with only
one node, with mean group size 16.6 with the largest group having 22061 nodes (roughly 40% of
nodes).
Distribution of movies over groups: Figure 3.8 shows the histogram of the # of groups reached
by the movie propagations (following [155], we assume that a movie reaches a group if at least
10% of its nodes rated that movie). We show only the first 100 points of the distribution. We
observe that a very large fraction of movies propagate in a small number of groups. Interestingly
we observe a multi-modal distribution, suggesting movies have multiple scales of spread.
Groups through the lens of surrogates: An important point to note is that our groups may not be
link-based communities: we just ensure that nodes in a group have the same diffusive properties.
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Fig. 3.8: Distribution of # groups entered by movie traces.
We validated this observation in the previous section (Table 3.3). Hence a natural question is if
groups found in Flixster have any other natural structure (e.g. demographics)—if they do, we can
get a non-network external surrogate for similar diffusive characteristics. Fortunately, the Flixster
does contain a couple of auxiliary features for its users (like ID, Last Login, Age). We calculated
the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) for ‘Age’ inside each group, and compared it with the MAE
across groups. We found that the average MAE inside the group is very small (within 2 years)
compared to a MAE of almost 8 outside, which implies that ages are concentrated within groups
and can act as surrogates for diffusive characteristics.
Note. The material in Section 3.1 has been published in [171]. The authors agree that I made a
significant contribution and may use this work in my thesis.
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3.2 CBAF Algorithm for Approximating kDCP
The goal of this section is to develop our Coarsened Back and Forth (CBAF) algorithm to
approximately compute the top-k diffusion centrality vertices in huge social networks where it is
not feasible to compute DC for all vertices.
Top-k Diffusion Centrality Problem (kDCP). Given a 0 < k < |V |, the top-k diffusion central-
ity problem consists of finding a set T of k vertices of S having the highest DC, i.e. the DC of
every vertex in T is greater than or equal to the DC of every vertex in V − T .
The basic idea is to coarsen the original social network S into a smaller network S ′ which
tries to preserve the “diffusive behavior” of S. The top-k vertices are then computed over S ′ and
the solution is mapped back to a subgraph of S on which we again compute the top-k vertices.
Given a social network S, a GAP Π, and a property p, CBAF performs the following steps:
1. Compute the filtering S ′ of S;
2. Coarsen S ′ by merging its vertices so as to obtain a new social network SC and a mapping
from the vertices of S ′ to the vertices of SC ;
3. Compute a set TC of top-k vertices of SC ;
4. Use TC to compute an approximate set of top-k vertices of S.
The first step has already been described in Section 2.1.4.1, while the other steps will be
detailed in the rest of this section. The notations of the following sections are summurized in
Section Ap.1.4.
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3.2.1 Social Network Coarsening
This section proposes a new semantical coarsening technique that reduces network size by merging
together vertices that are similar, while trying to preserve the structural and semantic properties
of the network w.r.t. a property p. The coarsening process involves the following issues: (i) how
to select “similar” vertices to be merged together, (ii) how to assign properties to a merged vertex
and to its edges after merging, and (iii) how to compute edge weights between merged vertices.
These issues are addressed in the following subsections.
3.2.1.1 Vertex Similarity
CBAF can work with any mechanism to determine whether two vertices are similar. Throughout
this paper, we assume that given any vertex v, there is a set SIM(v) ⊆ V of vertices that are
similar to it. Such a function SIM can obviously be defined in many ways. We provide one
such way of defining SIM that takes the diffusion model for p into account (as well as the social
network structure).
Consider an SN S, a GAP Π, and a property p. Given two vertices u and v of S, we write
u ∼ v iff u and v activate the same set of rules of Π (cf. Section 2.1.4.1 for the the notion of
“activation”). Using this equivalence relation, we define SIMΠ(v) = {u ∈ V | u ∼ v}.
Obviously, many other definitions are also possible, but this is the one used in our experi-
ments.












































Fig. 3.9: An HIV social network. Shaded vertices denote people with HIV.
The set of vertices that activate rules r1, r2, and r3 are, respectively:
{a, b, c, e, f, g, h, k, l,m, n}
{a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, k, l,m, n, o, p, q}
{a, b, c, e, f, g, h, k, l,m, n}
Thus, SIMΠ(x) = {a, b, c, e, f, g, h, k, l,m, n} for all x ∈ {a, b, c, e, f, g, h, k, l,m, n} and
SIMΠ(x) = {d, o, p, q} for all x ∈ {d, o, p, q} . Notice that vertices i and j are unnecessary.
3.2.1.2 Vertex Merging
We now define how to merge similar vertices. When a set of vertices is merged into a new vertex
v, we have to specify vertex properties of v, as well as associated edge properties/weights.
Definition 19 (Vertex properties merging). Let S be an SN and {v1, . . . , vn} be a subset of the
vertices of S (to be merged). For each p ∈ VP, let gp : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be any associative and
commutative function. Then, the new vertex has the set of properties
mergeVP({v1, . . . , vn},VL) = {p ∈ VP | gp(ϑ(v1, p), . . . , ϑ(vn, p)) = 1}
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where ϑ(vi, p) = 1 if p ∈ VL(vi), otherwise ϑ(vi, p) = 0.
The above definition assumes the existence of a function gp that takes the values (0 or 1) of
the p-property of the vertices being merged and combines them into a single 0 or 1 value denoting
whether the merged vertex has property p or not.
Consider the social network shown in Figure 3.9 where the only vertex property is hiv. Some
examples for the function ghiv can be g′hiv(x1, . . . , xn) = min1≤i≤n
xi, computing the property
intersection, or g′′hiv(x1, . . . , xn) = max1≤i≤n
xi, computing the property union. Suppose we want
to merge the vertices in the set V ′ = {l,m, n}. If we use g′hiv, the resulting merged vertex
will not have any property as mergeVP(V ′,VL) = ∅, while if we use g′′hiv, the resulting
merged vertex will have the set of properties mergeVP(V ′,VL) = {hiv}. We can also use a
“majority” function where the new vertex has the property p if the majority of the vertices in
V ′ have the property p.
We now address the problem of assigning edges to the new merged vertex. Let S =
(V,E,VL, ω) be an SN and V ′ = {v1, . . . , vn} be a subset of V to be merged into a new ver-
tex v′. For each edge (v, u, ep) ∈ E such that either v ∈ V ′ and u ∈ V \ V ′ or u ∈ V ′ and
v ∈ V \ V ′, the new vertex v′ will have the outgoing edge (v′, u, ep) if v ∈ V ′, or the incoming
edge (v, v′, ep) if u ∈ V ′. For instance, consider the SN in Figure 3.9 and suppose we are merg-
ing vertices e and g into a new vertex e′. Then, the new edges involving vertex e′ are shown in
Figure 3.10.
We now define how to assign a weight to an arbitrary set of edges (having the same label)
in S = (V,E,VL, ω).
Definition 20 (Edge weighting). Let S = (V,E,VL, ω) be an SN and ep ∈ EP. Moreover, let






































Fig. 3.10: Social network of Figure 3.9 after merging vertices e and g into vertex e′.
ep, and gep : (0, 1]m → (0, 1] be any associative and commutative function. Then, we define
weight({e1, . . . , em}) = gep(ω∗(e1), . . . , ω∗(em))
where ω∗(e) = ω(e) if e ∈ E, otherwise ω∗(e) = 0.
Given two sets of vertices V ′ and V ′′ and an edge property ep ∈ EP, we define the set
possEdges(V ′, V ′′, ep) as the set of all possible edges having property ep that can exist from ver-
tices in V ′ to vertices in V ′′, i.e. possEdges(V ′, V ′′, ep) = {(v′, v′′, ep) | v′ ∈ V ′ ∧ v′′ ∈ V ′′}.
Finally, if v′ is a new vertex obtained by merging a set V ′ of vertices and e′ = (v, v′, ep) is a new
incoming edge then its weight is computed as weight(possEdges({v}, V ′, ep)), while, if e′′ =
(v′, v, ep) is a new outgoing edge, then its weight is computed asweight(possEdges(V ′, {v}, ep)).
3.2.1.3 Social Network Coarsening
We are now ready to give the definition of social network coarsening.
Definition 21 (Social network coarsening). Let S = (V,E,VL, ω) be an SN and θ be a real
number in (0, 1] called the contraction factor. A coarsening of S is an SN S ′ = (V ′, E′,VL′, ω′)
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together with an onto mapping π : V → V ′ satisfying the following properties:
• |V ′| ≤ θ · |V |;
• E′ = {〈π(v1), π(v2), ep〉 | 〈v1, v2, ep〉 ∈ E ∧ π(v1) 6= π(v2)};
• VL′(v′) = mergeVP({v ∈ V | π(v) = v′},VL) for each v′ ∈ V ′;
• ω′(e′) = weight(possEdges(π−1(v1), π−1(v2), ep)), for each
e′ = 〈π(v1), π(v2), ep〉 ∈ E′.
Thus, coarsening a social network S yields a new social network S ′ together with a mapping
π from the vertices of S to the vertices of S ′ such that (i) the number of vertices of S ′ is smaller
than that of S by a factor θ; (ii) if there was an edge between two vertices u and v in S, and u has
been merged into a new vertex u′ in S ′ while v has been merged into a new vertex v′ 6= u′ in S ′,
then there is an edge between u′ and v′ in S ′; (iii) the vertex properties of each merged vertex of
S ′ are assigned using function mergeVP ; and (iv) the weights of the edges of S ′ are assigned by
function weight.
Consider an SN S = (V,E,VL, ω) and let S ′ = (V ′, E′,VL′, ω′) and π : V → V ′ be a
coarsening of S. Given V ′′ ⊆ V ′, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote by π−1(V ′′) the set
{v ∈ V | π(v) ∈ V ′′}.
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Algorithm 7 CoarsenSN
Input: A social network S = (V,E,VL, ω), a GAP Π, a contraction factor θ ∈ (0, 1], a similarity function SIM , a
neighbors threshold ρ ∈ (0, 1],
, a vertex properties merging function mergeVP , and an edge weight function.
Output: A coarsening S ′ = (V ′, E′,VL′, ω′) and π : V → V ′ of S.
1: S ′ = (V ′, E′,VL′, ω′) = (V,E,VL, ω);
2: π(v)← v for all v ∈ V ;
3: R← V ′, cont← true;
4: while ((|V ′| > θ · |V |) ∧ cont) do
5: Randomly select a vertex v ∈ R;
6: M ← getMergingSet(v,S ′,Π, SIM, ρ); R← R \ (M ∪ {v});
7: if (M 6= ∅) then
8: VL′(v)← mergeVP({v} ∪M,VL′);
9: π(v′)← v for all v′ ∈ π−1(v); π(v′)← v for all v′ ∈M ;
10: V ′ ← V ′ −M ; 〈E′, ω′〉 ← UpdateEdges(E′, ω′, v,M,weight, π);
11: if (R = ∅) then
12: cont← false;
13: return 〈S ′, π〉;
14:
15: getMergingSet(v,S ′,Π, SIM, ρ)
16: U = all neighbors of vertex v in S ′;
17: U ′ = U ∩ SIM(v);
18: Randomly select a set M ⊆ U ′ of size |M | = ρ · |U ′| ;
19: return M ;
20:
21: updateEdges(E′, ω, v,M,weight, π)
22: E′′ = {〈π(v1), π(v2), ep〉 | 〈v1, v2, ep〉 ∈ E′ ∧ π(v1) 6= π(v2)};
23: for each e′ = 〈π(v1), π(v2), ep〉 ∈ E′′ do
24: ω′(e′)← weight(possEdges(π−1(v1), π−1(v2), ep)) ;
25: return 〈E′′, ω′〉;
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Algorithm 7 is a general algorithm for coarsening a social network. It starts by initializing
the mapping function π as the identity function. In each iteration, a vertex v in the current SN
is randomly selected, and the set of vertices to be merged with it is computed by the function
getMergingSet. This function computes the set U ′ of all v’s neighbors that are similar to v
according to the similarity function SIM received as input, and returns a subset M of U ′ whose
size is a percentage ρ of |U ′|. If the set of vertices M is not empty, vertex v is merged with M ,
otherwise a new vertex v is randomly selected. If v is merged with M , the new vertex properties
of v are computed using the mergeVP function, the mapping π is updated, and the set of edges
is updated by the function UpdateEdges. This function first computes the new set of edges so
that if there was an edge between a vertex in M ∪ {v} and another vertex u, now there is an edge
between v and u, while the new edge weight is computed by using the function weight received
in input. The algorithm’s iterations stop when either the number |V ′| of vertices in the current SN
is less than or equal to θ · |V ′|, where θ is the contraction factor establishing the desired size of the
coarsened network, or it is not possible to merge any other vertex. Of course, Algorithm 7 can be
used with our similarity function SIMΠ.
3.2.2 Adapting the DC Definition to the Coarsened Network
We now adapt diffusion centrality to the case of coarsened networks. This intermediate step will
later be used in the computation of diffusion centrality for vertices of the original network.
When a set of vertices M in the original network S is merged into a single vertex v′ in
the coarsened one, v′ represents the network Sv′ consisting of all vertices in M and all edges
among them from the original network. Thus, even if two vertices v′ and v′′ have the same
diffusion centrality on the coarsened network, the actual diffusion of the property of interest in the
original network among the vertices belonging to Sv′ and Sv′′ may be different and depends on
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the properties of the two subnetworks Sv′ and Sv′′ (number of vertices, edges, density, etc.). To
take this into account, we assign a weight to each vertex v′ in the coarsened network representing
the importance of vertex v′ w.r.t. to the original network.
Definition 22 (Diffusion centrality on a coarsened network). Let S be a social network, SC =
(VC , EC ,VLC , ωC) be a coarsening of S with vertex mapping π, andmvw be a function assigning
a weight to each vertex in VC . Then, the diffusion centrality of a vertex v in the coarsened SN is
defined as
dc′Π,p,SC (v) = Σv′∈VC−{v}
(






mvw(v′′) · lfp(Π ∪ΠSC	p(v))(p(v
′′))
)
Function mvw, which we call merged vertex weight function, can be defined in several
ways. Below we provide three alternative definitions. Consider an SN S = (V,E,VL, ω), and let
SC and π be a coarsening of S. Given a vertex v of SC ,
• mvw0(v) = 1. In this case, the original definition of DC is used.
• mvw1(v) = |Vv| × |Ev ||Vv |2−|Vv | =
|Ev |
|Vv |−1 ,
where Vv = π−1({v}) and Ev = {〈v1, v2, ep〉 | v1, v2 ∈ Vv ∧ 〈v1, v2, ep〉 ∈ E}. In
this case, the weight of v is given by the number of vertices in the original SN that were
merged to form v multiplied by the density of the (sub)network Sv represented by v. The
idea behind this is that if Sv has high density and many vertices, the weight of v should be
high.
• mvw2(v) = ln(mvw1(v)) + 1.
Here, we consider the fact that the diffusion of the property p can rapidly decrease according
to the distance of vertices in Vv from the diffusion source vertex v. Thus, mvw2(v) reduces
the effect of mvw1(v) on the diffusion centrality by taking its natural log plus 1.
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Algorithm 8 CBAF (Approximate Top-k)
Input: An SN S = (V,E,VL, ω), a GAP Π, a property p, an integer k,
a set of options opts as described in Table 3.4.
Output: An approximate set of top-k vertices.
1: S ′ = (V ′, E′,VL′, ω′)← networkF iltering(S,Π, p)
2: 〈SC = (VC , EC ,VLC , ωC), π〉 ← CoarsenSN(S ′,Π, opts)
3: TC ← computeTopK(SC , k,mvw) % Use HyperDC
4: TC = TC ∪ nbrs(TC , dC ,SC)
5: VI = π−1(TC) ∪ nbrs(π−1(TC), dI ,S)
6: SI = (VI , EI ,VLI , ωI)← SN induced from S by the vertices in VI
7: return computeTopK(SI , k,mvw0)
3.2.3 CBAF: Approximately Solving the kDCP Problem
In this subsection we show how to approximately compute the top-k diffusion centrality vertices
in a social network S = (V,E,VL, ω). First, we introduce some definitions.
Definition 23 (Induced social network). Given an SN S = (V,E,VL, ω), the SN induced from S
by a set of vertices VI ⊆ V is SI = (VI , EI ,VLI , ωI), where EI = {〈v1, v2, ep〉 | 〈v1, v2, ep〉 ∈
E ∧ v1, v2 ∈ VI}, VLI(v) = VL(v) for all v ∈ VI , and ωI(e) = ω(e) for all e ∈ EI .
Given an SN S = (V,E,VL, ω), a set of vertices T ⊆ V , and a positive integer d, we
denote by nbrs(T, d,S) the set of the neighbors of the vertices in T at distance at most d. If
d = 0, then nbrs(T, d,S) = ∅.
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θ ∈ (0, 1] contraction factor mvw merged vertex weight function
SIM similarity function dC neighbors distance for extending
ρ ∈ (0, 1] neighbors threshold the set TC
mergeVP vertex properties merging function dI neighbors distance for extending
weight edge weight function the set π−1(TC)
Tab. 3.4: Input options opts for Algoritm 8.
We are now ready to present our CBAF algorithm shown in Algorithm 8. CBAF takes
as input a social network S , a GAP Π, a property p, an integer k, and a set of options opts as
described in Table 3.4. It returns an (approximate) set of top-k diffusion centrality vertices over S.
The first step of the algorithm filters out the original SN S by removing all unnecessary vertices,
obtaining the network S ′ (line 1). Then S ′ is coarsened into a smaller social network SC (line 2),
and the exact set TC of top-k vertices over SC is computed (line 3) by running HyperDC to find
the diffusion centrality of all vertices in S ′ and choosing the top-k. At this point the set TC is
extended with its neighbors in SC at distance at most dC so that the following computation is not
biased by the vertices in TC (line 4). Next, the above set of vertices is mapped back to the vertices
of the original SN S and is extended with its neighbors on S at distance at most dI obtaining the
set of vertices VI (line 5). After that, the social network SI induced from the vertices in VI on
S is computed (line 6), and the algorithm returns the approximate set of top-k vertices over S as
the exact set of top-k diffusion centrality vertices computed over SI (line 7). Note that CBAF first
evaluates diffusion centrality of all vertices in the coarsened network S ′ (which is typically small)
and then diffusion centrality of all vertices in a subgraph of the original network corresponding to
the neighborhood of vertices associated with the solution found in line 3 of the CBAF algorithm.
This is typically a small fraction of the vertices in the original social network S.
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3.2.4 CBAF Algorithm: Performance Experiments
We implemented CBAF (Algorithm 8) in Java and tested scalability, runtime, and spread of CBAF
with networks of up to 2M vertices and 20M edges (Section 3.2.4). In this section, we describe
experiments we performed to compare CBAF with HyperDC in terms of both runtime and spread.
Simply put, these experiments show that CBAF almost always achieves the same spread as Hy-
perDC with a runtime that is always lower (with the correct choice of settings) than HyperDC—
moreover, sometimes it takes less than half the runtime of HyperDC.
Input Options for CBAF. There are a number of input options for CBAF that influence its per-
formance. In order to find the best possible input options, we ran extensive experiments in which
1944 different candidate option sets were considered. The three option sets that achieved a good
balance between runtime and spread are reported in Table 3.5—these were the options we used in
our experiments with CBAF.
label dC dI weight mergeVP mvw ρ
OP1 1 0 max majority mvw1 1.0
OP2 1 0 max intersect mvw1 1.0
OP3 1 0 average majority mvw0 1.0
Tab. 3.5: Best Input Options for CBAF
In all experiments, we used the vertex similarity function SIMΠ defined earlier. The con-
traction factor θ was chosen from the set {0.2, 0.3, 0.4}.
CBAF Evaluation Measures. We used two measures to evaluate CBAF. The time ratio is simply
the ratio of time taken by CBAF vs. HyperDC. The spread ratio is the ratio of spread according to
CBAF (assuming the top-k vertices have property p) vs. that according to HyperDC.
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We experimentally compared HyperDC and CBAF over 4 datasets — these included the
two largest STEAM networks (GAME420 with 1.3M vertices and 12.43M edges, GAME220 with
2.03M vertices and 20.59M edges) and the 2 largest non-game social networks (Email-Eu and
Douban) together with the Flickr, Jackson-Yariv, and SIR diffusion models. In all the experiments
we set δp = 0 and δq = 5%.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the experimental comparisons between CBAF and HyperDC over
the Email-Eu and Douban networks, using the options of Table 3.5, with k = 100, and θ ∈
{0.4, 0.3, 0.2}.
For the huge networks GAME420 and GAME220 we ran the experiments with θ = 0.4 and
k ∈ {0.01%, 0.05%, 0.10%}. In Table 3.8 we present the results only for the network GAME220,
which is the largest one, because the results for GAME420 are quite similar to the ones for the
GAME220 network.
Runtime. We note that option OP3 consistently yields the fastest runtimes for CBAF. The time
ratios are always less than one in all networks and for all diffusion models with the exception of
the Jackson-Yariv model in the huge networks with k = 0.10%. In particular, on the Douban
network with the SIR model the time ratio is less than 50%, while delivering an almost perfect
spread ratio of 0.99. On the Email-Eu network using the Jackson-Yariv model, it runs in just over
50% of the time taken by HyperDC. On the huge GAME220 network using the Flickr model it
runs in under 60% of the time taken by HyperDC. CBAF does not work well for the Jackson-Yariv
model in the two huge networks because of the high average degree of these networks.
Spread. In all cases, all three options yield approximately the same spread. In the huge networks
and the Douban network, the spread ratio is always close to one. On the Email-Eu network,
the spreads range from 0.8-0.9 for the Jackson-Yariv and SIR models. However, for the Flickr
model, the spread is lower, mostly in the 0.6-0.7 range. The reason for this is that the Email-Eu
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network has a very low average degree which leads to merged vertices (in the coarsened networks)
representing only small sets of vertices of the original network so that the induced network is small
and not representative enough to compute approximate top-k vertices well.
Summary of Experiments. We compares HyperDC with CBAF. We show that CBAF almost
always achieves the same spread as HyperDC with a runtime that is always lower (with the correct
choice of settings) than HyperDC - moreover, sometimes, it takes less than half the runtime of
HyperDC.
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Tab. 3.6: Results over the Douban network.
Model Option set θ ratiotime ratiospread
Flickr OP1 0.4 0.67 0.96
0.3 0.68 0.96
0.2 0.74 0.96
OP2 0.4 0.70 0.94
0.3 0.69 0.94
0.2 0.70 0.94
OP3 0.4 0.63 0.96
0.3 0.62 0.97
0.2 0.64 0.97
JY OP1 0.4 1.04 0.93
0.3 1.00 0.93
0.2 1.12 0.93
OP2 0.4 1.00 0.98
0.3 1.03 0.98
0.2 1.04 0.98
OP3 0.4 0.93 0.93
0.3 0.91 0.94
0.2 0.91 0.94
SIR OP1 0.4 0.79 1.00
0.3 0.81 1.00
0.2 0.81 1.00
OP2 0.4 0.79 1.00
0.3 0.81 1.00
0.2 0.82 1.00




Tab. 3.7: Results over the Email-eu network.
Model Option set θ ratiotime ratiospread
Flickr OP1 0.4 1.27 0.69
0.3 1.26 0.63
0.2 1.37 0.64
OP2 0.4 1.16 0.61
0.3 1.17 0.57
0.2 1.19 0.59
OP3 0.4 0.83 0.61
0.3 0.82 0.67
0.2 0.83 0.62
JY OP1 0.4 0.72 0.82
0.3 0.77 0.81
0.2 0.73 0.81
OP2 0.4 0.63 0.82
0.3 0.68 0.82
0.2 0.66 0.83
OP3 0.4 0.52 0.82
0.3 0.55 0.82
0.2 0.66 0.83
SIR OP1 0.4 0.93 0.90
0.3 0.85 0.91
0.2 0.88 0.88
OP2 0.4 0.69 0.91
0.3 0.72 0.91
0.2 0.72 0.92




Tab. 3.8: Results over the GAME220 network.
Model k (|seeds|/|V |) Option set ratiotime ratiospread
Flickr 0.01% OP1 0.61 0.98
OP2 0.70 0.98
OP3 0.52 0.99
0.05% OP1 0.69 0.97
OP2 0.76 0.99
OP3 0.45 0.99
0.10% OP1 0.60 0.99
OP2 0.85 0.99
OP3 0.60 0.94
JY 0.01% OP1 1.09 0.98
OP2 1.10 0.97
OP3 0.95 0.97
0.05% OP1 1.25 0.99
OP2 1.11 0.98
OP3 0.95 1.00
0.10% OP1 1.18 0.95
OP2 1.19 0.98
OP3 1.04 1.00
SIR 0.01% OP1 0.96 0.97
OP2 1.13 1.02
OP3 0.66 0.97
0.05% OP1 1.19 1.00
OP2 1.23 0.99
OP3 0.72 0.98





The idea of coarsening a network for some task is not new, and has been used extensively in
the popular community detection techniques (METIS [125] and GRACLUS [69]): nevertheless,
they use different metrics for coarsening like cut-based, flow-based or heavy-edge matching-based
conditions. In contrast we study diffusion-based metrics, and do not aim to find communities.
The related problem of graph sparsification has also been well studied in the theory com-
munity under the notion of “spanners” [75]. A spanner is a sparse subgraph that maintains the
pairwise distances between all nodes within a multiplicative or additive factor. Fung et al. [84]
study the cut-sparsifier problem which asks for a sparse weighted subgraph such that the weight of
all cuts is maintained within a small multiplicative factor. Graph sparsification for influence anal-
ysis has emerged as a new tool for analyzing large networks. Mathioudakis et al. [151] propose
an algorithm to find the sparse backbone of an influence network. The major difference is that
graph sparsification removes edges (so the nodes stay the same), while we coarsen and contract
node-pairs to reduce the graph. Another line of very recent work [155] tries to learn influence
models at community-scale, using groups supplied by graph-partitioning algorithms like METIS.
Our work is related in the sense that we also aim to ‘group’ nodes, but not based on link-based
communities, instead automatically based on nodes’ diffusion characteristics. In that sense we
believe our work provides a complementary viewpoint: learn models directly at the node level,
and then try to group them appropriately automatically.
The rest of the related work can be categorized into Epidemic Thresholds, Influence Maxi-
mization, Other Optimization problems, and General Information Diffusion.
Epidemic Thresholds. The classical texts on epidemic models and analysis are May and An-
derson [11] and Hethcote [111]. Much research in virus propagation focuses on the so-called
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epidemic threshold, i.e. determining the conditions under which an epidemic will not break
out. Widely-studied epidemiological models include homogeneous models [17, 154, 11] which
assume that every individual has equal contact with others in the population. While earlier
works [130, 168] focus on some specific types of graph structure (e.g., random graphs, power-
law graphs, etc), Chakrabarti et al. [50] and Ganesh et al. [88] found that, for the flu-like SIS
model, the epidemic threshold for any arbitrary graph depends on the leading eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix of the graph. Prakash et al. [169] further extended the result to a broad class of
epidemic models.
Influence Maximization: The influence maximization problem was introduced by Domingos and
Richardson [174]. Kempe et al. [127] formulated it as a combinatorial optimization problem under
the Independent Cascade Model, proved it is NP-Hard and gave a simple 1 − 1/e approximation
based on the submodularity of expected spread of a set of starting seeds. Numerous follow-up
papers have looked at speeding-up the algorithm (e.g., [143, 97, 53, 133, 54]).
Other Optimization Problems. Another related problem is immunization, i.e, the problem of
finding the best vertices for removal to stop an epidemic, with effective immunization strategies
for static and dynamic graphs [109, 196, 38]. Other such problems where we wish to select a
subset of ‘important’ vertices on graphs, include ‘outbreak detection’ [143] and finding most-
likely starting points (‘culprits’) of epidemics [142, 170].
General Information Diffusion. There is a lot of research interest in studying dynamic processes
on large graphs, (a) blogs and propagations [101, 137, 127], (b) information cascades [27, 91, 98]
and (c) marketing and product penetration [176]. These dynamic processes are all closely related




We propose influence-based coarsening as a fundamental operation in the analysis of diffusive
processes in large networks. Based on the connections between influence spread and spectral
properties of the graph, we propose a novel Graph Coarsening Problem and provide an effec-
tive and efficient heuristic called COARSENET. By carefully reweighting the edges after each
coarsening step, COARSENET attempts to find a succinct representation of the original network
which preserves important diffusive properties. We then describe the CSPIN framework to solve
influence maximization problems on large networks using our coarsening strategy. Experimental
results show that CSPIN indeed outperforms traditional approaches by providing high quality so-
lutions in a fraction of the time. Finally we show that our COARSENET framework can also be
used for examining cascade datasets in an exploratory setting. We observe that in our case study
the nodes merged together form meaningful communities in the sense of having similar diffusive
properties which can serve as surrogates using external demographic information.
In addition, we present a very novel (but approximate) Coarsening Back and Forth (CBAF)
algorithm that allows us to take a huge social network, reduce it to a manageable size, solve the
problem of finding the top-k vertices on the coarsened network, and then pull the results back
onto the original. We conduct a very detailed experimental study on several real-world social
networks. The experiments looks at the scalability of CBAF, showing that it almost always has a
lower runtime than HyperDC, while achieving high spreads. In particular, CBAF was tested on
networks with over 2M vertices and over 20M edges and achieved acceptable runtime.
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Chapter 4: STUN:Querying Spatio-Temporal Uncertain (Social) Networks 1
4.1 Introduction
There are now numerous ongoing efforts to infer spatial, temporal, and other properties of social
networks. Fig. 4.1 shows a small example of a Facebook style graph that represents various friend
relationships, organized relationships showing who organized a particular event, and attended
relationships showing who attended certain events. In such applications, edge relationships can
be quantified via three types of labels characterizing the relationship. Uncertainty arises when
applications infer edges from Facebook style social networks, e.g. inferring whether A and B
are friends by analyzing the original Facebook friend relationship. Time arises even in original
Facebook friend relationships where the friendship begins at a certain time and may end at a
certain time. Space arises when applications infer the location of an individual or an event which
has a Facebook page.
The friend edge in Fig. 4.1 from Jon to Liz labeled (1, [1, 20]) says that Jon friended Liz at
time 1 upto time 20 (current time) and the certainty that the friendship exists is 1. The friend
edge from Jim to Ed labeled (0.7, [10, 20]) on the other hand may be an inferred friendship
link saying Jim is a friend of Ed with 70% certainty and the friendship is believed to have
started at time 10 and continued to the current time (20).
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Fig. 4.1: A STUN knowledge base. The region for all friend edges is S
In this chapter, we present the theoretical framework underlying Spatio-Temporal Uncer-
tain Networks (STUN), together with prototype algorithms, index structures, and a system that
supports some (but certainly not all) aspects of spatio-temporal uncertainty in networks. First
we formally define STUN knowledge bases and their semantics in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 de-
fines STUN subgraph matching queries and answers. Section 4.4 describes an index structure
and a query processing algorithm that uses that index structure in order to process STUN sub-
graph matching queries. The index hierarchically decomposes the network as well as space-time
simultaneously and the query processing algorithm uses this index to effectively prune search.
Section 4.5 introduces STUN ranking queries which attempts to identify important nodes in a
STUN network, extending the well-known PageRank algorithm. In Section 4.6 we provide spe-
cific proposals for applying certainty, time, and space to ranking queries. Finally, Section 4.7
describes our prototype implementation, together with experiments showing the scalability of our
approach.
117
4.2 STUN Syntax and Semantics
STUN manipulates graph data consisting of a set of vertices, and a set of labeled edges. These
are then augmented with certainty, space, and time attributes. Thus in Figure 4.1 the individuals
and parties are the vertices and the types of links, namely friend, organized and attended are
the labels. Formally, we write V for the set of vertices and L for the set of labels, with V ∩L = ∅.
Let SNT be a set of triples of the form (v, l, v′), where v, v′ ∈ V and l ∈ L.
In our STUN framework we add uncertainty, space, and time information to such triples.
Uncertainty is added by the use of a certainty factor c ∈ [0, 1] for each triple to form a STUN
quadruple (v, l, v′; c). For example, the quadruple (jim, friend, ed; 0.7) represents the informa-
tion that “Jim” is a friend of “Ed” with certainty 0.7.
We provide spatial information in terms of regions. We assume the existence of a spatial
reference system S ⊆ [0,M ]× [0, N ], withM,N ∈ R that contains a set of two-dimensional real-
valued points. A space point is a member of S that represents an exact position in the reference
system. A region is a set of space points in the reference system that is not necessarily connected.
We use R for the set of regions. Throughout this paper, and in any realistic system, we assume
that regions are “named” and that the names are used rather than the corresponding sets of points.
We provide time information in terms of time intervals. We assume the existence of a
temporal reference system T that is a set of non-negative real numbers. A time point is a member
of T that represents an exact time in the reference system. An interval is a pair [st, et], with
st, et ∈ T and st ≤ et, that expresses a specific period in the reference system. Given a time
interval T = [st, et], we write |T | for et− st and t ∈ T iff st ≤ t ≤ et.
We represent spatial and temporal information as a pair, written [R, T ], called a STUN
annotation, where R is a region (or region name) and T is a time interval. Thus we will annotate
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each STUN quadruple with its corresponding spatial and temporal attributes. In Fig. 4.1, we use
the STUN-annotation [Bethesda, (15, 15)] to denote that “Phil” organized “Party2” at time 15 in
the region named “Bethesda”.
Definition 24 (STUN Tuple). A STUN tuple is an expression of the form (v, l, v′; c) : [R, T ] where
(v, l, v′; c) is a STUN quadruple and [R, T ] is a STUN annotation.
The STUN tuple (Phil,organized, Party2; 1) : [Bethesda, (15, 15)] says that “Phil” orga-
nized “Party2” with certainty 1 and the event occurred at time 15 at some location within the
region “Bethesda”, but we do not know exactly where.
A STUN knowledge base KB is a finite set of STUN tuples. A graph representation of an
example STUN knowledge base is shown in Fig. 4.1. Note that for convenience, in Fig. 4.1 for the
organized and attended links we indicate the certainty factor, region, and time interval; while
for friend links we indicate the certainty and time interval only; the region is taken to be S.
Next we move to the STUN semantics. There are two key concepts. An interpretation
assigns a real number between 0 and 1 to every triple in SNT for every point in space and time. An
interpretation satisfies a STUN tuple if it assigns a large enough certainty value to a STUN tuple
for the given region and interval. Formally, a STUN interpretation I is a mapping SNT×S×T→
[0, 1]. I satisfies a STUN tuple (snt; c) : [R, T ] iff ∀t ∈ T , ∃p ∈ R such that I(snt, p, t) ≥ c.
Thus we require that for every time value in the interval, there is a point in the region for which
the interpretation assigns a value at least as big as c to the triple. A STUN knowledge base is
consistent if there is an interpretation that satisfies all its STUN tuples.
It should be noted that, as things stand, using this semantics makes every STUN knowledge
base consistent because the interpretation that maps everything to 1 satisfies all the STUN tuples.
In order to make the concept of consistency correspond better to real-world situations, we may
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introduce integrity constraints.
As in this chapter we do not deal with consistency checking, we do not define a formal
syntax for STUN integrity constraints. We just indicate what such a constraint might look like
applying a logic formalism to the STUN knowledge base of Fig. 4.1. Here the notation ← F
indicates that formula F is not allowed to hold in a STUN interpretation.
Consider first
← (v, `, v′; c) : [R, T ], (v, `, v′; c′) : [R, T ], c < c′.
This integrity constraint states that there cannot be two links that are identical in all respects except
that the certainty values are different.
Next, consider that all organized labels going to the same vertex have the same time inter-
val. As an integrity constraint we can write this as
← (v,organized, v′′; c) : [R, T ],
(v′,organized v′′; c′) : [R′, T ′],
T 6= T ′, c > 0, c′ > 0.
A similar constraint holds for the attended labels as well as for regions. However, the corre-
sponding constraint for friend
← (v, friend v′′; c) : [R, T ],
(v′, friend v′′; c′) : [R′, T ′],
T 6= T ′, c > 0, c′ > 0.
does not hold for v = “Kai” v′ = “Pam”, v” = “Mia”, c = 0.7, c′ = 0.3, R = R′ = S,
T = [5, 10], and T ′ = [10, 20].
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4.3 STUN Subgraph Matching Queries
Using a STUN knowledge base involves asking queries. For this purpose we need to define the
syntax of such queries. In this section we deal with queries that match subgraphs. Recall first that
the STUN syntax already contains the set of vertices: V , labels: L, regions: R, and intervals: I.
These are the domains of interest: D = {V,L,R, I} where R = 2S and I = {[st, et] | st, et ∈
T, st ≤ et}. The elements of these domains are the constants. For each domain σ ∈ D we
assume the existence of a set VARσ of variables ranging over σ. Variables are expressed by strings




that is, a term is a constant or variable.
For queries that specify spatial and temporal constraints we need a set of predicate symbols.
Queries need the capability of expressing spatial concepts such as “inside” and temporal con-
cepts such as “after”. We assume the existence of a set P of predicate symbols representing spa-
tio/temporal relationships. Each predicate symbol ps ∈ P has an associated arity, arity(ps) ∈ N,
a signature sign(ps) =< σ1, . . . , σn > with arity(ps) = n such that ∀i ∈ [1, n] σi ∈ D, and a
denotation den(ps) ⊆ σ1 × · · · × σn.
For example, the current prototype STUN system supports the spatial predicates inside,
overlap, intersect, equal, and disjoint, and the temporal predicates after, before, overlap, and
during. For the inside predicate, we have arity(inside) = 2, sign(inside) = < R,R >,
den(inside) = {(r, s)} where the region r is inside the region s.
A STUN SM-query is a subgraph matching query which is formally composed of two parts:
the graph part and the constraint part. For the graph part we define the concept of an SM-query
graph tuple as a STUN tuple where a variable may be used for each element. Formally, an SM-
query graph tuple has the form (v, l, v′; c) : [R, T ] where v, v′ ∈ V ∪ VARV , l ∈ L ∪ VARL,
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c ∈ [0, 1], R ∈ VARR, and T ∈ VARI . An SM-query constraint is an expression of the form
ps(t1, . . . , tn) where ps ∈ P, arity(ps) = n, sign(ps) = {σ1, . . . , σn}, and ∀i ∈ [1, n] ti ∈
σi∪VARσi . Thus an SM-query constraint applies one spatial or temporal predicate. An SM-query
constraint is ground iff none of its terms are in VAR. A ground SM-query constraint ps(t1, . . . , tn)
is true iff (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ den(ps).
Next we define the concept of a STUN SM-query and query answer.
Definition 25 (STUN SM-Query). A STUN SM-query q is a pair (Gq, Cq) where Gq is a set of
SM-query graph tuples and Cq is a set of SM-query constraints.
The output variables of an SM-query may be just a subset of those present in the query. To
clarify this issue we underline the names of the variables that are required to be in the output.
We write two SM-queries in graph form in Fig. 4.2. The one on top asks for all people ?I
who attended a party in Maryland at timepoint 5, with certainty at least 0.5. This query can
be written as the STUN SM-query q = (Gq, Cq), where Gq = {(?I, attended, ?P ; 0.5) :
[?s, ?t]} and Cq = {inside(?s,Maryland), during(?t, [5, 5])}. The second query is more
?I?P












Fig. 4.2: Examples of STUN SM-queries
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complicated. It asks for all people ?I who have been a friend of Jim in the time interval [10, 20]
with certainty at least 0.9 as well as a friend of Phil in the same time interval with certainty
at least 0.6 and who attended a party in Maryland organized by Phil that occurred during the
time interval [0, 20] and was attended by Jim. This query can be written as q = (Gq, Cq),
where Gq = {(?I , attended, ?P ; 1.0) : [?s1, ?t1]), (?I , friend, Jim; 0.9) : [?s2, ?t2]),
(Jim, attended, ?P ; 1.0) : [?s1, ?t1]), (?I , friend, Phil; 0.6) : [?s2, ?t2]), (Phil, orga-
nized, ?P ; 1.0) : [?s1, ?t1])} and Cq = {inside(?s1,Maryland), during(?t1, [0, 20]),
during(?t2, [10, 20])}.
To define the concept of an answer to a STUN SM-query we start with substitutions. A
substitution θ maps variables to ground terms and each ground term to itself.
Possible substitutions for the first query of Example 4.3 are:
• θ1 = {?I/“Jon”, ?P/“Party1”, ?s/“Maryland”, ?t/[5, 5]};
• θ2 = {?I/“Sam”, ?P/“Party1”, ?s/“Maryland”, ?t/[5, 5]};
• θ3 = {?I/“Sam”, ?P/“Party1”, ?s/“Potomac”, ?t/[10, 15]};
• θ4 = {?I/“Ana”, ?P/“Sue”, ?s/“Maryland”, ?t/[5, 5]}.
For the second query we could have:
• θ5 = {?I/“Mia”, ?P/“Party2”, ?s1/“Bethesda”, ?t1/[15, 15], ?s2/“Bethesda”, ?t2/[1, 20]};
• θ6 = {?I/“Mia”, ?P/“Sue”, ?s1/“Bethesda”, ?t1/[15, 15], ?s2/“Bethesda”, ?t2/[1, 20]}.
We denote the application of θ to a term x as xθ. Likewise, we denote the application of θ
to all of the terms appearing in an expression X as Xθ.
Definition 26 (STUN SM-Query Answer). A substitution θ is an answer to a STUN SM-query
q = (Gq, Cq) w.r.t. a STUN knowledge base KB iff
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Substitutions θ1 and θ2 of Example 4.3 are answers to the first query of Example 4.3, whereas
θ3 and θ4 are not. Likewise, θ5 is an answer to the second query, and θ6 is not.
4.4 Indexing and SM-Query Answering
In order to efficiently answer SM-queries we use an index that exploits the type of information
stored in a STUN knowledge base. This section gives the details of the indexing algorithm and
how it is used to answer SM-queries. The STUN index is a tree each of whose nodes occupies a
disk page and represents a portion of the STUN knowledge base (i.e., of the corresponding graph).
In addition, each inner node “captures” the subgraph represented by its two children. Each level
of the index tree represents a partition not only of the whole graph, but also a partition of the
entire spatial reference system S and the entire temporal reference system T. The latter two are
induced by the graph partition. Before describing these in detail, we need to introduce the notions
of k-merges of a graph, and minimal bounding rectangles (and time intervals).
In a k-merge, multiple graphs are mapped into a new graph containing at most k vertices –
every vertex (resp. edge) in the “merged” graph represents one or more vertices (resp. edges) in the
original graph. Let G = (V,E) be a graph. Consider graphs Gi = (Vi, Ei), with i ∈ [1, f ], such
that for all i ∈ [1, f ] Vi ⊆ V , k ≤ maxi∈[1,f ](|Vi|, and Ei ⊆ E. The k-merge of G1, G2, . . . , Gf
w.r.t. G is a graph Gm = (Vm, Em) such that (i) |Vm| = k; (ii) there is a merge mapping
µ :
⋃
i∈[1,f ] Vi → Vm (given a vertex v ∈ Vm, we call the vertices which are mapped to v the
represented vertices of v, rep(v) = {v′ ∈
⋃
i∈[1,f ] Vi | µ(v′) = v}), and (iii) em = (v1, v2) ∈ Em
iff ∃v′1 ∈ rep(v1), v′2 ∈ rep(v2) such that e = (v′1, v′2) ∈ E.
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Graph GL associated with the left child L of the root of the tree in Fig. 4.3 is a 3-merge of
graphs G1, G2 associated with the children of L. In particular, (i) vertex 1 of GL represents
vertex 1 of G1, (ii) vertex 2 of GL represents vertices 2 of G1 and 1 of G2, and (iii) vertex 3
of GL represents vertices 3 of G1 and 2, and3 of G2.
In order to handle space and time we use the well known notion of minimum bounding rect-
angles (MBRs) of space regions and define minimum bounding intervals (MBIs) of time intervals.
The MBR of a region R is a quadruple MBR(R) = (min(X),max(X),min(Y ),max(Y ))
whereX = {x|(x, y) ∈ R} and Y = {y|(x, y) ∈ R}.2 The minimal bounding interval (MBI) of a
set of time intervals TI is the time interval MBI(TI) = [st, et] where st = min({st′|[st′, et′] ∈
TI}) and et = max({et′|[st′, et′] ∈ TI}).
Each of the nodes in a STUN index tree represents a subgraph KB′ of KB. We employ a
vertex- and edge-weighted undirected graph for representing KB′, denoted WUG(KB′), where
• the set of vertices is that of KB′;
• two vertices have at most 1 edge connecting them;
• there is an edge between two vertices iff there is at least 1 edge between them in KB′;
• each edge e is annotated with an MBR (denoted e[MBR]) and an MBI (e[MBI]).
The notion of k-merge is straightforwardly extended to this kind of graph. For instance, theWUG
associated with the leftmost left node of the tree in Fig. 4.3 is shown below it – vertices “Ed” and
“Party1” are mapped to node 1 in the leftmost inner node.
2 Given a set of MBRs M , MBR(M) = (min(X),max(X),min(Y ),max(Y )) where X =
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Fig. 4.3: STUN index for the knowledge base in Fig. 4.1
Definition 27 (STUN Index). Given a STUN knowledge base KB, a STUN index IKB of order
k (k ≥ 2) is a balanced tree such that:
• Each node occupies a disk page and represents a subgraph of KB (by storing its WUG).
• The graphs at leaf nodes represent a vertex partition of WUG(KB).
• If nodeN is the parent of nodesN1, N2, . . . , Nf , then the graphGN at nodeN is a k-merge
of the graphs GN1 , GN2 , . . . , GNf w.r.t. WUG(KB).
• For each node N , N [MBR] (resp. N [MBI]) is the MBR (MBI) of the regions (intervals)
associated with the STUN tuples in the subgraph of KB represented by GN .
Fig. 4.3 shows a STUN index of order 3 with f = 2. For clarity, the figure shows only the left
subtree of the root in detail. In particular, the figure shows the merge mappings, the MBIs of
leaf and inner nodes, and the MBIs of subgraph edges.
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The tree structure of the STUN index is similar to that of DOGMA [40]. However, when
building a STUN index, we wish to maximize the “quality” of the graph partitions represented
by each level of the index tree by also taking into account the spatio-temporal annotations on the
STUN tuples. In principle, each index node should represent a subset of the STUN graph that has
(i) few cross edges with the subgraphs in other nodes at the same level; (ii) small overlap with the
regions in the subgraphs in other nodes at the same level; (iii) small overlap with the time intervals
in the subgraphs in other nodes at the same level.
Fig. 4.4 shows the buildSTUNIndex algorithm that, given a STUN knowledge base KB,
builds a STUN index IKB . Lines 1–7 build the initial WUG that represents KB. Vertex weights
are initialized to 1 (line 3). Edge weights are initialized by means of any suitable distance function
δ that measures the spatio-temporal distance between two neighbor vertices (line 5). The MBR
(resp., MBI) associated with each edge e = (v, v′) of the WUG is computed by looking at the
regions (resp., intervals) of the STUN tuples connecting v and v′ in KB (lines 6–7). Lines 8–11
iteratively apply Algorithm coarsenGraph which builds a new, smaller WUG along with an ap-
propriate vertex mapping µ (allWUG’s and µ’s are considered global variables of the algorithms).
The iteration ends when the current WUG is small enough to be stored (together with the vertex
mapping) on a single disk page. Finally, on lines 12–14 the STUN index is built and returned, by
applying Algorithm buildTree on the empty root of the index tree and the coarsest WUG.
Procedure coarsenGraph starts by building a copyG′ of the given graphG and an identity
merge mapping between the two (lines 1–2). Then, until the size of G′ becomes half of that of G,
the procedure repeatedly chooses two vertices v,m of G′ and merges v into m. Vertex v is chosen
at random and m is its closest neighbor in terms of edge weight (ties are broken at random). The
edge between v and m is denoted as g. First, the procedures adds the vertex weight of v to that of
m (line 7). We then consider two cases: (1) v has neighbors other than m; (2) v has no neighbor
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Algorithm buildSTUNIndex
Input: STUN knowledge base KB
Output: STUN index IKB
1 G0 ←WUG(KB) with uninitialized weights, MBR’s and MBI ’s
2 µ0 ← empty mapping
3 for all v ∈ V0, v-weight(v)← 1
4 for all e = (v, v′) ∈ E0
5 e-weight(e)← δ(v, v′)
6 e[MBR]←MBR({MBR(R) |(v, l, v′; c) : [R, T ] ∈ KB})
7 e[MBI]←MBI({T | (v, l, v′; c) : [R, T ] ∈ KB})
8 i← 0
9 while Gi, µi occupy more than 1 disk page
10 i← i+ 1
11 Gi, µi ← coarsenGraph(Gi−1, v-weight, e-weight)
12 root(IKB)← empty node R
13 buildTree(R, i,Gi)
14 return IKB
Fig. 4.4: Algorithm buildSTUNIndex
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Procedure coarsenGraph
Input: G = (V,E), weight functions v-weight, e-weight
Output: Coarsened graph G′, merge mapping µ
1-2 G′ ← G, µ← mapping from each vertex in V to its copy in V ′
3 while |V ′| > |V |
2
4-5 v ← uniformly random chosen vertex from V ′, n← number of neighbors of v −1
6 m← neighbor of v with minimum edge weight
7 v-weight(m)← v-weight(m) + v-weight(v), g ← (v,m)
9 if n > 0
10 for all e = (v, u) ∈ E′ with u 6= m
11 if ∃f = (m,u) ∈ E′
12 e-weight(f)← e-weight(f) + e-weight(e) + e-weight(g)
n
13 f [MBR]←MBR({f [MBR], e[MBR], g[MBR]})
14 f [MBI]←MBI({f [MBI], e[MBI], g[MBI]})
15 else
16 f ← (m,u)
17 e-weight(f)← e-weight(e) + e-weight(g)
n
18 f [MBR]←MBR({e[MBR], g[MBR]})
19 f [MBI]←MBI({e[MBI], g[MBI]})
20 E′ ← E′ ∪ {f}
21 E′ ← E′ \ {e}
22 else
23 n′ ← number of neighbors of m −1
24 for all e = (m,u) ∈ E′




28-30 E′ ← E′ \ {g}, V ′ ← V ′ \ {v}, µ(µ−1(v))← m
31 return G′, µ
Fig. 4.5: Algorithm coarsenGraph
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Procedure buildTree
Input: Tree node N , level i, WUG G = (V,E)
1 GN ← G
2 N [MBR]←MBR({e[MBR] | e ∈ E})
3 N [MBI]←MBI({e[MBI] | e ∈ E})
4 if G is not a subgraph of WUG(KB)
5 {G1, . . . , Gf} ← graphPartition(G)
6 for all j ∈ [1, f ]
7 add an empty node Cj as a child of N
8 GCj ← induced subgraph in Gi−1 by vertex set {v | µi(v) ∈ VGj}
9 buildTree(Cj , i− 1, GCj )
Fig. 4.6: Algorithm buildTree
other than m.
In case (1), the procedure considers each of v’s other neighbors, denoted as u, in turn (lines
9–21). The edge between v and u is denoted as e, and it is removed after the merging process
(line 21). If there is already an edge between u and m, its weight is increased by e’s weight and a
portion of g’s weight; moreover, the MBR and MBI of the edge between u andm is extended with
those of e and g (lines 11–14). If no edge between u and m exists, the procedure adds a new such
edge to the graph. The weight of this edge is the sum of e’s weight and a portion of g’s weight,
whereas the MBR and MBI of the edge are computed based on those of e and g (lines 16–20).
In case (2), the procedure adds an equal portion of g’s weight to the edges connecting m to
its neighbors, and extends the MBRs and MBIs of these edges with that of g (lines 22–27).
Finally, g and v are removed from the graph and the merge mapping is updated (lines 28–
30).
Procedure buildTree starts by assigning the WUG G to the index node N (which is at the
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i-th level of the tree) and computing the corresponding MBR and MBI (lines 1–3). Then, if N is
not a leaf node, the procedure employs any external graph partitioning algorithm graphPartition
that, given a vertex- and edge-weighted graph, partitions its vertex set into f sets such that the
total weight of all edges crossing the sets is minimized, and the total vertex weights are as close
as possible (line 5). Finally, for each of these f vertex sets, a child node is added to N , the
subgraph induced in Gi−1 by the vertex set is assigned to N (lines 6–8), and the procedure calls
itself recursively to build the child tree (line 9). Note that obviously G, being at the i-th level of
the tree, is always coarser than Gi−1.
We conclude the description of our algorithms with the following remarks:
1. As a further improvement, during the coarsening phase we keep track of which vertices and
edges are “original”, i.e., present in the WUGs at leaf nodes. For each original edge, we
store the set of labels associated with the STUN tuple represented by that edge (such sets
can therefore be shared among different nodes of the index). Thus, if an original vertex only
has original edges, we can retrieve the labels associated with these edges by just looking at
the current index node.
2. We apply the notion of internal partition distance from [40] to reduce the size of the sets
of candidate ground terms during query answering. In particular, for each index node N
and each vertex v in GN , we compute and store the distance of v from the outside of GN .
This way, besides restricting candidates to immediate neighbors of a vertex, we can apply
additional constraints that take into account “longer-range” distance requirements among
query vertices.
3. We employ a spatio-temporal vertex distance function that looks at the neighborhood of the
two vertices and measures the “amount” of space and time the vertices share with each other
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with respect to their neighborhoods. Moreover, the function weighs the “contributions” of
the various edges with their associated certainty level. Given an edge (v, v′) in a STUN
graph, we define
















cT (v, v′) =
∑
(v,l,v′;c):[R,T ]∈KB












[c · area(R)] ,
functions length and area have their common meaning, and α, β ∈ R with α+ β = 1.
4. As our graph partitioning algorithm, we employ GGGP [126].
4.4.1 SM-Query Answering Algorithm
Fig. 4.7 shows our answerQuery algorithm for answering STUN SM-queries using the STUN
index. The algorithm has a recursive, depth-first structure and it maintains a set of candidate
substitutions Rx for each variable x in the query. At each recursive invocation, it greedily chooses
the next variable w to find substitutions for (line 6), by taking the one which has the smallest
number of candidates (ties are broken at random). If there is no candidate for w, no further
extension of the current substitution can be found and the algorithm backtracks (line 7). Otherwise,
for each candidatem inRw, it builds a new substitution with w → m and new candidate sets from
the current ones (lines 8–13) by restricting the set of candidates to the “valid” neighbors ofm, i.e.,
those that satisfy the constraints in the query, and calls itself recursively.
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Algorithm answerQuery
Input: STUN SM-query q = (Gq, Cq), substitution θ,
candidate sets {Rx}
Output: Set A of substitutions
Global variables: STUN index IKB , set A initialized to ∅
1 if θ maps every variable in q to a ground term then
2 add θ to A and end-algorithm
3 if θ = ∅ then
4 for each variable x in q
5 Rx ← ALL // placeholder for all the vertices in KB
6 w ← variable in q having minimum |Rw|
7 if Rw = ∅ then end-algorithm
8 for each m ∈ Rw
9 θ′ ← θ ∪ (w → m)
10 for each variable x in qθ′
11 R′x ← Rx
12 for each variable v linked to w by a tuple in Gq
13 R′v ← Rv∩ validNeighbors(q, θ, Rv,m)
14 answerQuery(qθ′, θ′, {R′x})
Fig. 4.7: Algorithm answerQuery
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Procedure validNeighbors
Input: STUN SM-query q, substitution θ, ground term m
Output: Set M of valid neigbhors of m
1 {(v1, N1), . . . , (vh, Nh)} ← followMergeMappings(m)
2 L← N1
3 for each i ∈ [2, h]
4 L← L∪ findLeafNodes(q, (vi, Ni), (vi−1, Ni−1))
5 M ← retrieveNeighbors(m,L)
6 filterInternalPartitionDistance(qθ,M)
7 return M
Fig. 4.8: Algorithm validNeighbors
Procedure findLeafNodes
Input: STUN SM-query q,
(vertex, node) pairs (v,N), (ve, Ne)
Output: Set L of leaf nodes of IKB
1 D ← child nodes of N except Ne
2 if D = ∅ then return {N}
3 L← ∅
4 for each Nd ∈ D
5 if conn(v,N,Nd) and checkSTConstraints(Nd, Cq) then
6 L← L∪ findLeafNodes(q, (⊥, Nd),⊥)
7 return L
Fig. 4.9: Algorithm findLeafNodes
The validNeighbors procedure starts by extracting the list of index nodes that connect the
leaf node containing m to the root node, along with all the vertices that represent m in these
nodes (line 1). Observe that we only need the leaf node itself if m does not have edges that
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cross the boundaries of the leaf node. The algorithm then retrieves all the leaf nodes that may
contain valid neighbors of m (and are not already in memory), extracts these neighbors (applying
the appropriate restrictions on labels), and filters out those that do not satisfy internal partition
distance constraints (lines 3–6).
The findLeafNodes procedure, given an index node N (along with the vertex v that repre-
sents m in N ) and one of its child nodes, recursively finds the other child nodes Nd such that the
subtree rooted in Nd may contain valid neighbors of m (lines 4–6). To achieve this, it uses (i) a
procedure conn that checks whether a vertex in Nd is mapped to v or to one of its neighbors in N ,
and (ii) a procedure checkSTConstraints that checks whether the spatio-temporal constraints in
the query can be satisfied by considering the Nd[MBR] region and the Nd[MBI] interval.
4.5 STUN Ranking and SR-Queries
In this section, we show how to extend the well-known PageRank algorithm [39] to STUN databases,
thus taking into account certainty, space, and time. This then allows users to pose STUNRank
queries which allow them to find important nodes in STUN graphs.
We start by briefly reviewing the PageRank algorithm, which is a way to give scores to
vertices based on the stationary distribution of a random walk on a directed graph. Vertices score
higher if they are visited more often this way.
Basic PageRank starts with a graph G = (V,E) where |V | = n. We can assume that the
vertices (pages) are numbered from 1 to n and use v to refer both to a vertex and its numerical
value. A random walk is described by an n× n transition matrix Mpr where mpr[v, v′] = 1out(v′)
iff vertex v′ has an outgoing edge to vertex v; 0 otherwise. We write out(v′) for the outdegree of
v′. The Web surfing interpretation is thatmpr[v, v′] is the probability of a random surfer following
a link from page v′ to page v.
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The PageRank (column) n× 1 vector ppr is initialized to ppr0 = 1/n. So initially all pages
get the same rank. Then the transition matrix is applied iteratively as
ppri+1 ← d ·M
prppri + (1− d) · 1/n
where d is a real value in [0, 1] called the damping factor, 1 is an n × 1 vector of all 1’s, and
1/n is called the teleport vector. The Web surfing interpretation is that after the j-th iteration,
pprj [v] is the probability of a random surfer being at page v after following j links and 1 − d
is the probability of “teleporting” to a random page or, equivalently, to introduce a new random
surfer at a random page. Usually, the values of ppr converge to acceptable error limits after a few
hundred iterations. Moreover, Mpr is usually very sparse because the average number of non-zero
elements in a column is the average outdegree of the vertices in the network.
The original PageRank formulation assumes that the PageRank of a vertex is divided equally
among the out-neighborhood of the vertex. We define a transition matrix that also takes into ac-
count space, time, and uncertainty. Moreover, we use the personalized variant of PageRank [108]
that has a non-uniform distribution of the values in the teleport vector (instead of 1/n).
In our STUNRank implementation users can specify how to take into account
(1) space, time, and uncertainty;
(2) the relative importance of vertices and labels;
(3) which labels, regions, time intervals, and minimum certainty level to consider.
(1) involves general concepts, while typically (3) depends on a query. Hence we define two
versions of rank flow functions: query-unaware and query-aware. In more detail, for (1) users
may define 3 query-unaware rank flow functions:
• Fs(v, v′) evaluates how the space-based STUNRank of vertex v flows to vertex v′;
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• Ft(v, v′) evaluates how the time-based STUNRank of vertex v flows to vertex v′;
• Fc(v, v′) evaluates how the certainty-based STUNRank of vertex v flows to vertex v′.
For (2) users may define a function score : V ∪ L → N that expresses the relative impor-
tance of vertices and labels. This function can in turn be used in the specification of the rank flow
functions.
For (3), we introduce the query-aware versions of the rank flow functions. They have a
third argument that is a STUN ranking query (SR-query) of the form
q = 〈Lq, Rq, Tq, τq〉
where Lq is a set of labels, Rq is a set of regions, Tq is a set of time intervals, and τq is a certainty
threshold. The meaning of q is that we consider only the portion of the graph restricted to Lq, Rq,
and Tq – moreover, when looking at certainty values, we consider only those above τq. We require
any user-provided set of functions be such that, for any k ∈ {s, t, c}, Fk(v, v′) = Fk(v, v′, qall)
with qall = 〈L,R, {[min(T),max(T)]}, 0〉.
4.5.1 Computing STUNRanks
Recall from earlier that the PageRank vector ppr is generally computed using ppri+1 ← d·Mprp
pr
i +
(1− d) · 1/n. In the computation of the STUNRank vector we modify this computation to
pi+1 ← d ·Mpi + (1− d) · t.





M is defined in two different ways depending on how the iteration is done: combine-first uses
a single matrix, whereas combine-last builds four different matrices then combines the resulting
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rank vectors. We allow users to provide weights α, β, γ ∈ [0, 1] with α + β + γ ≤ 1 to specify
the relative importance of the spatial, temporal, and certainty based components.
Table 4.1 shows the combine-first and combine-last definitions of transition matrices, itera-
tions, and STUNRank vectors in both the query-unaware and query-unaware cases. Note that, in
the query-aware case, besides employing the query-aware versions of the F functions, we modify
the definitions in order to also restrict the computation of the PageRank matrix based on the given
query q = 〈Lq, Rq, Tq, τq〉.
4.6 Proposed Rank Flow Functions
In the previous section we stated that users may specify various rank flow functions. In this section
we give our proposed rank flow functions along with the intuition behind them.
We start by defining query-unaware functions. For the space-based STUNRank we define
Fs(v, v′) =
∑
(v,l,v′;c):[R,T ]∈KB [|R| · score(l)]∑
(v,l,v′′;c):[R,T ]∈KB [|R| · score(l)]
.
The intuition is that the STUNRank flowing from a vertex v to each of its out-neighbors v′ is
proportional to the total amounts of space occupied by the regions annotating the edges from v to
v′. Regions are also weighted by the score of edge labels.
Similarly, for the time-based STUNRank we define
Ft(v, v′) =
∑
(v,l,v′;c):[R,T ]∈KB [|T | · score(l)]∑
(v,l,v′′;c):[R,T ]∈KB [|T | · score(l)]
.
where the STUNRank flowing from a vertex v to each of its out-neighbors v′ is proportional to the
total length of the time intervals annotating the edges from v to v′.
Then again, for the certainty-based STUNRank we define
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Transition matrices Iterations STUNRank vector
Query-unaware
Combine-first
m[v, v′] = π ·mpr[v, v′]+
α · Fs(v′, v)+
β · Ft(v′, v)+
γ · Fc(v′, v)
pi+1 ← d ·Mpi + (1− d) · t p
Combine-last
∀k ∈ {s, t, c},
mk[v, v′] = Fk(v′, v)
ppri+1 ← d ·M
prppri + (1− d) · t
∀k ∈ {s, t, c},
pki+1 ← d ·Mkpki + (1− d) · t
p = π · ppr + α · ps
+β · pt + γ · pc
Query-aware
Combine-first
m[v, v′] = π ·mprq [v, v′]+
α · Fs(v′, v, q)+
β · Ft(v′, v, q)+
γ · Fc(v′, v, q)
pi+1 ← d ·Mpi + (1− d) · t p
Combine-last
∀k ∈ {s, t, c},
mk[v, v′] = Fk(v′, v, q)




i + (1− d) · t
∀k ∈ {s, t, c},
pki+1 ← d ·Mkpki + (1− d) · t
p = π · ppr + α · ps
+β · pt + γ · pc
Tab. 4.1: Definitions of transition matrices, iterations, and STUNRank vectors, where (i) π = 1−α−β−γ,
and (ii) given an SR-query q, Mprq is the PageRank matrix computed by only considering edges
(v′, l, v′′; c) : [R, T ] such that l ∈ Lq
Fc(v, v′) =
∑
(v,l,v′;c):[R,T ]∈KB [c · score(l)]∑
(v,l,v′′;c):[R,T ]∈KB [c · score(l)]
.
so the STUNRank flowing from a vertex v to each of its out-neighbors v′ is proportional to the
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total certainty annotating the edges from v to v′.
Fig. 4.10 shows a graphical representation of the query-unaware combine-first transition ma-
trix for the example of Fig. 4.1 obtained with:
• label and vertex scores set to 1;
• α = β = γ = 0.25;


























































Fig. 4.10: Graphical representation of a query-unaware combine-first transition matrix for the example of
Fig. 4.1
Given an SR-query q = 〈Lq, Rq, Tq, τq〉, we define the query-aware STUNRank flow func-
tions shown in Fig. 4.11. The difference with the query-unaware functions is the use of Lq for all
of them, Rq for the space-based function, Tq for the time-based function, and τq for the certainty-
based function.
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|R ∩ (∪R′∈RqR′)| · score(l)
]
Ft(v, v′, q) =
∑
(v,l,v′;c):[R,T ]∈KB,l∈Lq [|{t ∈ T | ∃ T
′ ∈ Tq, t ∈ T ′}| · score(l)]∑
(v,l,v′′;c):[R,T ]∈KB,l∈Lq [|{t ∈ T | ∃ T ′ ∈ Tq, t ∈ T ′}| · score(l)]
Fc(v, v′, q) =
∑
(v,l,v′;c):[R,T ]∈KB,l∈Lq ,c≥τq [c · score(l)]∑
(v,l,v′′;c):[R,T ]∈KB,l∈Lq ,c≥τq [c · score(l)]
Fig. 4.11: Proposed query-aware similarity functions
Fig. 4.12 shows a graphical representation of the query-aware combine-first transition matrix
for the example of Fig. 4.1 obtained with:
• label and vertex scores set to 1;
• α = β = γ = 0.25;
• “Bethesda” and “Potomac” regions in “Maryland” and their areas set to 49, 100, and
10,000, respectively;
• Lq = {friend,attended};
• Rq = {Bethesda};
• Tq = [3, 11];
• τq = 0.5.






















































Fig. 4.12: Graphical representation of a query-aware combine-first transition matrix for the example of
Fig. 4.1
STUNRanks obtained by employing our proposed rank flow functions in the combine-first (Fig. 4.13)
and combine-last (Fig. 4.14) cases. In each of the figures, we also compare the results obtained in
the query-unaware case with those obtained with two different SR-queries.
It can easily be noticed that the “Party” vertices have the higher ranks in almost all of the
query-unaware combinations, with the “Sam” vertex among the top-3 vertices in the cases where
the temporal component has higher weight. Moreover, in the presence of a query, ranks are heavily
influenced by the query components, as expected. For instance, with Lq = {friend,organized},
vertex “Sam” ranks top-1 in almost all cases, because its outgoing links do not match the query,
thus the fraction of STUNRank it receives from its incoming links can only decrease due to the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    












































































































































































































Fig. 4.13: STUNRanks obtained with combine-first in the query-unaware (top) and query-aware (bottom)
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Fig. 4.14: STUNRanks obtained with combine-last in the query-unaware (top) and query-aware (bottom)
cases. Label and vertex scores are set to 1. The damping factor is set to 0.85
4.7 Implementation and Experiments
We developed a prototype implementation of the STUN system in about 11,600 lines of Java code.
We ran three sets of experiments to assess the performance of the STUN system when dealing with
144
both subgraph matching and ranking queries.
4.7.1 Results with SM-Queries
In the first set of experiments, we used data from YouTube [158] where the vertices included
individuals and groups, and the edges included follows, group membership, and co-located edges.
We randomly assigned time intervals to the first two kinds of edges. To assign regions, we first
selected 20% of the groups and randomly associated regions to them. Then, we added a co-located
edge between two members of such groups if there was a nonempty temporal overlap between
their memberships – this temporal overlap and the region associated with the group were assigned
the edge. All the experiments were run on a dual-core 2.8GHz CPU with 8G of RAM running
Windows 7.
The objective of our experiments was to determine the scalability of the STUN index by
varying three quantites: the size of the graph (number of edges), the complexity (number of edges
and number of variable vertices) of queries, and the number of constraints in the query. Graphs
of a specific size were selected from the YouTube graph by randomly choosing a connected set of
edges till we reached the desired number of edges. Query graphs were also randomly generated.
Fig. 4.15 shows three graphs in which we varied the number of edges of the STUN graph
(100K, 500K, 1M), the number of constraints in the query (0 through 5) and the number of edges
and variable vertices in the query. Though we ran far more experiments than shown in the figure,
due to space limitations, we show three classes of queries – ones with 3 edges and only 1 variable
vertex, ones with 5 edges and 2 variable vertices, and ones with 12 edges and 5 variable vertices.
Every single data point shown in Fig. 4.15 was obtained by running 200 queries.
The results shows that (i) as the number of constraints in a query increases, STUN’s query
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Fig. 4.15: Query execution time versus number of spatial and temporal constraints
the search space; (ii) as expected, the time taken to process queries increases with the query
complexity and the amount of data. However, even with 5 variables in the query (corresponding to
a 5-way join in a relational database), we are able to process queries in a 1M edge graph in 1.5-2
seconds – and for simpler queries, the query processing time can often be well under 0.5 seconds.
Fig. 4.16 shows the same data in the previous figure – only this graph shows how the three
types of queries mentioned above perform as we vary the size of the STUN knowledge base. We
see that the query processing time increases slightly super-linearly with the size of the database,
though the slope of the graph increases with the complexity of the query.
4.7.2 Results with STUNRank and SR-Queries
The objective of our second set of experiments was to determine the compute time performance
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Fig. 4.16: Query execution time versus size of the STUN knowledge base
tion 4.6. For these experiments, we varied the size of the graphs and their average outdegree. We
used datasets from YouTube. Graphs of specific sizes (50K, 100K, 150K, and 200K vertices) were
selected from the YouTube graph by randomly choosing a connected set of edges till we reached
the desired number of vertices. We generated 30 datasets for each size. In these data sets, we
assigned time intervals and regions in the same way as the datasets used in the first set of exper-
iments, and in addition we randomly assigned a spatial region to 50% of follow edges. We fixed
the parameters α = 0.25, β = 0.25, and γ = 0.25, and set all label scores and vertex scores
to 1. Numbers were averaged over 5 independent runs with the maximum number of iterations
set to 100 and a tolerance (difference between two consecutive rank vectors) set to 10−5. All the
experiments were run on an Intel Xeon@2.40 GHz, 24 GB RAM.
Fig. 4.17 reports the overall computation times needed to compute STUNRanks versus
dataset size. The results show that, in general, STUN scales gracefully with respect to dataset
size, and that most of the computation is devoted to the construction of the transition matrices.
The most important difference between the combine-first and the combine-last scenarios is the
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Fig. 4.17: Overall STUNRank computation times in the query-unaware case
Figs. 4.18 and 4.19 report the computation times measured when using each of the datasets,
versus the average outdegree of the datasets. The results clearly show that, while iteration times
naturally depend on the size and average outdegree of the graph, the construction of the transition
matrices is much more influenced by the specific characteristics of each different dataset.
In the third set of experiments, we assessed the performance in the query-aware case, by
varying the “coverage” of the Rq and Tq components of an SR-query (area(Rq)/area(S) and
length(Tq)/length(T)) in the [0.01, 0.6] range. We randomly generated 10 datasets of 100K
vertices each and 100 queries for each value of the coverage and each dataset. We assigned time
intervals and regions in the same way as for the datasets used in the first set of experiments. We
fixed the parameters α = 0.25, β = 0.25, γ = 0.25, Lq = {follows} and τq = 0.5, and set all
labels and vertex scores to 1. Numbers were averaged over 100 independent runs per each value of
the coverage and each dataset with a maximum number of iterations of 100 and a tolerance equal
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Fig. 4.18: Matrix (top) and iteration (bottom) computation time for various network densities in the
combine-first query-unaware case
Fig. 4.20 reports the matrix building time in the combine-last case when varying query
coverage, averaged over the whole set of average outdegree values employed. The results show
that the performances are rather stable, with an increase of just 19.2% when moving from the
minimum to the maximum coverage value.
Finally, Fig. 4.21, which reports iteration time in both the combine-first and combine-last
scenarios versus coverage for two specific values of average outdegree (1.8 and 3.6), shows that
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Fig. 4.19: Matrix (top) and iteration (bottom) computation time for various network densities in the
combine-last query-unaware case
case, computation time increases at most 35% when moving from the minimum to the maximum
coverage value.
4.8 Related Work
To date, the only system capable of performing subgraph matching in the presence of space, time,
and uncertainty when they are all present at the same time is the Annotated RDF system [197]













0,01 0,02 0,05 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6
ms.
area(Rq)/area(S),  length(Tq)/length(T)
Fig. 4.20: Average matrix computation time in the combine-last query-aware case
ple, triples of spatial regions, time intervals, and uncertainty. Annotated RDF query processing
algorithms are all in memory algorithms. However, as shown in [197][Table II], even for a graph
database with just 549K edges from the ChefMoz data set used in those experiments, it takes
1.243 seconds in memory, while with just over 1M edges (1.234M edges) on the GovTrack data
set, it takes almost 18 seconds to process simple queries. In contrast to their in memory times
which one would expect to be fast, our on-disk times for comparable queries on 500K edge data
is under 200ms for the first two types of queries shown in Fig. 4.15. Our work here is also closely
related to the DOGMA work [40] in which we previously developed an index structure to store
RDF graphs on disk to support subgraph matching. In this paper, we show how such a framework
can be augmented with four quantities – constraints, space, time, and uncertainty – and show that
we can still answer complex queries on social network data efficiently.
Many approaches to graph storage and querying in the Semantic Web community use re-
lational databases as their back-end [194], for instance by inferring the relational schema of the
given RDF data [185], or using a triple based denormalized relational schema [203]. Other RDF
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Fig. 4.21: Iteration time in the combine-first (top) and combine-last (bottom) query-aware case
Existing work on general subgraph matching (e.g., [57, 70, 205, 206, 207, 208]) typically
employ heuristics to predict the cost of answering strategies based on statistics about the dataset
and the current state of query processing. For instance, [208] transforms vertices into points in a
vector space, thus converting queries into distance-based multi-way joins over the vector space.
In particular, [57] proposes a two-step join optimization algorithm based on a cluster based join
index. GADDI, proposed in [205], employs a structural distance based approach and a dynamic
matching scheme to minimize redundant calculations. In [206] the authors propose SUMMA,
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which improves over GADDI and employs more advanced indices. The algorithm in [207] em-
ploys an aggressive pruning strategy based on an index storing label distributions. In [70], the
authors propose an index over sets of data graphs with the objective of enabling efficient pruning
over graphs with tens of thousands of vertices. In contrast, our work focuses on query answering
over single, very large graphs that contain edges that may be labeled with a combination of space,
time, and uncertainty – something none of these papers address.
The PageRank algorithm and its many variants have the general objective of appropriately
ranking linked objects in various scenarios. They have received a tremendous deal of attention
in the last decade [15, 26, 35, 51, 60, 108, 141, 162, 39]. The initial problem formulation [39]
has been extensively studied in order to improve its feasibility and performances in fastly grow-
ing networks [16, 26, 35, 81, 141, 39]. Many works have also been targeted at exploiting the
flexibility of the personalized variant of PageRank [16, 26, 51, 81, 108, 141]. For instance, [51]
presented an approach targeted at proximity search in entity-relationship graphs. The main intu-
ition was to compute and index “sketchy” random walk fingerprints for a subset of vertices, which
were then adaptively loaded to various resolutions to form approximate personalized PageRank
vectors. Finally, some work has been devoted to the idea of exploiting “context” information to
make the PageRank of a vertex flow non-uniformly to its out-neighborhood [15, 51, 60, 162]. For
instance, [15] presented a variant of PageRank where link weights were computed based on their
relative position in the Web page, associated tags, and length of the anchor text. In [60], a dynamic
query-dependent ranking technique was proposed that, given a link- and vertex-labeled directed
graph, applied a flow-based model to dynamically rank vertices with respect to any of the original
labels. [162] employed a given clustering of Web pages and gave different weights to each link by
looking at the positions of the connected vertices with respect to the clusters. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the approaches proposed in the past takes into account spatio-temporal, cer-
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tainty, and vertex/label importance information to derive suitable PageRank-based vertex rankings
in complex graphs.
4.9 Conclusions
With the growing importance of social networks, there are now many efforts to learn properties
of such networks. For instance, learning relationships between people is a complex problem, and
there is much work in identifying links between individuals [132]. However, such links are almost
always uncertain. Likewise, when we look at real-world social networks like Facebook, there is
spatial and temporal information often present. For instance, a page associated with an event being
organized on FaceBook has an associated location and an associated time.
In this chapter, we extend classical social network data management with spatial, temporal,
and uncertain attributes, leading to the STUN framework. We propose a theoretical model for
STUN as well as a STUN subgraph matching query language that extends classical graph matching
queries with space, time, and uncertainty. Furthermore, we develop an index structure to store
STUN databases. The graph structure, time, and space are hierarchically decomposed into a single
index. We also develop a STUN subgraph matching algorithm that effectively utilizes this index,
pruning away large parts of the search space. Finally, we introduce STUNRank queries where
users can ask queries about important nodes in a STUN database. STUNRank queries come in
two flavors – query-aware and query-unaware. Moreover, we provide two classes of STUNRank
definitions – combine-first and combine-last. Additionally, our framework allows a user to specify
the relative importance of space, time, uncertainty, and traditional network flows in his query,
allowing the user greater expressive power. Finally, we report on experiments using real-world
YouTube data showing that our algorithms work well in practice.
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Chapter 5: Malware Infection Prediction
5.1 Introduction
The goal of this research is to develop methods to predict the percentage of hosts in a given popu-
lation (we use country in our experiments) that will be infected by a particular piece of malware,
given some historical data about the malware and the hosts, but with no information whatsoever
on how the hosts are connected together. This is made even more challenging by the fact that not
all truly infected machines are actually detected to be infected (by say using some anti-virus soft-
ware). This problem is an important one with immediate applications in web and cyber security.
For example, a better prediction of the number of infections in a country will enable anti-virus
companies and security firms to better deploy patches and safety measures to counter threats.
In order to achieve this, we make several contributions. First, we define a very novel set
of features that are related to the ability of hosts to detect malware and patch vulnerabilities. In
order to achieve this, we present a novel host-malware bipartite graph and a bi-fix-point algorithm
to compute these features. These lead to a feature-based prediction model (FBP). Then, build-
ing upon the well-known SIR-model of disease spread, we develop an epidemiologically-inspired
predictive model called DIPS in which each host is either in a detected, infected, patched, or
susceptible state. We define the model and show how to learn the parameters of the model in
a data-driven way. We also define a variant of DIPS called DIPS-EXP. The outputs of these
models, as well as outputs of past work on predicting epidemic spreads, are then fed into three
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different ensemble models: ESM0, ESM1and FBP+Funnel. We study the relative predictive accu-
racies of all of these models. On split-sample 10-fold cross validation tests, ESM0 provides the
best performance, significantly outperforming past work by large margins, irrespective of whether
we use root mean squared error (RMSE), normalized RMSE (NRMSE), or Pearson Correlation
Coefficient (PCC) as our measure. All the experiments use large-scale extensive real-data from
Symantec’s Worldwide Intelligence Network Environment (WINE) data set.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe our dataset and set-up in the next section.
Section 5.3 describes statistical features we develop for our task and the feature based predic-
tion model (FBP). In Section 5.4, we propose a novel non-linear time-series model (DIPS). The
ensemble models (ESM) to combine two suggested models (FBP and DIPS) is described in Sec-
tion 5.5. In Section 5.6 we present our empirical data analysis including the prediction task. We
review related work in Section 5.7, and we discuss the implications of our results in Section 5.8.
5.2 Dataset and Set-up
Symantec’s WINE data is collected from real-world hosts running Symantec anti-virus software.
Users of Symantec’s product line have a choice of opting-in to report telemetry about the security
events1 (e.g. executable file downloads, virus detection) that occur on their hosts. The WINE
dataset contains information about the hosts, files of the hosts and malware recognized on a file of
a host.
We selected the 100 most frequently detected malware from the WINE data and extracted
infection information about hosts infected by these malware using the following records.
Anti-virus telemetry. Anti-virus (AV) telemetry records detection history of known malware over
hosts. From each record, we extracted the detection time and the hash (MD5 and SHA2) of the
1 The events included in WINE are representative of events that Symantec observes around the world [167].
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malicious file detected. Each record indicates that the anti-virus has blocked an attack that may
have resulted in an infection.
Binary reputation. The binary reputation data records all binary executable files – benign or ma-
licious – that were downloaded/copied on end-hosts worldwide. From each record, we extracted
the creation time of the malicious file in the host (infection time) and the country where the host
was when the file was infected.
time
...t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 
# of infected hosts
# of detections
1 2 4 5 4 3 4 4 3







Infection time Detection time
Fig. 5.1: Examples of infections/infection intervals
We note that an infection interval is the period from the infection time to the detection time
of a malware in a host (See Figure 5.1). When the length of the infection interval is larger than 0,
we call it an infection.2 The number of infections over the 100 most frequently detected malware
during 640 days was 3,170,669 (for the US alone, it was 989,263).3 The infection patterns are
very different (See Figure 5.2). We adopt the following approach to address this problem: (a) we
first carefully define and extract novel domain-based features from the WINE datasets including
2 If the anti-virus software blocked a file containing a malware immediately when the files appeared, then the detec-
tion record is not an infection in our framework.
3 Note that we do not know the number of infected hosts that have not been detected.
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Fig. 5.2: Examples for infection patterns of 2 malware in the US in our dataset. Number of infected hosts
(bold red) and number of detection (blue) vs time (in days). Note that the number of detection are
a fraction of the number of infected hosts and that both time-series are highly non-linear.
measures of hosts’ detection ability and incompetence — we call this feature-based prediction
(FBP) ; (b) we then construct a novel non-linear temporal model called DIPS (Detected, Infected,
Patched, and Susceptible) based on epidemiological principles, and then (c) utilize sound regres-
sion methods to link both the features as well as the epidemiology-based models to the dependent
variable (the number of malware infections). Because the inputs of FBP as well as multiple DIPS
variants and FUNNEL[153] are themselves predictors that feed into yet another predictor, our
overall framework is an ensemble prediction method.
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5.3 Feature-based prediction ( FBP)
In a very dynamic environment like malware infections and patching, it is not possible to predict
infection patterns solely based on infection trends. Some amount of domain knowledge has to be
incorporated (for example, when the number of detected infections are small). Hence as a first step,
we build a feature-based prediction model (FBP), where given past history we extract meaningful
features of hosts and malware. Essentially these features encode the defending abilities of hosts
and infection properties of the malware as relative scores.
Next, we describe the domain-based features we constructed for our analysis in more de-
tail. We define H and M as the set of host and the set of malware, respectively. For each host
h ∈ H, F(h) denotes the set of files of h. For f ∈ F(h), thf is the time stamp representing
the time when f appears on h. For each host h ∈ H, the malware detection set dH(h) of h is
a set of tuples of the form (f,m, t) where f ∈ F(h), m ∈ M and t is the time stamp when
the file f infected by the malware m is discovered on the host h. By using the the malware
detection sets for each host, we define the set of host detection dM(m) of the malware m as
dM(m) = {(f, h, t)|h ∈ H, f ∈ F(m), (f,m, t) ∈ dH(h)}.
Vulnerabilities: Let V be the set of all vulnerabilities. Given a malwarem ∈M the set V u(m) is
the set of all vulnerabilities used by this malware. For each vulnerability v ∈ V , two time stamps
are important [28]:
• Anti-virus signatures released. Once the vulnerability is disclosed, anti-virus vendors
release new signatures for ongoing attacks and created heuristic detection for the exploit.
After this point, the attacks can be detected on end-hosts with updated A/V signatures. We
denote this as tsv. We can retrieve this information from Symantec website or the National
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Vulnerabilities Database (NVD)4 maintained by NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology of the US Government).
• Patch released. On the disclosure date, or shortly afterward, the software vendor releases
a patch for the vulnerability. After this point, the hosts that have applied the patch are no
longer susceptible to the exploit. We denote this as tpv. This information is readily available
from NVD.
5.3.1 Incompetence
Given a host h ∈ H and a tuple (f,m, t) ∈ dH(h), we define two classes of features: hosts’
incompetence in detecting malware and incompetence in patching (DI and PI , respectively). For
each, we consider an absolute case and a relative case (i.eADI ,API ,RDI andRPI). These four
measures measure the incompetence of a host in detecting and patching the malware m associated
with file f . The only difference between the relative case and absolute case is that the absolute
case does not consider the time tsv for each vulnerability v contained in a malware.
ADI(h, f,m, t) = t− thf
RDI(h, f,m, t) = maxv∈V u(m) max(0, t−max(tsv, thf ))
API(h,m) = (max(f,m,t)∈dH(h) t)− (min(f,m,t)∈dH(h) thf )
RPI(h,m) = maxv∈V u(m) max(0, (max(f,m,t)∈dH(h) t
−max(tpv, (min(f,m,t)∈dH(h) thf ))))
For instance, absolute detection incompetence,ADI(h, f,m, t) of host hw.r.t. a file f of malware
m and the time t when f was detected by host h is simply (t − thf ), i.e. the time that passed
from the detection time to the time of original infection. The relative detection incompetence
RDI(h, f,m, t) looks at all possible vulnerabilities v that malware m exploits. For each such
4 https://nvd.nist.gov/
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vulnerability, it looks at the time elapsed between when the file f was detected by host h and
when either the file infected the host or when an updated anti-virus signature could have detected
it. The longer this time gap, the more incompetent the host. The absolute and relative (API, RPI)
patching incompetence are similarly defined.
Estimation by using only the WINE datasets. The relative detection and patch incompetence
formulas can be rewritten as:
RDI(h, f,m, t, ) = max(0, t−max((minv∈V u(m) tsv), thf )))






For a malware m, ts(m) = minv∈V u(m) tsv denotes the earliest time at which a host down-
loaded an anti-virus signature for the vulnerability (we call this “time signature”), showing that he
might have become aware of the malware, and tp(m) = minv∈V u(m) t
p
v denotes the earliest time
the host applied a patch for a vulnerability for malware m (we call this “patch signature”). Both
these quantities are recorded by WINE. Then, the two measures becomes the following:
RDI(h, f,m, t, ) = max(0, t−max(ts(m), thf ))




A possible way to estimate time signature and patch signature of a malware in WINE is:




tp(m) = minv∈V u(m) t
p
v
≈ minh∈H,(,m′,t′)∈dH(h) max(f,m,t)∈dH(h) t



















For instance, average patch incompetence (AAPI) is obtained by adding up the average patch
incompetence of the host w.r.t. all malware files that it patched, and dividing this by the number
of such malware files associated with that host.
5.3.2 Features on Bipartite Host-Malware (HM) Graphs
Given a training set of historical WINE data, we can derive a bipartite graph whose vertices are
hosts and malware, respectively. An edge links a host and malware if the training data shows
that the malware has infected the host. Edges can be weighted with quantities like AD(h,m) or
RDI(h,m) as defined earlier in this section.
We now define some novel features using HM-graphs. The absolute detection ability (ADA)
of a host h captures the host’s ability to detect malware, while the absolute detection hardness
(ADH) of a malware m captures the difficulty in detecting that malware. Clearly, these two quan-
tities are closely intertwined. We define them below in a mutually recursive manner.
ADA(h) =
∑
(f,m,t)∈dH(h)w12(h, f,m, t) ·ADH(m)
ADH(m) =
∑
(f,h,t)∈dM(m)w21(m, f, h, t) ·ADA(h)
where h ∈ H,m ∈M and










By way of explanation, consider the definition of ADA(h). To do this, we look at every
(f,m, t) triple in the training set. If h can detect m, then the harder m is to detect (captured
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by ADH(m) in the formula), the better h’s detection abilities are. Thus, when considering a
specific (f,m, t) triple, the definition ofADA(h) multipliesADH(m) by a quantityw12 which is
the relative competence (inverse of absolute detection incompetence ADI(h, f,m, t)). A similar
rationale applies to the definition of ADH . As in the previous section, we can define relative
variants, RDA,RDH as well.
RDA(h) =
∑
(f,m,t)∈dH(h)w12(h, f,m, t) ∗RDH(m)
RDH(m) =
∑
(f,h,t)∈dM(m)w21(m, f, h, t) ∗RDA(h)
where h ∈ H,m ∈M and










5.3.2.1 Fix-point Computation and Convergence Result
As ADA,ADH are mutually recursively defined, one may wonder if they are well-defined.
We show below, an iterative fix-point computation procedures that describes how this may be
achieved. We now define the iterationsADAi, ADH i as follows. LetADA0(h) = 1|H| , ADH
0(m) =
1
|M| for h ∈ H,m ∈M,then for iteration i > 0,
ADAi(h) =
∑
(f,m,t)∈dH(h)w12(h, f,m, t) ∗ADH i−1(m)
ADH i(m) =
∑
(f,h,t)∈dM(m)w21(m, f, h, t) ∗ADAi−1(h)
We can capture the above computations as a bi-fix-point algorithm, Algorithm 9 that main-
tains two listsADA,ADH . The entryADA(h) specifies the value of the ADA quantity computed
thus far - similarly for the entry ADH(m). These two lists are manipulated. We assume the exis-
tence of an equivalence relation≡ on ADA and ADH lists, telling us when two ADA lists and two
ADH lists are essentially the same. For instance, we can decide that ADA lists `1, `2 are similar
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whenever a measure of distance, such as cosine distance or Jaccard distance, between the two
vectors is below a threshold.
Algorithm 9 BiFixpoint
Input: H,M, T (∗T is a training set ∗)
Output: ADA,ADH
1: forall h ∈ H, ADA(h)← 1|H| (∗ initialize ∗)
2: forall m ∈M, ADH(m)← 1|M|
3: change← true;
4: while change do
5: ADA′(h)←
∑
(f,m,t)∈dH(h) w12(h, f,m, t) ∗ADH(m)
6: ADH(m)←
∑
(f,h,t)∈dM(m) w21(m, f, h, t) ∗ADA(h)
7: if ADA′ ∼ ADA and ADH ′ ≡ ADH then
8: change← false
9: else
10: ADA← ADA′ and ADH ← ADH ′
11: return ADA,ADH
The following result shows that this algorithm is guaranteed to converge.
Theorem 1. For any sets (H,M, T ), BiFixpoint(H,M, T ) is guaranteed to converge and the
returned solution is unique.
Proof. The recursive equations describing RDA and RDH have the same structure of those
of a bipartite Markov Chain where the first partition is the set of hosts H and the second is
the set of malware M. In fact we can rewrite the equations in the following way RDA(h) =∑
m∈{m′|(,m′,)∈dH(h)} p12(h,m) ∗ RDH(m) and RDH(m) =
∑
h∈{f |(,h,)∈dM(m)} p21(m,h) ∗
RDA(h) where p12(h,m) =
∑
(f,m,t)∈dH(h)w12(h, f,m, t) and p21(m,h) =
∑
(f,h,t)∈dM(m)w21
(m, f, h, t). Because of the definition of the weightsw12 andw21, it follows that for eachm ∈M,∑
h∈{h′|(,h′,)∈dM(m)} p12(h,m) = 1 and for each h ∈ H,
∑
m∈{m′|(,m′,)∈dH(h)} p21(m,h) = 1.
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In addition both the p1,2(h,m) (with m ∈ M and h ∈ {h′|(,h′,) ∈ dM(m)}) and p2,1(m,h)
(with h ∈ H and m ∈ {m′|(,m′,) ∈ dH(h)}) are greater than zero. Moreover, by construction,
if we have an edge (h,m) also the edge (m,h) exists, both with value (probability) greater than
zero. The last statement implies that for each pair of nodes (a, b) in each connected components
in this Markov chain the probability to reach a from b (and vice versa) after a finite number of
steps is greater than zero. This implies that, for each connect component, the associate transition
matrix is regular, it follows that the BiFixpoint(H,M, T ) algorithm converges and the returned
solution is unique.
5.3.3 Patch Ability
Exactly analogous to the measures defined above, we can define two patch abilities: absolute and







































In order to compute the patch ability we can use theBiFixpoint(H,M, T ) algorithm with
opportune modifications according the specific equations. By following the same proof method-
ology of Theorem 1, is possible to prove that the resulting algorithm converge and the returned
solution is unique.
5.3.4 Collaborative Features
LetH be a set of all hosts andH ′ be a subset ofH . We use a memory based collaborative filtering
approach to produce features whose meaning is close to the number of malware infections in a
specific set of hosts H ′, i.e. all the hosts of a specific country. The basic intuition under this
collaborative filtering is that if host h is infected by malware m and host h′ similar to h, then h′
could also be infected by m. We assume the existence of a function sim : H ×H → [0, 1] that
similarity between hosts. Given a host h ∈ H ′, the percentage of infected hosts in H (weighted






where ∃(,m, ) ∈ dH(h′) is used to check if h is infected by m. Intuitively infected(h,m)
estimates the possibility that the host will be infected by m. In fact, the greater the percentage of
hosts similar to h infected bym, the greater is the possibility (or probability) that hwill be infected
bym. Since we want to predict the expected number of infected hosts inH ′, our resulting variable




If we assume that infected(h,m) is a correct estimation of the probability that the host h will
be infected by m, the value
∑
h∈H′ infected(h,m) estimates the expected number of infected
host in H ′. Since H can be huge (millions of hosts), we consider a reduced subset H̃ obtained by
uniformly sampling H , and then we replace H in Eq 5.3.4 by H̃ .
Similarity Measures. We define different notions of similarity – each of these notions yields
a different feature estimating the expected number of infected hosts. The definitions below show
some examples.
sim1(h, h′) = 1− |ADA(h)−ADA(h′)|
sim2(h, h′) = 1− |RDA(h)−RDA(h′)|
sim3(h, h′) = 1− |APA(h)−APA(h′)|











5.3.5 The FBP Model
The FBP Model is a general framework to predict the ratio of hosts infected by malware m in
country c with a given regression method r such as GPR (Gaussian Process Regression), Elastic
Net, Ridge, Lasso, and etc. The dependent and independent variables for the regression method
are following:
Dependent variable. The dependent variable for each country -malware pair (c,m) is the
percentage of hosts in country c infected by malware m.
Independent variables (features). For each country-malware pair (c,m), we computeADI,API,
RDI,RPI , AADI , ARDI , AAPI , ARPI , ADA, RDA, APA and RPA of hosts in country
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c, APH and RPH of malware m and the collaborative variables of the hosts in c with the 6
similarity measures. Other features are the percentages of the hosts which were not detected form
in countries which are economically similar to country c.5 Two measures, Human Development
Index (HDI) and Per Capita GDP PPP of countries are used to determine the similar countries. The
features are computed for each day d with respect to four different time intervals from 0, d − 60,
d− 30, d− 10 to d day.
Nearest Neighbors (additional feature selection) To make the learned model more robust,
we also take features of the k−nearest neighbors. For a given country-malware pair (c,m) and
similarity measure S, we find the k most similar country-malware pair(s) Pk to (c,m) with respect
to the past infection pattern. We then use the features of Pk as well (in addition to those of (c,m))
for predicting. Various existing techniques can be used for measuring similarity between two
time-series e.g. Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), Euclidean distance etc.
5.4 Time-series model based prediction ( DIPS)
In this section we propose a novel non-linear time-series model called DIPS (short for Detected,
Infected, Patched, Susceptible) which is a variant of the SIR model of disease spread tailored
for malware. Typical infection patterns (see Figure 5.2) are highly non-linear. Hence intuitively
linear approaches are ill-suited to this task. Malware spread has multiple similarities to informa-
tion diffusion and epidemiology (indeed, some of the earliest papers on this topic try to model
it as a disease). Inspired by these models, DIPS adapts a recent model [153] to handle malware
infections. The most challenging part is to deal with difference in the detected and actual infec-
tions. We assume that in the training dataset we have the true (as well as the detected) number of
5 We define that country C and C′ are similar w.r.t. measure T when |T (C)−T (C′)|/(T (C) + (T (C′)) ∗ 0.5 ≤ p
where p = {3%, 6%, 9%, 12%, 15%, 18%}.
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infections but in the test dataset, we are only given the number of actual detection.
5.4.1 Model Parameters
Similar to fundamental models like the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) ‘mumps-like’ model,
our model assumes that the machine population can be in one of the following states:
• Susceptible: In this state, a machine is not patched and hence is vulnerable to an attack by a
particular malware.
• Infected: In this state, the machine is now infected, and spreads the malware by infecting
other susceptible hosts.
• Detected: In this state, we have detected that the machine is infected (by say an anti-virus
software running on the machine). Note that not all infected machines may be detected as
infected.
• Patched: As the name suggests, in this state the machine is patched, and cannot get infected.
We temporally track the number of hosts in each of these states. In addition, we assume we
have a variable DET (t) which is the true number of detection at time t.
5.4.2 The DIPS Model
We are now ready to describe the DIPS model. There are a total of N potential susceptible hosts
for the malware (one may also assume that there is an inflow of additional hosts at every time
tick). Each host starts out in the Susceptible state. From the susceptible state, a host may move
into the Patched state (at the rate of θ(t)) or the Infected state. We assume each infected host may
infect a susceptible host at a certain rate (called β(t)), which is also periodic and dictated by users’
habitual behavior. An infected host may move into the Detected state upon detection, after which
the host may become susceptible again (if it is not patched), or be patched (at the rate of δ(t)) and
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Fig. 5.3: DIPS model. D, I, P and S are the Detected, Infected state, Patched and Susceptible states
Infection Rate β(t): This is the rate at which an infected host infects susceptible machines. We
assume β(t) has the following form:




• β0: is the infection rate by users’ (who are using the hosts) habitual behavior averaged over
days
• Pp: stands for the period of a cycle. Infection data, like information diffusion data, and
epidemiological data, typically shows obvious periodicity (like weekly) which we want to
capture.
• Pa: represents the amplitude of the fluctuation.
• PS : represents the phase shift in the cycle.
Patching rates δ(t) and θ(t): As mentioned above, we assume that susceptible hosts get patched
at the same rate θ(t) and hosts in the detected state get patched at rate δ(t). More formally:
θ(t) = 0 (t < tp) or θ0 (t ≥ tp)
δ(t) = 0 (t < tp, td) or δ0 (t ≥ tp, td)
where tp is the start time of the patching and td is the first detection time.
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Error rate γ(t): This captures the fact that the number of true detectionsDET (t) may not exactly
match the number of detection in our model (i.e. the number of hosts in the D(t) state).
Finally, putting everything together, the DIPS model can be expressed using the following
differential equations:
S(t+ 1) = S(t)− β(t)S(t)I(t) + (1− δ(t))D(t)− θ(t)S(t)
I(t+ 1) = I(t) + β(t)S(t)I(t)− γ0DET (t)
D(t+ 1) = γ0DET (t)
P (t+ 1) = P (t) + δ(t)D(t) + θ(t)S(t)
Intuitively, S(t), I(t), D(t), P (t) capture the number of hosts in a susceptible, infected,
detected, and patched state, respectively.
5.4.2.0.1 The DIPS-exp model We have another variant of the DIPS model, called DIPS-exp
where we have an inflow of additional susceptible hosts at every time-tick (σ(t)). All the equations
in Equation 5.1 remain the same, except for the equation defining S(t+ 1) which changes to:
S(t+ 1) = S(t)− β(t)S(t)I(t) + (1− δ(t))D(t)− θ(t)S(t) + σ(t)
5.4.3 Model Learning
The parameters of the DIPS model Θ = {N, β0, Pa, PS , γ0,
tp, θ0, δ0} (DIPS-exp additionally has a parameter of σ0) need to be learned. Given two real
time-sequences, Itrue(t) and Dtrue(t), of the number of actual infections and detection (resp.) at
time-tick t, we find the parameters which optimize the following equation:






The learning algorithm is given in Algorithm 10. Basically, there are two phases to learn the
parameters. The first step is to adjust the initial parameters to fit them on overall infection time-
sequences (Isumtrue (t) and D
sum
true(t)) and fix parameter tp,θ0, Pa and PS . The learning order of
the parameters is N → β0 → γ0(→ σ0) → tp → δ0 → θ0 → Pa → PS6. The sec-
ond step is to fit the learned parameters on the specific infection pattern of country c for mal-
ware m. Here, we only update the following parameters: N → β0 → γ0(→ σ0) → δ0. The
LearnParameters(Θ, I(t), D(t), f lag) is the function to update the given parameter values Θ
applying parameter p ∈ Θ ← arg minp
∑
t (I(t) − IΘ(t))2 and to return the updated parame-
ters, Θ′ and the error,
∑
t(I(t) − IΘ′(t))2. The flag represents the learning order of each step
(if flag = 1, the first step, else the second step). Initially, S(0) = N − D(0) − I(0), P (0) =
0, D(0) = DET (0), and I(0) = Itrue(0). We leverage the Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) algo-
rithm [144] for each argmin in LearnParameters.
5.5 Ensemble Models ( ESM)
We have suggested three models: feature based prediction (FBP), and time-series model based
prediction (DIPS and DIPS-exp). We now propose ensemble models, ESM which combine both
of them to improve performance. We add the expected number of infections we get from the
DIPS and DIPS-exp models as features for our feature prediction model. We do not use the
learned parameters Θ∗ of DIPS directly as features. This is because DIPS is highly non-linear;
to take advantage of it, we use the output of DIPS instead.
To summarize, we extract all the features, add the output of DIPS as additional fea-
tures, and then use a regression model to perform prediction. We used a variety of models
like logistic regression and Gaussian process regression.
6 The order affects the prediction performance a lot.
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Algorithm 10 DIPS learning algorithm
Input: country c, malware m and X(m) = {(c′, Itrue(t), Dtrue(t))|c′ ∈ Countries, Itrue(t) and Dtrue(t) for c′
and m}
Output: Θ = {N, β0, Pa, PS , γ0, tp, θ0, δ0, (σ0)}
1: Θ← {N ′, β′0, P ′a, P ′S , γ′0, t′p, θ′0, δ′0, (σ′0)} # Assign default parameter values
2: Isumtrue (t), Dsumtrue(t)←
∑
c′∈Countries,(c′,I(t),D(t))∈X(m) I(t), D(t)
# Sum of # of infections/detection over countries w.r.t. each time
3: err ← infinite, err′ ← 0,Θ′ ← Θ
4: while err > err′ do # Learn all parameters
5: err′,Θ′ ← LearnParameters(Θ′, Isumtrue (t), Dsumtrue(t), 1)
6: if err > err′ then
7: Θ← Θ′, err ← err′
8: err′ ← 0
9: Let (c′, Itrue(t), Dtrue(t)) ∈ X(m) where c′ equals c
10: Θ′ ← Θ, err′ ← 0
11: while err > err′ do # Learn N, β0, γ0(σ0), δ0 only
12: err′,Θ′ ← LearnParameters(Θ′, Itrue(t), Dtrue(t), 0)
13: if err > err′ then
14: Θ← Θ′, err ← err′
15: err′ ← 0
16: return Θ
5.6 Empirical Analyses
In this section, we empirically analyze the performance of the proposed prediction methods.
Specifically, we study three questions:
• Q1: Can we predict the number of hosts in a country that are infected by a malware?
• Q2: How does predictive accuracy change with the number of infections?
• Q3: Does the prediction performance of the models depend on the number of hosts moni-
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tored?
Experiment setting. We focused on top 50 most infectious malware in the 100 malware
infection data extracted from WINE, and the top 40 countries (by GDP), leading to 2000 (50x40)
country-malware pairs. This data includes over 1.45M unique hosts and 2.99M infections. The
number of reported hosts varies from just from 634 (Iran) to 554,969 (United States). We ran the
experiment over 541 days from 60th to 600th day among total 640 days. In order to ensure reliable
data, we eliminated the first 60 and last 40 days of the 640-day data set.
Performance metrics. We checked RMSE (root mean squared error), NRMSE (normalized
RMSE), and Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) to evaluate performance. NRMSE =RMSE
/(max(X)−min(X)), where X is a set of ground true infection ratios of each malware-country
pair over all days. Due to space constraints, we focus on NRMSE7.
Train/Test Split. Each prediction model was trained in the first l days (on the features
defined earlier) and tested for the remaining days. We used 80% of the data for training and the
rest for validation.
Prediction models. We tested 7 different prediction models, FUNNEL [153]8, FBP, DIPS,
DIPS-EXP, two different ESM models (ESM0 and ESM1) and FBP+Funnel. FUNNEL is a recently
proposed time-series model which has been used to predict large scale disease patterns (and like
DIPS, it too is based on epidemiological models like SEIR). ESM0 refers to ESM using FBP
with the expected values of the two DIPS models as additional features for each pair. ESM1 uses
FBP with FUNNEL and DIPS models. To estimate the performance of ESM more precisely, we
also tested FBP+Funnel which uses FBP with only FUNNEL (but without DIPS).
For FBP, we tested various regression methods such as GPR (Gaussian Process Regres-
7 The other two measures provide similar results.
8 The code was downloaded from http://www.cs.kumamoto-u.ac.jp/∼yasuko/software.html
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sion), Elastic Net, Ridge, Lasso, and etc with k more country-malware pairs whose infection
patterns are similar with each country-malware. We tested with k ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The similarity
was measured by Dynamic Time Wrapping (DTW). For FBP, DTW showed best performance
in our testing among several similarity measures, such as Euclidean distance, average correlation
coefficient, DTW and etc. In testing with 2000 (country,malware) pairs, FBP showed the best
performance with GPR and k = 2 w.r.t. the average RMSE and NRMSE. The average correlation
coefficients were similar for all. We did not consider k > 2 because the performance improvement
from k = 1 to k = 2 was very trivial. In the following experiment sections, we fix k = 2 and GPR
for FBP and the FBP setting was used for ESM0, ESM1 and FBP+Funnel also.
5.6.1 Performance over all countries and malware
Answering Q1 with overall performance. The overall performance of the prediction models is
shown in Table 5.1. FBP is clearly better than FUNNEL with respect to all four measures, showing
that the features defined in Section 5.3 are useful to predict infection patterns generally. Also,
DIPS shows good prediction performance. The average MAE*, RMSE and NRMSE are 25%,
30% and 73% respectively of FUNNEL. Moreover the average correlation coefficient is more than
6 times that of FUNNEL. ESM models (FBP+DIPS) shows significant performance improvement
from FBP and the best performance with respect to NRMSE. DIPS models show slightly better
prediction performance w.r.t. MAE*, RMSE and Correlation coefficient than ESM0 and ESM1.
We can also confirm that FBP+Funnel (FBP with FUNNEL only) and ESM1 (ESM0 with FUNNEL)
do not show clear improvement from FBP and ESM0. This suggests that DIPS significantly
improves upon the predictive accuracy of past work. In any case we wish to point out that FUNNEL
was designed and intended for disease patterns and not malware spread.
More detailed analysis: Performance of the prediction models for each country-malware
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Model MAE* RMSE NRMSE C.C.
FBP 73.74 0.00170 0.179 0.12
FUNNEL 127.83 0.00269 0.226 0.08
DIPS 32.36 0.00083 0.165 0.50
DIPS-EXP 36.56 0.00096 0.223 0.48
ESM0 39.41 0.00115 0.150 0.31
ESM1 41.84 0.00118 0.151 0.31
FBP+Funnel 79.01 0.00189 0.179 0.19
Tab. 5.1: Average of MAE, RMSE, NRMSE and Correlation coefficient over 2000 pairs in testing period.
Training ratio is 0.8. The MAE* values were computed with —# of ground true infected hosts -























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 5.4: Scatter plot for NRMSE and Correlation coefficient over 2000 pairs. Each point represents the
performance for each country-malware pair.
pair is shown in Figure 5.4. DIPS models show many cases having very high correlation co-
efficient and very low NRMSE. But there are some cases having very high NRMSE when the
correlation coefficient is very low. On the other hand, NRMSE of FBP is relatively low even
when the correlation coefficient is pretty low. Interestingly, ESM models have the both strength
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of FBP and DIPS. To analyze the performance more, kernel density estimations are shown in
Figure 5.5. As you see in Figure 5.5 (a), the density of ESM models and DIPS models are high in
very high correlation coefficient values. In Figure 5.5 (b), the density of DIPS models and ESM
models are really high with very low NRMSE values. But DIPS models have very long tail having
very high NRMSE values.
(a) Correlation coefficients
●





































Fig. 5.5: Kernel Density of (a) Correlation coefficient and (b) NRMSE over 2000 pairs
Answering Q2. We define the infectiousness level as the average number of infected hosts
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over all days. Precisely, ln(1 + Avg.# infected hosts over days), here 1 is added as a default
because Avg.# infected hosts over days could be less than 1. In Figure 5.6, we projected
values of correlation coefficients and NRMSE over the infectiousness level w.r.t. each country-
malware pair in order to check how each model works in different infectiousness levels. Each dot
corresponds to a certain country-malware pair — the infectiousness level varies a lot. In terms
of correlation coefficient, DIPS shows the best performance across all infectiousness levels espe-
cially with very high values in highly infectiousness levels, and ESM0 follows after it. Switching
the perspective to NRMSE more interestingly, DIPS still shows very good performance in gen-
eral but some glitches in relatively lower infectiousness levels. This shows the performance of
DIPS may be less robust when the number of infections is low. On the other hand, NRMSE of
FBP is still low in the situation. This means the two models are very complementary to each
other. So, ESM models show very stable and reliable performance regardless of infectiousness
levels for both measures. Shortly, FUNNEL doesn’t show any good performance even in highly
infectiousness levels.
5.6.2 Performance for certain countries
Answering Q3. The number of reported hosts over countries in our data is very different. Fig-
ure 5.7 shows the performance of the models according to each country. The order of countries
from left to right is the descending order w.r.t. the number of hosts in each country. DIPS models
show good correlation coefficients. ESM models show stable and good performance for NRMSE
over countries whose number of monitored hosts are very different. The overall prediction per-
formance of DIPS and ESM do not depend on the size of monitored hosts except the cases when
the number of monitored hosts are really small relatively. But for the countries having really
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Fig. 5.6: (a) Correlation coefficient and (b) NRMSE by ln(1+ Avg.# infected hosts over all days)
correlation coefficient.
5.6.3 Summary of experiments
ESM and DIPS have low prediction errors and relatively high correlation coefficient values on
average over all 2000 (country,malware) pairs. Both models have better prediction performance
for the country-malware pairs having more infected hosts. For the cases having lower infectious
levels, DIPS was not reliable and sometimes yielded very large errors. Interestingly, in the lower
infectious levels, DIPS and FBP showed complementary performance. So, the combination of
two techniques, ESM showed good and very stable performance for almost all cases except the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 5.7: (a) Correlation coefficient and (b) NRMSE by each country. The order from left to right is the de-
scending order by the number of hosts over countries. Each red line is the average over countries.
5.7 Related Work
We considered related work in cyber-security, data mining and epidemiology. Much research has
tried to model malware propagation. In July 2001, the Code Red worm infected 359,000 hosts on
the Internet in less than 14 hours [160]. Code Red achieved this by probing random IP addresses
(using different seeds for its pseudo-random number generator) and infecting all hosts vulnerable
to an IIS exploit. Staniford et. al. [187, 186] analyzed the Code Red worm traces and proposed
an analytic model for its propagation. They also argue that optimization like hit-list scanning,
permutation scanning can allow a worm to saturate 95% of vulnerable hosts on the Internet in
less than 2 seconds. Such techniques were subsequently employed by worms released in the wild,
such as the the Slammer worm [159] (infected 90% of all vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes) and
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the Witty worm [201]. Gkantsidis et al. study the dissemination of software patches through the
Windows Update service and find that approximately 80% of hosts request a patch within a day
after it is released; the number of hosts drops by an order of magnitude during the second day,
and is further reduced by factor of 2 in day three [89]. Additionally, [199] [138] [145] conducted
measurement studies into routing instability in Broder Gateway Protocol (BGP) routers caused
by catastrophic events, such as worm outbreaks or power outages. Other recent research also
includes using machine learning methods like belief propagation on the file-machine graph [52] to
infer files’ reputations (say malicious or benign). Papalexakis et. al. [167] propose the SharkFin
and GeoSplit models of spatio-temporal propagation of malware based on an analysis of the WINE
data. Their system models only the total volume of malware attacks as a whole over time using
a simplified model. In contrast, in this paper we model the magnitude of malware attacks per
machine in context of the machine usage and using many more sophisticated variables. As such,
our work can be also thought of as providing a fine-grained picture of malware attacks than just
gross-volume.
Remotely related work also comes from the area of information diffusion. Information
diffusion is the phenomena in which an action or idea becomes widely adopted due to the influence
of others, typically, neighbors in some network [27, 91, 98]. There are a lot of dynamic process
on graphs, all of which are related to virus propagation like blogs cascades [5, 137, 101] and
information cascades [152].
Finally our DIPS model is inspired by epidemiological models. The canonical textbooks
and surveys discussing fundamental epidemiological models like SIS and SIR include [111, 11].
Much work has gone into in finding epidemic thresholds (minimum virulence of a virus which
results in an epidemic) for a variety of networks [17, 154, 11, 130, 87, 169].
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5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied the problem of predicting the volume of actual malware infections in
a country given past data. This is a challenging problem because we can only detect a fraction of
malware infections. There are many potential benefits of accurately predicting malware volume,
which can have implications for better anti-virus software, and targeted patching. Using Syman-
tec’s extensive malware database WINE, we investigated the infection patterns of 50 malware in
more than 1.4 million hosts spread over two years in several countries. We present ESM, an en-
semble based approach which carefully leverages well-designed domain-specific features (FBP)
and a novel non-linear time-series model DIPS which incorporates detection and infections seam-
lessly. We show that our approach gives robust and stable predictions, even in case of low volume
of infections, across all the countries over several metrics (correlation coefficients and NRMSE).
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Chapter 6: Systemmatic banking crises prediction
6.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis has underscored the role of financial connectedness as a potential source
of systemic risk and macroeconomic instability. It has also highlighted the need to better under-
stand whether an increase in connectedness leads to a higher probability of a financial crisis. In
this section, we contribute to the literature on “early warning systems” (EWS) by investigating
whether measures of systemic risk, which are based on modeling the global financial system as
a network, can serve as early warning indicators and improve the performance of standard crisis
prediction models. In doing so, we use two commonly-employed prediction methods – a data
mining algorithm and an econometric crisis incidence model.
We build on the literature that links connectivity in the global banking network (“GBN”) to
systemic risk and contagion that arise during systemic banking crises.1 In particular, we compute
indicators of interconnectedness based on the pattern of financial linkages worldwide and test
their performance as leading crisis indicators. The EWS literature has traditionally focused on
balance of payments and currency crises in emerging market countries,2 and has identified several
1 See [85], [64], and [8].
2 Seminal contributions include [74], [121], [67], [122], and [24]. [23] caution that the out-of-sample performance
of EWS, especially over long horizons, has been mixed. In recent years, the literature has received a new stimulus,
with a focus on evaluating factors associated with recessions and growth collapses [66, 34], fiscal crises [18], and
financial crises in advanced economies [113]. Credit bubbles have been identified as the most robust determinant of
banking crises over very long time spans [181]. For an examination of how traditional models fared in predicting 2009
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macroeconomic factors that are robustly correlated with crises. These include asset price bubbles,
low international reserves, real exchange rate appreciation, hyperinflation, and excessive short-
term and foreign exchange borrowing. Our approach adds to this literature by focusing on the role
of financial connectedness in predicting systemic banking crises. It also speaks to the concern that
complex linkages among nations and financial institutions may be a source of systemic risk and
accentuate business cycle downturns [204, 188, 182].
Our strategy is two-pronged. First, we assess the ability of a wide range of network-based
connectedness measures to predict crises according to a data mining technique, namely a “classifi-
cation algorithm” patented by one of the authors ([189]). Classification algorithms have been used
extensively in applications in the medical sciences, genetics, finance, meteorology, web research,
and terrorism research. Classification algorithms allow us to evaluate the predictive ability of a
large number of potential crisis indicators and to narrow down the set to the “most promising”
indicators that we can use in a parsimonious regression model. Second, we employ a standard
econometric model of crisis prediction – a probit – and evaluate its performance with and without
this set of indicators. Probit models have been used with varying degrees of success to predict
balance of payments, debt, and banking crises.3
Our findings indicate that network-based measures of financial connectedness help predict
systemic banking crises. In particular, increases in a country’s interconnectedness and decreases
in the connectedness of that country’s direct financial partners (or neighbors) are associated with
a higher probability of crisis. We also find evidence of non-linearities – interconnectedness has a
more pronounced influence on crisis probability at higher levels. The results of the classification
algorithm suggest that measures of financial connectedness are useful in predicting both crisis-
years and the onset of crises. This is especially true when we focus on the most recent wave of
emerging market crises, see [44].
3 See [68], [1], [61] and [73] for reviews of the large econometric literature on EWS.
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crises (2007-2010). The probit analysis reinforces these results. Estimates from a probit model
that incorporates connnectedness indicators in addition to standard macroeconomic fundamentals
generally outperforms, in and out of sample, a model based on fundamentals alone.
Our approach adds to a growing literature on the evolution of financial connectedness over
the business cycle. In this literature, cross-country linkages are captured in many different ways.
[59] build a GBN using data on cross-country debt flows and equity investments. The authors
show that countries that are more connected, hence more centric, in the GBN prior to the recent
crisis experienced a smaller loss of output during 2008-2009. [105] and [46] construct GBNs using
granular information on bank-level exposures in the syndicated loan market. [105] finds that US
recessions are associated with lower network connectivity. [46] show that the home countries
of banks that are “central” in the GBN experienced lower stock market crashes during 2007-
2008 compared to other countries. [86] argue that direct and indirect financial exposures can
act as conduits for the transmission of banking crises internationally. [157] construct a GBN
based on cross-border bank lending and securities investments and show that connectivity tends
to rise before systemic banking crises and to fall afterward. This body of work underscores the
importance of financial connectivity for economic performance during crises.
Few studies look directly at the question whether financial connectedness can serve as an
early warning indicator. [29] show that linkages across four US financial sectors – hedge funds,
banks, broker/dealers, and insurance companies – have become more significant prior to the 2007-
2009 crisis. In particular, the impact of returns of banks and insurers on those of hedge funds
and broker/dealers was stronger than the other way around before the crisis. This finding suggests
that measures of connectedness from the returns correlation network may be useful out-of-sample
indicators of systemic risk. [45] measures financial integration based on the network of inter-
bank lending and borrowing in the syndicated loan market, and finds that country-level indicators
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of financial connectivity, which are proxies for financial integration, have predictive power for
the incidence of banking crises during 1980-2007 after controlling for credit growth and other
macroeconomic fundamentals.
Our work differs from these studies in several ways. First, while [29] focus on US financial
institutions and hence on systemic risk in the US economy, we look at the ability of global financial
linkages to predict systemic banking crises in a cross-country setting. Second, we investigate the
performance of EWS augmented with measures of financial connectivity and include 2008-2010
crises (not covered in [45]). Including the latest generation of crises – which account for 74 out of
430 country-years over 1978-2010 – is important because financial connectedness may arguably
have played a more important role during the most recent wave of crises compared to earlier
ones. Third, while we use less granular information than [86] and [105], who employ bank-level
information on syndicated loan contracts, our data gives a comprehensive view of cross-border
banking system exposures – of which syndicated loans are only one component. Finally, we
consider a wide range of network-based connectedness indicators – 27 distinct indicators – along
with their lags and growth rates up to five years prior to a crisis.
To construct the GBN we use annual data on cross-border banking system exposures from
the BIS locational statistics over 1978-2010. The BIS locational statistics have been used ex-
tensively to analyze geographical patterns in financial linkages [157, 107], financial integration
[120], and factors associated with capital flows [33, 32]. The data represent foreign exposures of
banks in BIS reporting countries vis-a-vis residents (borrowers) in all other countries. The data are
representative of banking activity in each location as reporting banks typically account for more
than 90 percent of total banking assets in each BIS reporting country. For each year we construct
a directed GBN with countries as “nodes” and cross-border exposures as “edges,” and compute
network indicators using both the binary and weighted versions of this network (defined in Section
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2.1).
Our analysis addresses several related, yet distinct, dimensions of systemic risk. The first
one is connectedness narrowly understood as direct exposures among economic agents (such as
financial systems or institutions). Connectedness matters for crisis incidence because the failure
of an economic agent can lead to the failure of another agent through this direct channel. An
indirect channel is contagion, by which an agent’s failure leads to panic among agents not directly
connected to him/her. It is difficult to empirically separate the effects of connectedness from those
of contagion. In this section, we take a view of connectedness that encompasses the two concepts
and refers to both direct and higher-order (indirect) exposures. We take this concept to the data
by mapping financial linkages across countries and extracting information from the pattern of
connections by means of network analysis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce the data,
describe the construction of the GBN and present discuss long-term trends in financial connectiv-
ity. We also describe the classification algorithm. In Section 6.3, we present the results, ranging
from simple correlations between connectivity and crises to the performance of the classification
algorithm and that of the regression analysis. In Section 6.4 we conclude. Additional results are
available in an online appendix.4 In this chapter, figures and tables are in the end of this chapter.
6.2 Data and Methods
6.2.1 Data Description
We use data from the BIS bilateral locational statistics – a component of the BIS international
banking statistics – that provide a comprehensive view of international banking transactions. The
4 The online appendix is available for download from www.camelia-minoiu.com/crisis-prediction-appendix.pdf. Ta-
bles and figures cited in the text are labelled “A” for this online appendix.
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data represent stocks of cross-border assets (such as loans, debt securities, and other assets) held by
banking systems in 210 countries during the 1978-2010 period. Similar to balance-of-payments
statistics, these data are defined on a locational basis, i.e., they capture exposures of reporting
banks in a given location regardless of their ownership structure [30, 31]. As such, the BIS loca-
tional statistics are useful for measuring financial integration across countries and territories (such
as off-shore financial centers) that report financial data. 5
The sample comprises 29 BIS reporting countries and 181 non-reporting countries. In what
follows, we refer to the former as “core” countries and to the latter as “periphery” countries. Note
that the core countries comprise advanced economies, emerging market countries, and several
offshore financial centers.6,7 The GBN is constructed solely on the basis of data from the core
countries. These countries also report liabilities, which we use to impute assets of periphery
countries vis-a-vis core countries. To understand how representative these data are of true global
linkages, we can imagine the full network as consisting of three layers: the links among core
countries, those between core and periphery countries, and those among periphery countries. Since
core countries report positions to the BIS, we observe the full extent of linkages within the core.
We similarly observe exposures of core countries vis-a-vis periphery countries. The liabilities of
core countries vis-a-vis periphery countries are used as the claims of periphery countries vis-a-vis
5 See Table A1 in the online appendix for a list of countries and territories included in our sample.
6 Countries are invited to report financial data to the BIS when their financial sector becomes large. In order to
minimize the effect of changes in sample composition on our results – due to countries starting to report to the BIS
at different points in time, or because some countries become independent states during the sample period – we also
experimented with a GBN based on data from the 13 core countries that report their claims continuously and the 175
countries that exist as independent entities since 1978, but the results were largely unchanged.
7 We use the “core” and “periphery” labels for the nodes in the GBN based on the structure of the data rather than a
formal core-periphery model. [180] shows that the international financial network underpinned by cross-country asset
holdings had a core-periphery structure before the global financial crisis.
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core countries, so we also observe linkages from the periphery toward the core.
It is important to note that we do not have data on linkages among periphery countries; in
other words, within-periphery connections are missing from the GBN. This data limitation should
be kept in mind when interpreting the results as our network variables may suffer from measure-
ment error and we cannot know if these errors are systematic. To date, data availability remains a
major problem in studies of global systemic risk (as discussed, for instance, in [48]). Nonetheless,
ours is a first attempt to utilize core countries’ liability-side data from the BIS locational statistics
to obtain as comprehensive a view as possible of cross-country banking linkages.8
The GBN is directed: a directed edge is created from country A to country B if country
A has non-zero claims vis-a-vis borrowers in country B. In the binary GBN, an edge exists if a
country has non-zero banking exposures vis-a-vis another country. The data for each year between
1978 and 2010 is modeled as a separate GBN.
In the analysis we consider two variants of the GBN with different edge weighting schemes.
The first one – the “baseline network,” used in the chapter – refers to edge weights given by log-
exposures divided by the log-product of GDPs within each pair of nodes. PPP-adjusted GDP data
come from the Penn World Tables (Mark 7.1). The advantage of this weighting scheme is that
banking system claims are scaled by the economic size of countries, which ensures that increases
in weighted indicators of connectedness are not driven solely by economic growth. The second
network – the “alternative network,” for robustness tests – uses real log-exposures as edge weights.
8 Exposures from asset- and liability-side data are not strictly comparable because the former refer to assets of
banking systems in core countries vis-a-vis residents in periphery countries, while the latter refer to assets of residents
in periphery countries vis-a-vis banks in core countries. This inconsistency is unlikely to affect our binary GBN,
but may lead to some measurement error in the weighted GBN. For purposes of our analysis, we need to obtain as
comprehensive a view of cross-country financial linkages as possible; therefore we prefer to use an imperfect measure
of periphery-core linkages rather than assume that they do not exist.
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(Weighted exposures are deflated using the US CPI.) The results based on the first GBN are largely
robust to using the alternative network. 9
6.2.2 Global Connectivity: Stylized Facts
We assess the extent and trend in global connectivity during 1978-2010 using selected indicators
of connectedness, complementing earlier work on the topological properties of the international
financial network [59, 157, 180]. (See Appendix Ap.2.1 for formal definitions of all network
indicators.) The GBNs for 1980 and 2007 are shown in Figure 6.1. The visualizations depict an
increase in global financial connectivity both in the full sample (top panels) and the core (lower
panels), with the latter showing a significantly denser network in 2007, before the global financial
crisis.
Figure 6.2 depicts network density and total exposures during 1978-2010. Network density
refers to the share of observed edges in the total number of possible edges, and ranges in the full
GBN between 5 percent at the beginning of the sample period and 12 percent in 2007. These
figures are markedly larger in the core network, with density rising from 17 percent in 1978 to 46
percent in 2007. While network density has increased continuously over the past three decades,
at an annual average rate of 3 percent, cross-border exposures have also risen, but almost three
times faster (at an annual average rate of 8 percent). At the peak of network density in 2007, total
cross-border exposures amounted to USD 90 trillion – about twice the size of global GDP.
Averages for our network indicators are reported in Table 6.1 at different points during the
sample period. The last column in the table shows the percent increase in each network indicator
between 1978 and 2010, indicating that financial integration – proxied by our rich set of intercon-
nectedness measures – has been on the rise since 1978. Average degree and strength, representing
9 See Tables A3, A7, Figure A5 in our online appendix.
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the number of financial partners and the magnitude of cross-border banking system exposures in
the GBN, exhibit the largest increases among all indicators, by a factor of 1.5 over 1978-2010.
Clustering coefficients capture the tightness of link formation around a node and are bounded
between 0 and 1. The clustering coefficients developed by [78] answer the following question:
Given that a node has connections to two neighbors, what is the probability that those neighbors
are also connected with each other (i.e., that they form a triangle)? For the 2000s the answer is 80
to 90 percent, which implies a high tendency for nodes to form triangles. The second clustering
coefficient we consider, proposed by [148], captures the effectiveness with which a node’s neigh-
bors are connected with one another and has also risen over the sample period. Overall, the rise in
average clustering coefficients – by between 59 and 85 percent during 1978-2010 – suggests that
not only has the number and intensity of bilateral financial links increased, but countries’ financial
neighbors have also become more tightly linked with one other.10
The next set of indicators refers to connectivity among a country’s neighbors. Average
nearest-neighbor degree (ANND) is the number of creditors or debtors that each country’s im-
mediate neighbors have. For instance, “out-out” ANND is the average number of creditors of a
creditor country. Similarly, “in-in” ANND is the average number of debtors of a debtor country.
ANNS indicators take into account the magnitude of exposures, too. All neighbor connectivity
indicators until 2007 and fall in the aftermath of the crisis.
Our last indicator is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI), a measure of market competi-
tion. Although this is not a network indicator, it helps assess the degree of portfolio diversification
in the GBN. The HHI, computed from the debtor countries’ perspective, is equal to the sum of
squared shares a country represents in its creditors’ portfolios. (For instance, if country A has 50
10 Recent work argues that clustering coefficients based on different triangle patterns in banking networks have dif-
ferent implications for systemic risk [192].
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percent of its liabilities vis-a-vis country B and 50 percent vis-a-vis country C, then A’s HHI is
equal to 0.5.) The HHI indicates a relative lack of concentration in the first half of the period, but
increases during the 1990s to levels of moderate concentration. By the end of the period the HHI
declines again, with debtor countries increasingly diversifying their pool of creditors. This trend
coincides with a period of high economic growth coupled with increased capital account openness
and financial system reform in many countries.
In sum, our network measures depict a general trend towards greater financial integration
during 1978-2007 – both in terms of countries’ direct connectivity and the tightness of their neigh-
bor networks. This trend was interrupted by the global financial crisis. But was this increased
financial integration higher than what would be expected conditional on the GBN’s observed den-
sity? To answer this question, for each year we generate a sample of 10,000 random networks
that have the same density as the GBN but we re-shuffle either (i) the location of the edges, or
(ii) the edge weights while keeping edge locations fixed (for a similar approach, see [79]). We
then compute, for each year, average network indicators (across nodes) in the random networks
and compare them to the observed ones. 11 We find that our observed GBNs are more “intercon-
nected” than expected, which indicates that the increase in financial integration observed during
1978-2010 is not merely the result of higher network density.12
6.2.3 Classification Algorithm
We first evaluate our connectedness measures’ effectiveness as early warning indicators with a data
mining method, namely a “classification algorithm.” The 27 indicators we consider are included
in the algorithm in levels lagged up to 5 years, and in growth rates computed over the past 1, 2,..,
up to 5 years (for a total of 270 indicators). We set up the GBN as a matrix whose rows corre-
11 See Figure A4 in our online appendix.
12 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this comparison.
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spond to country-year observations and whose columns correspond to (i) our set of network-based
indicators of connectedness, and (ii) the crisis incidence variable crisis. The crisis variable
takes value 1 if a systemic banking crisis occurred in the country during the specified year and
0 otherwise. (See Section 3.1 for the formal definition of systemic banking crises.) We run the
algorithm on the full set of crisis-years (rather than the onset of crises) to preserve the maximum
amount of variation in the data and improve the algorithms’ chances to learn from it.
The output of the classification algorithm is a series of association rules that describe re-
lationships between measures of connectedness and the probability of a crisis ([6]). Association
rules are of the form “If condition C holds over the network indicators, then the crisis variable
takes value 1.” The condition C can take the form `1 ≤ V1 ≤ u1 ∧ · · · ∧ `n ≤ Vn ≤ un (a
collection of sub-rules) where each Vi is a network indicator and the `i, ui’s are real numbers.
(Here all network indicators have real valued attributes.)
For an association rule to be acceptable, it needs to have a high confidence and a high
support. Confidence is the conditional probability P(crisis = 1|C), i.e., the share of correctly-
called crises. In most applications, the confidence is required to be above a pre-specified thresh-
old. However, confidence alone does not define “goodness” of an association rule because a rule
may have a high probability (e.g., probability of 1) with C being true just once and crisis
being true on that one occasion. In addition to confidence, we use support, which is defined as
|{r|r.crisis = 1 ∧ r.C}|where r is a row in the matrix described above, r.crisis is the value
of the crisis entry in row r and r.C is true iff row r satisfies condition C. Thus support is simply
the number of times (i.e., rows) for which both C and crisis = 1 are simultaneously true for a
given country-year pair. As in the case of confidence, support is required to exceed a threshold –
i.e., the two conditions must co-occur sufficiently many times – in order for the association rule to
be acceptable.
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We also require association rules to satisfy the property that “negative probability” be low
where negative probability is defined as P(crisis = 1|¬C). This computes the probability of
a crisis occurring when C is not true (the ¬ denotes negation). By ensuring that P(crisis =
1|¬C) is below a pre-specified threshold, we ensure that condition C acts like a “canary in a
coalmine.” When C is true it predicts a crisis with high probability - when it is not true, it predicts
a crisis with very low probability.
Algorithms like the one described here have been useful in a wide range of applications that
involve classification problems – that is, separating data into multiple buckets (e.g., two buckets,
one consisting of situations where some event occurred and one where the event did not occur).
For instance, classification algorithms have been used to predict whether some patients have breast
cancer [124], to explore associations among genes [65], and to predict upticks in terrorism [190].
In Internet research, classification algorithms are used to predict the category (e.g., sports vs.
politics) to which a webpage belongs, whether a particular email constitutes spam, and classifying
Internet traffic into various categories.
Although classification algorithms have not been used much in the economics literature,
there have been applications to finance. For instance, classification algorithms have been used to
predict individual stock movements [149], to classify individuals according to their credit scores
[14], and to separate buyer- from seller-initiated trades [164, 13, 76]. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first application to a macroeconomics question – the prediction of systemic banking
crises – one that is made possible by the availability of a large number of potential predictors
obtained through network analysis. Results based on the classification algorithm are presented in
Section 6.3.2.
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6.3 Results: Connectivity and Systemic Banking Crises
6.3.1 Exploring the Data: Conditional Correlations
Here we explore the ability of financial connectedness indicators to predict crises. We start by
examining whether network indicators display a different behavior before vs. after the onset of
a crisis. Crisis incidence data come from [139]. Systemic banking crises are defined as years in
which the banking sector exhibits significant distress and is subject to important policy interven-
tions – that is, at least three out of the five following interventions are present: public guarantees,
liquidity support, asset purchases, nationalizations, and large restructuring costs (for more details,
see [139, 140]). The number of systemic banking crises thus defined is shown in Figure 6.3 for
the 1978-2010 period. As shown in the figure, periphery countries account for most of the crises
that took place prior to the mid-2000s, while systemic events are roughly equally split between
core and periphery countries during 2007-2010.
To allow for the impact of connectedness on the likelihood of crises to be driven by global
and country-specific factors, we start by regressing the network indicators from our baseline GBN
against a full set of country and year dummies and obtain the residuals. We then plot these resid-
uals – averaged across all country-year observations – within a window of five years around the
onset of systemic banking crises. Figure 6.4 shows the evolution of selected network indicators
around banking crises after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity as described above. Note
that here we do not account for the impact of macroeconomic fundamentals (we do so in Section
3.3).
The three panels in Figure 6.4 present several notable patterns. In Panel 6.4a we notice that
degree and strength increase steeply before the onset of a crisis and level off subsequently. The
signal here is the rapid growth in interconnectedness captured by these simple network measures.
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The degree of clustering also rises before banking crises and peaks 1-2 years before their onset,
after which it begins to decline (Panel 6.4b). The pre-crisis decline in clustering reflects a lower
probability that a given country’s financial partners are connected, and suggests that there is tur-
bulence in the network right before the onset of a crisis. What happens to a country’s neighbor
connectedness before crises? Panel 6.4c shows that neighbor degree and strength decline 3-4 years
before the onset of a crisis. This suggests that there is link destruction among countries’ higher-
degree connections long before the onset of crises; and that the decline in neighbor connectivity
can also be informative about the arrival of a crisis.
In the panels of Figure 6.4 we also show a dotted line that captures most of the informa-
tion in our indicators. It represents the first principle component (henceforth labelled “1st PC”)
extracted from the variation in three groups of indicators through Principal Component Anal-
ysis (PCA). (See Appendix Ap.2.2 for details.) The first group of measures comprises degree
and strength indicators. The second group includes all the clustering coefficients (both binary
and weighted). The third one includes all the neighbor degree and strength indicators. The first
principal component (PC) generally explains between 80 and 90 percent of the variation in the un-
derlying indicators, and helps summarize the information from many variables into a single factor,
reducing the dimensionality of our data. Working with PCs instead of the full set of variables is
useful in an EWS if we wish to estimate parsimonious models.
Following this preliminary evidence that hints at the ability of financial connectedness to
predict crises, we next seek to strengthen our findings using the classification algorithm and re-
gression analysis.
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6.3.2 Results from the Classification Algorithm
We ran the classification algorithm on the baseline GBN for the full period (1978-2010) and two
sub-periods: 1978-2002, which covers first- and second-generation crises mainly affecting de-
veloping economies; and 2003-2010, which covers the latest wave of banking crises. Table 6.2
summarizes the in-sample performance of the algorithm in predicting crisis-years for the full sam-
ple and separately for core and periphery countries. For each sample and period, we report the
number of actual crises (column 1), the number of crises predicted by the algorithm (2), support
(3), precision (4), recall (5), and the number of sub-rules (6). Precision and recall are measures of
the performance of the algorithm. Precision is defined as the number of correctly predicted crises
divided by the number of predicted crises. It takes maximum value when are no “false alarms”
(Type 1 error is 0). Recall refers to the number of correctly predicted crises divided by the number
of actual crises. It attains a maximum when there are no “missed crises” (Type 2 error is 0).
For the sample of countries included in the baseline GBN there were 409 crisis-years during
1978-2010, of which more than 75 percent occurred before 2003. The algorithm produces 34
association sub-rules (Table 6.2, column 6) which we can combine into one giant rule to predict
crises.13 To give an example of several sub-rules, the algorithm yields that “A crisis will occur
in a given year if (i) out-degree at t − 3 is between 155 and 171 or (ii) the “in” BCC at t − 5 is
between 0.115 and 0.118 or (iii) in-strength at t−5 is between 63.5 and 66.5,” etc.(See the table in
Figure 6.6 for all the sub-rules generated by the algorithm for core countries during 2003-2010.)
The rules can be expressed by GAP (Generalized annotated program, [131]) directly. For example,
the gap rule for (i) would be simply crisis(c, t) : 1 ← outdegree(c, t − 3) : µ & µ ≥ 155 &
µ ≤ 171 where c is a country and t is a target year. The set of gap rules can be a diffusion and
13 Each association rule has the form crisis if C1,..., crisis if Cn. These rules can be combined into one large
rule crisis if C1 or · · · or Cn saying that a crisis occurs if any of the conditions C1, . . . , Cn is true.
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infection model for banking crises for countries.
Over the full period, precision is very high, reaching 94 percent for the full sample and 88
percent for core countries (column 4). Recall is relatively low at 11 percent for the full period,
but higher by subperiod: 94 percent for 1978-2002 and 40 percent for 2003-2010 (column 5).
Precision and recall are lower for core countries compared to periphery countries during the full
period, which may be partly due to the lower number of crisis-years experienced by advanced
economies overall, and hence the lower ability of the algorithm to learn about them from that
sample.14 By contrast, for the 2003-2010 period which mainly contains crises for core countries,
the algorithm has high precision and recall (0.85 and 0.83 respectively), thus performing quite
well in identifying crisis-years for the latest wave of banking crises.15
The consistently low Type 1 and Type 2 errors produced by the classification algorithm
add to our preliminary evidence that network-based measures of connectedness can serve as early
warning indicators. When we carefully examine the sub-rules, we notice that almost of all the
indicators considered are selected by the algorithm in some rule, but lagged levels show up more
frequently than lagged growth rates 16. In the next step, we use this information to construct a
relatively parsimonious empirical model that uses as covariates those indicators identified by the
algorithm as the most promising. Specifically, we estimate a regression-based EWS that controls
for standard macroeconomic fundamentals and adds measures of financial interconnectedness. To
keep the number of covariates manageable, we group the indicators into three categories – as in
14 Another reason is that four advanced economies that experienced crises during 2007-2008 are in fact part of our
periphery because we do not have cross-border exposure data for them.
15 Notice also that the algorithm produces a larger number of sub-rules when there is less variation in the data. This is
the case, for instance, in the full sample (1978-2002) and the subsample of periphery countries, which were more likely
to experience crises before 2003 but are also less interconnectedness due to the absence of within-periphery edges. For
these countries, network measures have less predictive content for banking crises.
16 See Table A4 in our online appendix for the frequency with which different indicators appear in sub-rules
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Figure 6.3 – and retain the first or two PCs from each group. Our rule for selecting the PCs is that
they have eigenvalues greater than one.
6.3.3 Results from Regression Analysis
We estimate a benchmark binary dependent variable model in the full sample of countries over
1978-2010. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value 1 for the onset of systemic
banking crises.17 We draw on the recent crisis prediction literature to specify a small set of key
macroeconomic fundamentals that have previously been identified as leading indicators of crises.
Specifically, we control for per capita income (at PPP), net foreign assets (in percentage of GDP),
foreign exchange reserves (in percentage of GDP), real exchange rate (RER) misalignment, and
periods of sustained capital inflows. RER misalignment is computed relative to the purchasing
power parity-implied real exchange rate and is further adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelson effect,
as in [175].
The net foreign asset and foreign exchange positions, as well as periods of RER overval-
uation are systematically associated with increased likelihood of currency and/or external crises
[121] while credit booms fueled by large capital inflows – captured in our model by a dummy
variable for capital flows bonanzas [173] – play a prominent role in the run-up to banking crises
[181, 7]). We also include a standard variable that allows for the possibility of contagion – a
dummy variable for at least one neighbor experiencing a crisis. Our regressors are a mixture of
variables that predict financial crises in general, since banking, currency, and debt crises often
occur together ([122]). All regressors are lagged one year.
Estimates from the benchmark model with macroeconomic fundamentals are reported in
17 Following [92], the dependent variable takes value 1 in the year of crisis onset, is set to missing for the subsequent
four years (as countries often lack access to international capital markets in the years of the crisis), and is 0 in non-crisis
years.
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Table 6.3 for the probit and logit estimators. We notice that the coefficients on the macroeconomic
characteristics have the expected signs across specifications: a more favorable net foreign asset
position and higher foreign exchange reserves are negatively associated with the likelihood of
crises. The probability of a banking crisis goes up when countries experience sustained periods of
high capital inflows or an overvalued RER and hence a loss of competitiveness. Having at least
one neighbor in crisis also raises the probability of the country itself experiencing a crisis – which
hints at the possibility of contagion.
While our preferred specifications do not include country or year fixed effects, for com-
pleteness we also show models with them. Country fixed effects control for omitted time-invariant
characteristics that may systematically drive a country’s predisposition towards crises. Year fixed
effects control for global shocks that may cause crises to cluster together (e.g., the 1997-1998
East Asian crises). Including these dummies leaves the coefficient estimates largely unchanged;
however, we see such models as less helpful for crisis prediction. One reason is that we cannot
anticipate future global shocks, so year fixed effects are unknown ex-ante. Another reason is that
estimated country fixed effects are not informative from a policy perspective because they do not
possess economic content. Furthermore, we wish to utilize all the information in our sample, in-
cluding from countries that have never experienced a crisis, which would be precluded if country
effects were added. As the probit vs. logit models yield similar results, in the remainder of the
analysis we only estimate probits and take as our baseline the model presented in column 4.18
To discriminate among competing crisis prediction models we can use a metric based on the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) [62, 80]. The ROC depicts the relationship between true
18 As a general check of model performance, we run Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the distributions of predicted
probabilities across crisis/non-crisis years. For each regression, we reject the null that the two samples of predicted
probabilities are drawn from the same distribution, which suggests that the models systematically yield different pre-
dicted probabilities across the two regimes (See Table A5).
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and false positives for a range of probability thresholds. The ROC lies above the 45-degree line
if the model generates crisis predictions that are superior to random guessing. According to this
criterion, the best model is the one that maximizes the area under the curve (AUROC). Random
guessing implies an AUROC of 0.5. Looking the AUROC estimates in Table 6.3, we notice that
they are in the 0.6-0.7 range, which is similar to the AUROCs obtained in recent studies of crisis
incidence [181, 118].
Next, we add measures of financial interconnectedness to the benchmark model. These are
the 1st and 2nd PCs extracted from our rich set of network indicators. In each specification we
add the chosen PCs based on all the lagged levels of the indicators as well as the one-year lagged
growth rates (labelled “growth”). The estimates are presented in Table 6.4. In column 1 we add the
PCs for a country’s own level of connectedness captured in degree, strength, and clustering. In the
richest specification (column 4) we add the PCs for neighbor connectedness as well as the HHI.
The coefficients on the degree/strength and clustering PCs are positive and statistically significant,
which suggests that an increase in a country’s own financial connectedness is associated with a
higher probability of crises one year later. By contrast, the coefficient on the neighbor connected-
ness PC is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a decline in the country’s neighbor
connectedness increases the probability of a crisis. A decline in neighbor connectedness may be
a sign that turbulence is occurring further out in the network and is ultimately transmitted to the
country in question through higher-degree connections.
How do the augmented probit models fare in terms of overall ability to predict crises? As
seen in Table 6.3 (column 4), the benchmark model has an AUROC of 0.703, which rises to 0.749
for the model augmented with all connectedness measures (Table 6.4, column 4). Compared to the
benchmark of a random guessing model which has an AUROC of 0.5, adding the network indica-
tors improves the predictive performance of the model by almost 23 percent. In addition, when we
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test the null hypothesis that the two AUROCs are equal, we reject it with 99 percent confidence
(p-value=0.001). The ROCs corresponding to these two models are shown in Figure 6.5. The
figure shows that the augmented-model ROC lies above the fundamentals-only ROC, especially
at high false positive rates, which are obtained by setting low probability thresholds to call crises.
Such low probability cutoffs would be chosen by policy-makers who prefer a higher positive rate
– i.e., to be alerted often even when there is no crisis – over missing crises. This implies that the
connectedness-augmented model may be particularly useful to conservative policymakers.
Having established that the augmented probit outperforms that based solely on macroeco-
nomic fundamentals, we next ask if there are nonlinearities in the effects of financial connected-
ness on the likelihood of systemic banking crises. The financial networks literature argues that
connectedness has a non-monotonic effect on network stability. At low levels of connectivity, ini-
tial shocks may not have a large impact on the network’s stability, but beyond a certain “threshold,”
such shocks – if they are large enough or sufficiently many – can lead to systemic instability [2, 9].
To examine this question, we estimate regressions that allow for our main connectedness measures
to have a different impact on the likelihood of crises at high/low levels of connectedness. We do so
by splicing the main variables into above/below median (for own connectedness PC and neighbor
connectedness PC) and top/bottom 25th percentile (for own clustering PC). The results, shown
in Table 6.5, provide some evidence of non-linearities: across specifications we notice that the
positive (negative) effect on crisis probability of own (neighbor) degree and strength is stronger in
the top range of the PC distributions. The same is the case for clustering, for which we find that
increases in clustering for countries that are in the top 25th percentile of the clustering distribution
are positively associated with crisis probability, but not for countries in the bottom 25th percentile
of the clustering distribution.
For policymaking purposes it may be also be useful to monitor a more parsimonious set
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of specifications as shown in Table 6.6. These are augmented probit models that include only
the 1st PC of our three groups of network measures: degree/strength, clustering, and neighbor
degree/strength. To unmask any underlying heterogeneity, we split the sample by country type
and also try to isolate the effects of interconnectedness on the likelihood of experiencing a crisis
solely after 2007. Table 6.6 estimates suggest that during the full period an increase in clustering
and a decrease in neighbor connectedness are associated with a higher probability of crisis in the
subsequent year, after controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals (column 1). This full sample
result is driven by core countries (column 3) while for periphery countries the coefficients on clus-
tering and neighbor connectedness PCs retain their signs but are less precisely estimated (column
2). This loss of statistical significance is not surprising as periphery countries are necessarily less
interconnected in the network due to the absence of within-periphery edges, so network indicators
such as clustering and neighbor connectivity are less relevant for them. Instead, for these coun-
tries, direct linkages – both in terms of number and intensity – seem to matter for the likelihood
of crisis.
To test whether interconnectedness has played a more pronounced role for the most recent
wave of crises, which occurred between 2007 and 2010, we replace the dependent variable with a
modified variable that takes value 1 only for post-2007 crises. This modified dependent variable
allows us to examine whether the recent crises were structurally different than earlier ones. The
results, shown in column 4, are telling: for the most recent crises, per capita GDP is positively
associated with crisis probability, unlike in the full period where poorer countries were more
likely to experience financial turmoil. As before, countries with higher net foreign asset positions
faced a lower probability of crisis, and countries with a higher degree of RER overvaluation also
had a higher probability of crisis. Finally, for the 2007-2010 wave of crises, all connectedness
measures matter – higher direct and indirect financial linkages increase the likelihood of distress
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in the banking sector.
6.3.4 In- and Out-of-Sample Performance
We conclude the analysis by examining the performance of our data mining and regression ap-
proaches in predicting the most recent wave of systemic banking crises. Nineteen high-income
countries and six emerging market countries experienced a crisis during 2007-2010.
We focus on crisis prediction for fourteen advanced economies listed in Table 6.7 for which
we have data on all variables. We notice that the classification algorithm correctly predicts in-
sample the onset of 5 out of the 14 systemic crises (column 1). The benchmark probit, which
exploits only lagged information about the state of the economy, generates relatively low in-sample
crisis probabilities (which is not unusual, as crises are relatively rare events), ranging from 2.6
percent for Denmark in 2008 to 10.2 percent for Greece in 2008 (column 3). For all but two
countries (Portugal and the US), these probabilities increase when we augment the probit model
with variables on financial connectedness. The starkest increase is for the UK, where the predicted
probability of a crisis rises from 5.5 to 26.4 percent between the benchmark and augmented model.
This result suggests that connectedness measures for most countries have substantial predictive
content. We find this plausible given the relative importance of these countries’ banking systems
in the GBN.
When both the algorithm and probit model are re-run on the subsample of core countries
over the 2003-2010 period, when connectedness may arguably have paid a more important role
as a conduit for financial stress, both techniques yield better in-sample performance. Now the
classification algorithm correctly identifies 11 of 14 onsets of crises (column 2); and the fitted
crisis probabilities are larger for both the benchmark and augmented probits (columns 5-6). The
augmented probit now consistently outperforms the benchmark model as it generates higher crisis
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probabilities for all crisis onsets during 2007-2008.
Continuing to focus on the latest wave of crises, we find that the classification algorithm
has a remarkable out-of-sample performance for core countries. Table 6.8 reports the precision
and recall associated with different crisis prediction windows. When k = 1, we look at the
performance of the algorithm in predicting the onset of a crisis in the year ahead; when k = 2
the window expands to include the following year, etc. We notice that recall is consistently high
across subsamples, which suggests that the algorithm misses few crisis onsets (columns 2, 4,
and 6). However, precision – the algorithm’s ability to not issue false alarms – is relatively high
only for the core countries (column 1). This hints at the fact that financial connectedness, not
surprisingly, is more useful for crisis prediction in core rather than periphery countries.19
One last piece of evidence on the out-of-sample performance of our methods is summarized
in Table 6.9, which lists the crises predicted by the algorithm for the 2006-2008 period (columns
1-3); as well as the probit’s out-of-sample predicted probabilities for the years 2007 and 2008
(columns 4-7). We find that the algorithm issues crisis alerts for Belgium, Ireland, The Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden in 2006 (and even earlier for some of these countries). It issues
a maximum number of alerts for the year 2007, but it does so correctly only for the US. In 2008,
the algorithm correctly anticipates 6 of the 14 crises in advanced economies.20
Looking at the augmented probit’s out-of-sample predicted probabilities, we note that they
are generally small: only those for the UK and the US are larger than 10 percent (column 5).
The augmented probit does not fare very well in predicting 2007 crises, with predicted crisis
probabilities for the UK and the US slightly above 2 percent (column 7). For this model to issue
19 Here we focused on the algorithm’s ability to predict all crisis-years, but it also does well in predicting the onset of
crises (see Table A2).
20 The algorithm also issues false alarms during this period, e.g., predicting banking crises in South Africa in 2006,
and in Canada in 2007-2008.
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a crisis alert in 2008 based on macroeconomic fundamentals, the policymaker would have had to
set a probability threshold of around 10 percent (column 4). With this threshold, the augmented
probit would have predicted systemic banking crises in 2008 in Ireland, Spain, the UK and the
US. Importantly, the out-of-sample probabilities do increase when the probit incorporates data on
financial interconnectedness.
6.4 Conclusions
It is widely believed that extensive financial linkages across countries have played an important
role in the severity and spread of the global financial crisis. In thischapter, we examined the
performance of financial interconnectedness as an early warning indicator for systemic banking
crises. To this end, we used data mining and econometric methods to examine the predictive
content of a rich set of network-based connectedness measures. We constructed these measures
using data on cross-border banking assets from a large sample of countries over the past four
decades.
Our results suggest that financial connectedness can predict crises. Higher levels of a coun-
try’s own connectedness – captured by simple indicators such as the number and intensity of its
financial ties in the global banking network – are associated with a higher probability of crises.
Lower connectivity among a country’s direct financial partners hints at turbulence in the network
and potential contagion, and it too is associated with a higher probability of crisis. We found ev-
idence of nonlinearities in that connectedness influences the probability of crises more at higher
levels of connectedness. A classification algorithm that searches for patterns in the data and as-
sociates levels and growth rates of network indicators with crisis incidence, has good ability to
predict the onset of crises. A probit model of crisis prediction generally yields higher crisis prob-
abilities, both in and out of sample, when it includes information on financial connectivity as
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opposed to macroeconomic factors alone.
We see these results as a first step towards exploiting the potentially rich informational con-
tent of network-based measures of financial connectivity for purposes of crisis prediction. While
our findings suggest that there is a useful amount of information in the measures we considered,
the list of indicators we used is by no means exhaustive. Future work could expand the scope of
the analysis. Our findings could further be probed on financial networks underpinned by different
types of cross-country linkages. Such work could result in improved early warning systems and
more lead time for designing appropriate policy responses.
Note. The material in Section 6 has been published in [156]. The authors agree that I made a






















































































































































































































































(d) Core network, 2007
Fig. 6.1: Global banking network in 1980 vs. 2007: Visualization of the baseline GBN for the largest 100 countries by GDP. Node color is proportional to GDP
(black is lower, red is higher). Edge weight is proportional with the intensity of the edge color (from light to dark green). In panels (a)-(b), the nodes on
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Fig. 6.2: Network density and total exposures: Network density is defined as the number of edges in the
GBN divided by the number of possible edges. Total exposures, representing cross-border banking
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Fig. 6.3: Number of systemic banking crises by country type: Number of crises by year and type of country
(periphery vs. core). “Core” countries are BIS-reporting countries. “Periphery” countries are the
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(c) Neighbor connectedness: Degree and strength
Fig. 6.4: Financial connectedness around systemic banking crises: The chart depicts average levels of se-
lected network indicators during 5 years before and after systemic banking crises (t=crisis).
The indicators are conditional on country and year fixed effects. The dotted line represents the
first principal component (labeled “1st PC”) extracted from each of the three groups of indicators
(see Section 3.1 and Appendix B for details).
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Fig. 6.5: ROCs for benchmark vs. augmented probit model: The chart shows the ROCs corresponding to
the benchmark probit model (Table 6.3, column 4) vs. the probit model augmented with principal
components extracted from network indicators (Table 6.4, column 4).
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1978 1985 1995 2007 2010 % increase 1978-2007
Degree and strength
Degree-in/out 9.3 12.2 15.4 23.7 23.5 154%
Strength-in/out 3.3 4.3 5.4 8.3 8.2 152%
Binary clustering coefficients
BCC Lopez-Fernandez 2004 0.56 0.66 0.85 0.89 0.89 59%
BCC Fagiolo 2007 (“cycle”) 0.49 0.59 0.78 0.89 0.89 84%
BCC Fagiolo 2007 (“middleman”) 0.49 0.59 0.78 0.90 0.89 82%
BCC Fagiolo 2007 (“in”) 0.53 0.62 0.78 0.88 0.88 66%
BCC Fagiolo 2007 (“out”) 0.51 0.61 0.80 0.89 0.89 75%
Weighted clustering coefficients
WCC Lopez-Fernandez 2004 0.23 0.27 0.36 0.37 0.36 64%
WCC Fagiolo 2007 (“cycle”) 0.18 0.21 0.28 0.32 0.32 85%
WCC Fagiolo 2007 (“middleman”) 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.33 0.32 83%
WCC Fagiolo 2007 (“in”) 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.31 64%
WCC Fagiolo 2007 (“out”) 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.32 78%
Average nearest neighbor degree and strength
ANND (out-in) 54.5 66.5 92.9 117.0 110.6 115%
ANND (out-out) 52.2 66.7 87.3 114.6 110.8 119%
ANND (in-in) 50.9 63.6 106.7 119.1 113.5 134%
ANND (in-out) 49.9 65.5 102.8 124.1 122.4 149%
ANNS (out-in) 19.9 24.6 33.5 42.0 39.5 111%
ANNS (out-out) 19.1 24.7 31.5 41.3 39.8 117%
ANNS (in-in) 18.2 22.8 37.9 43.1 40.4 136%
ANNS (in-out) 17.8 23.6 36.4 45.0 43.8 152%
Herfindahl-Hirschmann index
HHI 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.13 12%
Tab. 6.1: Average network indicators over time: The table reports average values (across nodes) for selected
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
Degree and strength-1st PC 0.200*** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.189***
(0.053) (0.049) (0.048) (0.054)
Degree and strength, growth-1st PC -0.003 0.002 -0.016 0.021
(0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.047)
Degree and strength, growth-2nd PC -0.001 0.001 0.009 0.059
(0.040) (0.042) (0.044) (0.062)
Clustering-1st PC 0.231*** 0.333*** 0.348*** 0.372***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.084)
Clustering-2nd PC 0.790 0.947* 0.914* 0.935*
(0.483) (0.489) (0.494) (0.487)
Clustering, growth-1st PC -0.003 -0.003 0.010 0.017
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
Clustering, growth-2nd PC -0.027 -0.033 -0.031 -0.002
(0.051) (0.053) (0.059) (0.059)
Neighbor connectedness-1st PC -0.189*** -0.205*** -0.218***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.051)
Neighbor connectedness, growth -1st PC -0.048 -0.062
(0.041) (0.040)






Observations 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368
AUROC 0.723 0.742 0.744 0.749
Tab. 6.4: Augmented probit results: The table reports the estimates of the benchmark probit model aug-
mented with principal components extracted from network indicators of financial connectivity.
The models are estimated on the full sample of countries over 1978-2010. The dependent variable
takes value 1 for the onset of a systemic banking crisis. All macroeconomic variables from Table
6.3 (column 4) and a constant are included, but the coefficients are as expected and not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** indicates statistical significance at 1 percent,
** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent.
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(1) (2) (3)
Degree and strength-1st PC * Above median 0.318*** 0.378*** 0.180**
(0.088) (0.104) (0.075)
Degree and strength-1st PC * Below median 0.014 0.185** 0.188
(0.015) (0.075) (0.125)
Degree and strength, growth-1st PC -0.022 0.002 -0.016
(0.032) (0.039) (0.044)
Degree and strength, growth-2nd PC -0.027 0.002 0.009
(0.037) (0.043) (0.044)
Clustering-1st PC * Above p75 0.158** 0.202*
(0.079) (0.105)
Clustering-1st PC * Between p25 and p75 0.001 0.017
(0.053) (0.054)
Clustering-1st PC * Below p25 0.066 -0.085
(0.140) (0.159)
Clustering-2nd PC 0.892* 0.828*
(0.494) (0.467)
Clustering, growth-1st PC -0.009 0.003
(0.011) (0.017)
Clustering, growth-2nd PC -0.037 -0.031
(0.055) (0.058)
Neighbor connectedness-1st PC * Above median -0.171***
(0.062)
Neighbor connectedness-1st PC * Below median 0.126
(0.141)
Neighbor connectedness, growth-1st PC -0.041
(0.040)
Neighbor connectedness, growth-2nd PC -0.015
(0.043)
Observations 3,524 3,368 3,368
AUROC 0.720 0.729 0.751
Tab. 6.5: Augmented probit results (non-linearities): The table reports estimates of the augmented probit
models presented in Table 6.4 in which we splice each of the 1st PC of the three groups of network
indicators into two or three variables to detect nonlinearities. Degree/strength and neighbor de-
gree/strength 1st PCs are spliced above and below the median; the clustering coefficient 1st PC is
spliced into three variables: top 75th percentile, bottom 25th percentile, and middle portion. The
dependent variable takes value 1 for the onset of a systemic banking crisis. The models are esti-
mated over 1978-2010 on the full sample. All macroeconomic variables, the HHI, and a constant
are included, but the coefficients are as expected and not shown. Standard errors are clustered at
the country level. *** indicates statistical significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10
percent.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Periphery Core Core, Alt DV
Log-per capita GDP -0.069** -0.138*** 0.526 5.174***
(0.034) (0.041) (0.339) (1.926)
Net foreign assets/GDP -0.095* -0.105* -0.776** -2.492**
(0.058) (0.063) (0.350) (1.119)
Capital inflows bonanza 0.382*** 0.326*** 0.584** 0.474
(0.097) (0.108) (0.244) (0.581)
Forex reserves/GDP -0.014*** -0.010** -0.073** -0.027
(0.005) (0.004) (0.035) (0.048)
RER misalignment 1.087** 0.949* 6.532*** 5.421**
(0.490) (0.485) (2.128) (2.714)
At least 1 neighbor in crisis 0.202** 0.245** -0.381 0.652
(0.091) (0.097) (0.271) (0.720)
Degree and strength-1st PC 0.028 0.307** 0.037 0.333**
(0.018) (0.131) (0.040) (0.132)
Clustering-1st PC 0.128** 0.034 1.027*** 4.513***
(0.055) (0.106) (0.244) (1.101)
Neighbor connectedness-1st PC -0.134** -0.095 -1.520*** -7.683***
(0.053) (0.076) (0.391) (2.018)
Observations 3,949 3,409 540 540
AUROC 0.722 0.738 0.831 0.983
Tab. 6.6: Augmented probit results (parsimonious version): The table reports estimates of a more parsimo-
nious version of the augmented probit model presented in Table 6.4 in which we retain only the
1st PC of each group of network indicators. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable takes value 1
for the onset of a systemic banking crisis. The models are estimated over 1978-2010 on the full
sample (column 1), periphery countries (column 2) and core countries (column 3). In column 4
the dependent variable is modified to take value 1 only for the 2007-2010 crises. A constant is
included, but the coefficient is not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***
indicates statistical significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Algorithm Probit
Full Core Full Core
Benchmark Augmented Benchmark Augmented
Belgium 2008 2008 3.5% 11.5% 3.0% 6.4%
Denmark 2008 2008 2.6% 3.9% 1.4% 2.4%
Germany 2008 3.7% 15.3% 3.6% 7.9%
Greece 2008 10.2% 12.5% 23.1% 26.7%
Ireland 9.3% 10.7% 19.9% 36.2%
Italy 2008 4.1% 5.8% 6.0% 12.1%
Luxembourg 2008 2008 . . . .
Netherlands 2008 . . . .
Portugal 2008 5.0% 2.9% 10.8% 16.8%
Spain 2008 10.1% 17.3% 23.2% 48.5%
Sweden 3.5% 3.7% 4.4% 6.2%
Switzerland 2008 2008 . . . .
United Kingdom 2007 2007 5.5% 26.4% 19.6% 44.1%
United States 5.7% 2.4% 24.4% 26.1%
Tab. 6.7: Classification algorithm and probit model in-sample performance: The table summarizes the in-
sample performance of the classification algorithm and probit models, focusing on the 2007-2008
crises. The algorithm and probits are run, respectively, on the full sample (1978-2010) and core
country subsample (2003-2010). Columns 1-2 report the year in which the algorithm predicts
a crisis. Columns 3-6 report predicted crisis probabilities from the benchmark and augmented
probits; missing values refer to countries for which data on at least one macroeconomic variable
is missing. 219
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Core Full Periphery
k-year ahead prediction Precision Recall Precision Recall Precision Recall
k=0 0.12 0.50 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.17
k=1 0.26 0.64 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.25
k=2 0.37 0.71 0.06 0.42 0.03 0.33
k=3 0.44 0.71 0.09 0.46 0.05 0.42
k=4 0.49 0.71 0.10 0.50 0.07 0.58
k=5 0.53 0.71 0.13 0.58 0.08 0.58
Tab. 6.8: Classification algorithm out-of-sample performance: The table summarizes the out-of-sample
performance of the classification algorithm in predicting the onset of crises for the full sample,
core, and periphery countries. The algorithm is run on the 2003-2010 period. The measures of
performance are precision (correctly predicted crises/total predicted crises) and recall (correctly
predicted crises/total actual crises).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Algorithm Probit
Benchmark Augmented Benchmark Augmented
2008 2007 2006 2008 2007
Belgium xx x x 0.7% 1.1% 0.1% 0.3%
Denmark xx x 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1%
Germany x 0.8% 1.4% 0.1% 0.3%
Greece 4.9% 4.2% 3.0% 1.9%
Ireland xx x x 5.8% 10.1% 0.1% 0.4%
Italy 0.9% 1.5% 0.2% 0.4%
Luxembourg . . . .
Netherlands x x . . . .
Portugal x 1.3% 1.6% 0.3% 0.7%
Spain xx x x 5.6% 12.1% 1.3% 2.0%
Sweden xx x x 0.9% 1.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Switzerland xx x . . . .
United Kingdom 10.9% 20.0% 0.9% 2.3%
United States xx 12.9% 12.0% 1.4% 2.4%
Tab. 6.9: Classification algorithm and probit model out-of-sample performance: The table summarizes the
out-of-sample performance of the classification algorithm and probit models, focusing on the
2007-2008 crises. In columns 1-3, “x” marks a predicted crisis in the year given by the column
heading. “xx” marks crisis predictions that are accurate. Columns 4-7 report crisis probabilities
predicted for the years 2007 and 2008 by the benchmark and augmented probits. Both the algo-
rithm and the probits are run on the core country subsample on a rolling basis, i.e., over 1978-2006
for 2007 prediction, and over 1978-2007 for 2008 prediction.
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Fig. 6.6: Classification algorithm - Examples of rules. The table reports examples of sub-rules generated
by the classification algorithm when run on the subsample of core countries over 2003- 2010





ANND (in-in) growth rate t-3 0.01589 0.02977
ANND (in-out) growth rate t-5 0.04853 0.06859
ANND (out-in) growth rate t-1 0.00744 0.01215
ANND (out-out) growth rate t-2 0.01424 0.01991
ANNS (in-out) growth rate t-5 0.09538 0.10602
BCC Fagiolo 2007 ("cycle") level t-3 0.18191 0.19096
BCC Lopez-Fernandez 2004 growth rate t-5 -0.28473 -0.22316
HHI level t-5 0.00583 0.00607
HHI level t-4 0.00574 0.00597
HHI level t-1 0.00570 0.00581
HHI level t-2 0.00571 0.00585
In-degree growth rate t-5 0.02041 0.03529
In-degree level t-5 167.00 174.00
In-degree level t-4 170.00 177.00
In-strength level t-5 63.51 66.46
In-strength level t-4 64.05 68.03
In-strength level t-3 65.10 68.58
In-strength level t-2 66.33690 68.57583
AN-in growth rate t-3 -0.00229 0.00408
AN-in level t-5 0.91924 0.96267
Out-degree level t-3 154.00 171.00
WCC Fagiolo 2007 ("cycle") level t-3 0.06724 0.06957
WCC Fagiolo 2007 ("middleman") level t-3 0.06822 0.07180





Below we provide details on the diffusion models used in the experimental evaluation.
The Flickr model consists of the following rule
p(v) : µv′,v × µp × µq × dpF ← e(v′, v) : µv′,v ∧ p(v′) : µp ∧ q(v′) : µq
saying that if vertex v′ has properties q and p then it can diffuse property p to its neighbor v. The
value dpF is a constant representing the probability that the vertex v will receive property p.
The Jackson-Yariv model is a diffusion model stating that a vertex will receive (adopt) a
property p according to the cumulative effect of its neighbors and the ratio of the benefit to the
cost of the vertex for adopting p. Suppose that vi is an agent having a default behavior that can
be changed in the new behavior p, and that vi has specific cost ci and benefit bi for adopting the










× wq × dpJY ←∧
vj |(vj ,vi)∈E
(
e(vj , vi) : Ej ∧ p(vj) : wj
)




j Ej) is a function describing how the number of neighbors of vi affects the benefits to





is the fraction of the neighbors of vi having property p, and
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3. dpJY is a constant representing the probability that the vertex v will adopt the property p.
In our experiments we set the function r(
∑
j Ej) to be a logarithmic function normalized by the
logarithm of the maximum in-degree dinmax of the network, and having values within the interval
[0.1, 2], i.e., r(
∑





+ 0.1. When the annotation µ of an atom p(v), with
v ∈ V , becomes greater than 1, then we set µ = 1. Moreover, observe that the vertex vi can adopt
property p only if it also has property q.
For the STEAM data, we set bici = 1 for all vertices, while for the Non-Game Social Network





The SIR model is a classic disease model which labels each vertex with susceptible if it
has not had the disease but can receive it from one of its neighbors, infectious if it has caught the
disease and t units of time have not expired, and recovered when the vertex can no longer catch or
transmit the disease. The diffusion rules are following
p(v) :(1−R)× µev′,v × µ
p
v′ × (1−R
′)× µqv × dpSIR ←
rt(v) : R ∧ e(v′, v) : µev′,v ∧ p(v′) : µ
p
v′ ∧ rt(v
′) : R′ ∧ q(v) : µqv
ri(v) :µ
r
v ← ri−1(v) : µrv, i ∈ [2, t]
r1(v) :µ
p
v ← p(v) : µpv
Here, only the vertices having property q can be susceptible and the diffusion property p
represents that a vertex is infected. Properties ri (i 6= t) express that the vertex is in the infectious
state at time t− 1 and rt means that the vertex is recovered. In our experiments, we set t = 2. The
constant dpSIR is the probability that the vertex v will be infected.
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Ap.1.2 STEAM Data Runtime
(a) STEAM Data: Runtime of HyperDC algorithm for Exact Diffusion Centrality computation with Flickr,
Jackson-Yariv, and SIR diffusion models compared with Classical Centrality Measures Averaged Per
Vertex when δq ∈ {1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%}.
●
Centrality
DC−FK DC−JY DC−SIR PageRank Closeness Betweenness Degree
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(b) STEAM Data: Runtime of HyperDC algorithm for Exact Diffusion Centrality computation with Flickr,
Jackson-Yariv, and SIR diffusion models compared with Classical Centrality Measures Averaged Per
Vertex when δq ∈ {1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%}. Detailed view of part of part (a).
●
Centrality
DC−FK DC−JY DC−SIR PageRank Degree





























































































































Fig. Ap.1: STEAM Data Runtime
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Fig. Ap.2: STEAM Data: p-values of T-test for runtimes of each centrality measure and HyperDC algo-
rithm. When p-value is less than or equal to 0.5, the cell color is green.
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Flickr 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017
Jackson-Yariv 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.027 0.033 0.043 0.047 0.058 0.065 0.069
SIR 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Flickr 0.004 0.082 0.890 0.333 0.121 0.030 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017
Jackson-Yariv 0.775 0.328 0.329 0.337 0.331 0.320 0.302 0.288 0.250 0.226
SIR 0.021 0.923 0.129 0.041 0.022 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.012
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Flickr 0.010 0.140 0.977 0.284 0.105 0.029 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017
Jackson-Yariv 0.857 0.319 0.328 0.337 0.331 0.320 0.302 0.288 0.250 0.226
SIR 0.044 0.802 0.112 0.037 0.020 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.012
Model
T-Test, Betweenness and Diffusion centrality runtimes in STEAM networks
p-value when % of vertices having condition property q is
T-Test, Degree and Diffusion centrality runtimes in STEAM networks
Model
p-value when % of vertices having condition property q is
T-Test, PageRank and Diffusion centrality runtimes in STEAM networks
Model
p-value when % of vertices having condition property q is
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Ap.1.3 Spread for Non-Game Social Network Data
Tab. Ap.1: Non-Game Social Network Data, Case 1: Average ratio of the spread generated by diffusion
centrality to the best spread generated by any of the classical centrality measures for different
δq .
Average ratio of the DC spread to the best spread of other centrality measures for different δq .
Model Network 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
FlickrModel Douban-dataset 56.2 14.3 31.6 18.0 8.1 4.9 3.7 2.7 2.1 1.9
BlogCatalog-dataset 3.9 2.9 2.6 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
email-Enron 5.3 3.0 2.6 3.5 3.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4
email-EuAll 240.1 6.1 4.4 4.3 6.3 3.3 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.2
soc-Epinions 36.7 11.4 6.5 4.2 3.8 3.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.7
wiki-Vote 9.2 13.5 2.0 4.1 2.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3
Average 58.6 8.5 8.3 5.9 4.3 2.9 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
JYModel Douban-dataset 4.8 3.8 2.9 2.6 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1
BlogCatalog-dataset 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
email-Enron 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0
email-EuAll 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
soc-Epinions 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
wiki-Vote 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
Average 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
SIRModel Douban-dataset 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
BlogCatalog-dataset 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
email-Enron 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
email-EuAll 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
soc-Epinions 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
wiki-Vote 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Average 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
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Tab. Ap.2: Non-Game Social Network Data, Case 1: Average ratio of the spread generated by diffusion
centrality to the best spread generated by any of the classical centrality measures for different k.
Average ratio of the DC spread to the best spread of other centrality measures for different k.
Model Network 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
FlickrModel Douban-dataset 20.8 25.4 17.2 17.6 14.7 10.4 9.2 9.4 9.4 9.4
BlogCatalog-dataset 3.2 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
email-Enron 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0
email-EuAll 73.0 82.9 86.9 6.0 5.7 5.4 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.3
soc-Epinions 11.7 10.8 9.0 8.5 8.6 5.8 5.5 4.8 4.8 4.7
wiki-Vote 5.2 5.9 4.7 4.8 4.6 3.8 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3
Average 19.6 21.7 20.4 6.9 6.3 4.9 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.9
JYModel Douban-dataset 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2
BlogCatalog-dataset 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
email-Enron 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
email-EuAll 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3
soc-Epinions 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
wiki-Vote 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Average 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
SIRModel Douban-dataset 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
BlogCatalog-dataset 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
email-Enron 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
email-EuAll 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
soc-Epinions 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
wiki-Vote 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Average 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
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Tab. Ap.3: Non-Game Social Network Data, Case 2: Average ratio of the spread generated by diffusion
centrality to the best spread generated by any of the classical centrality measures for different δp
values.
Average ratio of the DC spread to the best spread of
other centrality measures for different δp .
Model Network 0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5%
FlickrModel Douban-dataset 124.0 145.3 123.9 127.6 129.7 14.7
BlogCatalog-dataset 383.3 392.1 6.7 5.0 2.0 7.6
email-Enron 198.7 245.3 224.5 226.1 3.0 2.2
email-EuAll 181.1 236.1 194.1 205.1 251.8 7.2
soc-Epinions 266.1 227.3 222.3 232.4 208.0 8.5
wiki-Vote 106.9 119.5 112.6 106.0 5.3 8.3
Average 210.0 227.6 147.3 150.4 100.0 8.1
JYModel Douban-dataset 4.4 5.1 4.7 5.2 5.4 2.7
BlogCatalog-dataset 3.4 3.4 3.4 1.9 1.1 1.0
email-Enron 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 1.9 1.1
email-EuAll 3.5 3.9 4.4 4.1 3.7 1.6
soc-Epinions 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4 1.4
wiki-Vote 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.3
Average 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.7 2.9 1.5
SIRModel Douban-dataset 9.4 21.0 10.2 12.6 14.6 1.6
BlogCatalog-dataset 26.5 26.7 24.4 24.5 1.5 1.0
email-Enron 26.5 26.5 28.6 29.8 27.2 1.0
email-EuAll 22.5 31.0 38.8 34.0 25.5 1.5
soc-Epinions 25.3 23.8 24.0 24.2 25.0 1.3
wiki-Vote 6.3 6.2 6.4 6.4 6.8 1.0
Average 19.4 22.5 22.1 21.9 16.8 1.2
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Tab. Ap.4: Non-Game Social Network Data, Case 2: Average ratio of the spread generated by diffusion
centrality to the best spread generated by any of the classical centrality measures for different k
values.
Average ratio of the DC spread to the best spread of other centrality measures for different k.
Model Network 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
FlickrModel Douban-dataset 963.2 23.8 20.9 16.9 16.8 16.6 13.4 12.3 12.3 12.1
BlogCatalog-dataset 1298.9 8.9 4.2 3.3 2.6 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7
email-Enron 1466.8 6.6 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.7
email-EuAll 1743.6 9.3 8.8 5.9 5.4 4.5 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.2
soc-Epinions 1895.9 8.7 6.2 5.3 5.0 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8
wiki-Vote 724.8 9.9 6.7 4.8 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.5
Average 1348.9 11.2 8.5 6.7 6.2 5.7 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.3
JYModel Douban-dataset 18.9 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8
BlogCatalog-dataset 14.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
email-Enron 32.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
email-EuAll 21.2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
soc-Epinions 16.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4
wiki-Vote 4.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3
Average 18.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
SIRModel Douban-dataset 101.7 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7
BlogCatalog-dataset 165.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
email-Enron 223.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
email-EuAll 242.4 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
soc-Epinions 195.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1
wiki-Vote 45.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Average 162.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
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Ap.1.4 Table of Notations
Notations for social networks
Symbol Explanation Section
VP Set of vertex predicate symbols, also called properties 2.1
EP Set of edge predicate symbols 2.1
S Social Network (SN), which is a tuple (V,E,VL, ω) 2.1
V Set of vertices 2.1
E Set of (labeled) edges; E ⊆ V × V × EP 2.1
VL(v) Set of properties of vertex v; VL(v) ⊆ VP 2.1
ω(e) Weight of edge e 2.1
Notations for generalized annotated programs
Symbol Explanation Section
A : µ Annotated atom, where A is an atom and µ is an annotation term 2.1
Π Generalized annotated program (GAP) 2.1
ΠS GAP representing SN S 2.1
grd(r) Set of ground instances of rule r 2.1
grd(Π) Set of all ground instances of all rules in GAP Π 2.1
TΠ Operator mapping an interpretation of GAP Π to another interpretation of Π 2.1
lfp(Π) Least fixed point of TΠ 2.1
Notations for diffusion centrality
Symbol Explanation Section
dc(v) Diffusion centrality of vertex v 2.1
p Diffusive property 2.1
S ⊕ p(v) Insertion of p(v) into SN S 2.1
S 	 p(v) Removal of p(v) from SN S 2.1
DCP Problem of finding the DC of all vertices 2.1
kDCP Problem of finding a set of k vertices having the highest DC 2.1
HyperLFP Algorithm to compute the least fixed point of a GAP 2.1
HyperDC Algorithm to solve DCP 2.1
CBAF Algorithm to approximately solve kDCP 3.2
Notations for optimizations
Symbol Explanation Section
dep(Π) Dependency graph of GAP Π 2.1
RΠ,p Set of predicate symbols that can reach property p in dep(Π) 2.1
MΠ,p Set of predicate symbols that are mutually recursive with property p in dep(Π) 2.1
IΠ,p p-interfered predicate set 2.1
Πp {r ∈ Π | the head predicate symbol of r belongs to RΠ,p} 2.1
Π∗p {r ∈ Πp | every predicate symbol q in the body of r is s.t. q /∈ IΠ,p} 2.1
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Notations for the HyperLFP and HyperDC algorithms
Symbol Explanation Section
h Hyperedge, i.e., a pair 〈S, t〉 where S is the source set of vertices and t is the target vertex 2.1
H Set of hyperedges 2.1
S(h) Source set of hyperedge h 2.1
t(h) Target vertex of hyperedge h 2.1
H(S,Π, p) Diffusion hypergraph for SN S, GAP Π, and property p 2.1
Notations for the CBAF algorithm
Symbol Explanation Section
SC Coarsened network 3.2
TC Top-k vertices in SC having highest DC 3.2
SIM Vertex similarity function in network coarsening 3.2
mergeVP Vertex properties merging function in network coarsening 3.2
weight Edge weight function in network coarsening 3.2
π Mapping from vertices of S to vertices of SC 3.2
θ ∈ (0, 1] Contraction factor in network coarsening 3.2
ρ ∈ (0, 1] Neighbors threshold in network coarsening 3.2
mvw Merged vertex weight function for SC 3.2
dC Neighbors distance for extending TC 3.2
dI Neighbors distance for extending π−1(TC) 3.2
Notations for the experimental evaluation
Symbol Explanation Section
δp % of vertices having property p 2.1
δq % of vertices having property q 2.1
seeds Top-k vertices to which the diffusive property p is assigned 2.1
ratiotime Ratio of the runtime of CBAF to the runtime of HyperDC 2.1
ratiospread Ratio of the spread of CBAF to the spread of HyperDC 2.1
Tab. Ap.5: Notations
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Ap.2 Systematic Banking Crises prediction
Ap.2.1 Network Indicator Definitions
This appendix provides formal definitions for the network indicators employed in the analysis.
Consider a weighted directed network G = (V,E,w) where:
– V is a finite set of nodes (countries)
– E ⊆ V × V is a finite set of directed edges
– w : E → [0, 1] assigns a weight to each edge.
Edge weights represent log-transformed real cross-border banking exposures (scaled by
the log-product GDP of the two nodes in the baseline network; and unscaled in the alternative
network). In what follows, adjacent nodes of a node v are given by Nv = N inv ∪ Noutv where
N inv = {v′|w(v′, v) > 0} and Noutv = {v′|w(v, v′) > 0} and bv,v′ = 1 if w(v, v′) > 0 and 0
otherwise. We compute the following network indicators:
1. In-degree and Out-degree. The in-degree of a node v is denoted dinv and represents the total
number of a node’s creditors. The out-degree of a node v is denoted doutv and represents the









2. In-strength and Out-strength. The in-strength of a node v is denoted strin(v) and refers
to the total weight of in-coming edges (a node’s liabilities). The out-strength of a node v











3. Ain and Aout. These are measures of in-strength and out-strength that are normalized by









4. AN in and ANout. These indicators denote the average Ain and Aout values normalized













5. Average nearest node degree (ANND). The ANND denotes the average in-degree (or out-


























6. Average nearest node strength (ANNS). The ANNS denotes the average in-strength (or out-





















7. Binary and weighted local clustering coefficients. We use two types of clustering coeffi-










|Nv| × (|Nv| − 1)
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w(v, v′)w(v′, v′′)w(v, v′′)
doutv × (doutv − 1)
where d↔v = |N inv ∩Noutv | as defined in [78]. See online appendix for a graphical represen-
tation of the triangle taxonomies.
8. Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI). This is the standard measure of competition or market
power concentration from the international organization literature and is not strictly a net-
work indicator. The HHI helps gauge the degree of diversification (or concentration) of a












Group of indicators List of indicators
1) Degree and strength
1-period lagged levels: din, dout
1st PC: 90.8 percent strin, strout
Ain, Aout
1-period lagged growth rates: AN in, ANout
1st PC: 43.5percent
2nd PC: 32.0 percent
2) Clustering
1-period lagged levels: BCC1, [148]
1st PC: 88.3 percent WCC1, [148]
2nd PC: 7.0 percent BCC2Cycle, [78]
1-period lagged growth rates: BCC2Middleman, [78]
1st PC: 69.0 percent BCC2In, [78]






1-period lagged levels: ANNDin,in
1st PC: 89.7 percent ANNDout,in
ANNDin,out
1-period lagged growth rates: ANNDout,out
1st PC: 58.1 percent ANNSin,in
2nd PC: 36.8 percent ANNSout,in
ANNSin,out
ANNSout,out
Ap.2.2 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
We group 26 network indicators into three groups – degree and strength, clustering, and neigh-
bor connectedness – and extract the first and second principal components (1st PC and 2nd PC)
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